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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Cable median barrier crashes from a total of 12 states were analyzed. Crash data included 
scene diagrams, photographs, and field measurements, crash narratives, although the availability 
of data in each crash varied. 
Major contributors to penetration crash propensity were identified:  diving underride, in 
which the front end of the vehicle dropped below the bottom cable; prying, in which the vehicle 
profile caused cable separation or lifting; override; bouncing override, in which the vehicle 
rebounded after contact with the back slope and bounced over the top of the barrier; system 
failure, in which one component failure or design failure prevented the cables from adequately 
engaging the vehicle; and large vehicle crashes, such as tractor trailers, buses, and single-unit 
trucks into TL-3 systems. 
Major contributors to rollover were identified:  steep median slopes, in which the slope 
caused unstable bouncing or abrupt changes in slope profiles acted as trip points for the tires; 
broadside skid, in which the vehicle was skidding with a sideslip angle of nearly 90 degrees prior 
to contact with the barrier; contact with post, in which the post acted as a trip point; and other 
factors such as towing trailer units, median anomalies, or with large vehicles such as tractor-
trailers, buses, or motor homes. 
Recommended improvements to cable median barrier systems included:  minimum top 
cable height of 35 in. (890 mm); maximum top cable height of 15 in. (381 mm); minimum of 4 
cables supported by posts; higher lateral cable-to-post attachment strength at bottom and lower 
strength at top; low strong-axis strength post sections; and to eliminate cable entrapment in a 
vertical slot in the post when initial cable contact occurs at a post location. 
A summary of factors and how they contributed to penetration, rollover, and severe crash 
probability is shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Major Conclusions, Cable Median Barrier Systems 
 
Penetration Rollover Severe Crashes
Clear, Dry Increase Increase Increase
Rain/Snow Decrease Decrease Decrease
Generic 3-Cable Lowest Highest Lowest
Brifen TL-3 Unk Low Moderate
CASS TL-3 High High Moderate
CASS TL-4* Moderate High Moderate
Nucor TL-3 at 15' Post Spacing High Moderate High
Nucor TL-4* Moderate Unk Moderate
Safence* Unk High Low
Gibraltar* High Unk Low
Winter Lowest Lowest Lowest
Summer Highest Highest Highest
Flatter than 10:1 High Moderate Unk
10:1-8:1 Low Moderate Unk
8:1-6:1 Lowest Lowest Unk
Steeper than 6:1 Higher at Steeper Slopes Higher at Steeper Slopes Unk
Near Shoulder High Highest Highest
On Approach Slope/Back Slope Moderate Moderate Moderate
Center of Median Highest Lowest Lowest
Below 20 Degrees Low Moderate Low
20-40 Degrees Moderate Moderate Moderate
Above 40 Degrees High High High
Greater than Velocity Vector Highest Moderate High
Similar to Velocity Vector Moderate Low Moderate
Less than Velocity Vector* Low Moderate Unk
Small/Mid-Size Car Moderate Low Low
Large Car High Lowest Moderate
SUV Moderate Highest Moderate
Pickup Moderate High Low
Van Moderate High High
Large Truck/Tractor Trailer High High Very High
Heavier than Average High Low No Effect
Approximately Average Moderate Moderate No Effect
Lighter than Average Low High No Effect
Higher than Average High Low Unk
Approximately Average Moderate Moderate Unk
Lower than Average Low High Unk
* Data not statistically significant.  Actual average result may vary from what is shown.
** Data was collected relative to TL-3 Nucor NU-CABLE system with 15 ft post spacing.
Vehicle Type
Vehicle Weight Relative to Type of Vehicle (i.e. cars, utility vehicles)
Vehicle Roll and Yaw Moments of Inertia Relative to Type of Vehicle (i.e. cars, utility vehicles)
System Type
Season
Wide Median Approach Slopes**
Barrier Placement
CG Velocity Vector
Orientation Angle
Effect of Factor on Rate of
Factor
Weather/Road Conditions
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2 INTRODUCTION 
2.1 Problem Statement 
A cross-median crash is the most severe type of run-off-road event in the United States. 
Cross-median crashes represent approximately 2% to 5% of all divided interstate crashes; yet 
fatalities and serious injuries occur in as much as 30% of these crashes. With the significantly 
disproportionate number of severe crashes occurring due to cross-median crash events, many 
states have turned to cable median barriers to reduce the risk of these types of severe crashes. 
Cable median barriers have been extensively studied to determine the cost-effectiveness 
of installation, in-service performance, rates of severe injury and fatality reduction, and 
maintenance and post-impact performance evaluation. For examples of these studies, the reader 
is encouraged to review those references noted in Chapter 16. 
However, cable median barriers are median obstacles as well. They can place occupants 
at increased risk of severe injury or fatality if the barriers fail to adequately contain and redirect 
errant vehicles, resulting in rollover or vehicular penetration through the barrier. Furthermore, 
these barriers are also involved in many non-rollover, non-penetration fatalities and serious 
injuries, though no concerted effort has yet been made to determine the causes of these serious 
and fatal injuries.  
Many industry experts expect the total mileage of cable median barrier to double within 
the next 10 years. As total cable median barrier mileage continues to climb, there is an 
opportunity to prevent many penetration, rollover, and serious injury or fatality crashes by 
improving barrier design, installation guidelines, and crash-testing guidelines to mitigate crash 
concerns with these barrier types.  
2.2 Research Objective 
The objective of this study was to evaluate a significant number of cable median barrier 
crashes across a broad spectrum of states to determine containment failure causality, design 
improvements, placement guidelines, and improved full-scale testing procedures to improve 
motorist safety performance. 
2.3 Scope 
In order to accomplish the research objective, a series of tasks were undertaken, and are 
summarized as follows: 
(1) Cable barrier crash data were requested from many states with prominent histories of 
studying cable median barrier; 
(2) Crash data were analyzed and segregated by state, vehicle type, vehicle class, impact 
conditions, median geometry, barrier type, crash result, crash severity, and 
containment failure mechanism; and 
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(3) Containment failure mechanisms of cable barriers were evaluated extensively using a 
combination of scene diagrams, crash narratives, photographic evidence, site 
measurements, and crash reconstruction techniques. 
Additional studies are planned in the future to address specific vehicle types in vehicle-
to-barrier interactions which may aggravate penetration or rollover tendencies. 
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Much of the U.S. freeway system was designed and constructed in the 1950s and 1960s. 
During this time, it was common to build high-speed facilities with 30-ft (9-m) and 40-ft (12-m) 
wide medians. With the low traffic volumes found on those freeways during this period, the 
frequency of tragic cross median crashes was low. The California Department of Transportation 
(Caltrans) conducted a study to determine the benefits of using median barriers in these relatively 
narrow medians [1]. This study indicated that barriers could not be justified in medians wider 
than 50 ft (15 m). Caltrans repeated this study several times between 1967 and 1997. Each time, 
the authors arrived at the same conclusion; barriers were not cost-effective when installed in 
medians wider than 50 ft (15.2 m), despite rising traffic volumes. However, findings from the 
1997 version of this study were quite different and recommended that barriers be placed in 
medians as wide as 75 ft (22 m) [2]. The primary change between the 1997 report and earlier 
reports reflected the method of measuring real roadway departure data and travel speeds. Despite 
a mandated maximum speed of 55 mph through 1994 due to the National Maximum Speed Limit 
(NMSL) Law, actual travel speeds were between 15 to 20 mph higher (24 to 32 km/h). 
Following the repeal of this law, travel speeds in California were largely unchanged. This 
magnitude of speed increase observed between the 1968 and 1997 studies could easily explain 
the large increase in cross-median crashes and the differences in the benefits of using median 
barriers. 
Following a trend of a high rate of cross-median crashes and associated fatalities, the 
North Carolina Department of Transportation (DOT) investigated the use of median barriers 
between 1997 and 2004, to mitigate the severity of median crashes and to reduce the frequency 
of cross-median crash events [3-4]. This pilot study analyzed 400 miles (644 km) of interstate 
with barrier, which included 175 miles (282 km) of cable barrier and an additional 44 miles (71 
km) of cable barrier and W-beam combinations. Researchers observed a 71% drop in the number 
of cross-median crashes and associated fatalities or serious injuries due to the introduction of 
these cable median barriers. The total drop in severe and fatal injuries was 35% over this same 
period, while moderate injuries increased by 26%. The reason for the disparity between the drops 
in cross-median crash rates and severe crash rates is that any barrier system which can be struck 
by an errant motorist is a roadside obstacle. Every roadside obstacle can contribute to the number 
and frequency of severe crashes. Researchers postulated that by installing cable median barriers, 
95 cross-median crashes were prevented and more than 100 lives were saved annually. The 
barriers prevented a large number of cross-median crashes and were ultimately successful in 
significantly reducing cumulative severe injury or fatality (A+K) crash frequency.  
A similar study was conducted at Rowan University in 2005, identifying types of median 
barriers and crash histories for New Jersey Department of Transportation [5]. Although a net 
safety improvement was noted after median barrier installations, the crash frequency increased. 
Also, researchers noted that after cable barrier hits, maintenance personnel were slow to repair 
barriers often allowing the cables to sag to the ground in impact regions for up to several weeks. 
The Wisconsin DOT investigated the correlation between cross-median crashes on the 
number of cross-median fatalities [6]. Researchers observed that between 2001 and 2003, 
Wisconsin roads and highways experienced 53 fatalities and more than 600 injuries in 631 cross-
median crashes. Although most divided roadways were consistent with Wisconsin and American 
Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) design standards, cross-
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median crashes were observed to be relatively independent of median width, average daily traffic 
(ADT), and lane width. The study was further expanded to determine median barrier warrants 
based on median widths [7]. Results were similar to the studies in North Carolina and California, 
in which many roadways with medians as wide as 70 ft (21 m) were applicable for median 
barrier installation. 
A statistical analysis was conducted on cross-median crashes in the state of Minnesota 
between 2005 and 2008 to determine effectiveness of countermeasures as well as to validate or 
change the recommendations provided by AASHTO in the 2002 and 2006 Roadside Design 
Guides. Cross-median events were tabulated based on site statistics and used to generate 
statistical models of median encroachment frequencies [8]. The encroachment frequencies were 
then applied to models of freeway and rural expressway roads in the Roadside Safety Analysis 
Program (RSAP), and used in a benefit-to-cost analysis of median barrier types. Because 
Minnesota did not tabulate cross-median events directly on crash report forms, statistical data 
selection methods were used to determine frequency of cross-median encroachments based on 
subsamples. Based on the data analysis, cross-median events were most common during the 
period between December and February, when snowfall and ice formation was prevalent on 
Minnesota roads and medians. By reducing friction, vehicles that departed the roadway were 
unable to come to a stop before entering opposing travel lanes, despite typically lower travel 
speeds. Probabilities of vehicle collision, median encroachment, cross-median encroachment, 
and ADT were factored into a simulation using the Monte Carlo technique, and the model was 
recommended for evaluation against existing crash studies. 
Cable barriers have long been recognized as an effective way of preventing vehicles from 
encountering side slopes which increase the risk of serious crashes as well as embankments and 
separating traffic on high-speed facilities. Crash data analysis has indicated that cable barriers 
provide the highest overall level of safety when compared to concrete safety shapes and steel 
beam guardrails [9-10]. Further, study of guardrail performance on slopes indicated that cable 
barriers can perform effectively when installed on slopes as steep as 5:1 [11], while metal beam 
guardrails did not demonstrate crashworthy performance on 6:1 slopes. Finally, cable barriers 
were the least expensive barrier option for use in medians of high-speed freeways. In view of the 
positive safety performance, capability of performing when installed on sloping medians, and 
low construction costs, it was not surprising that many highway agencies in the U.S. have 
decided to implement cable barriers whenever it was necessary to prevent cross-median crashes 
through depressed median ditches. As of today, the DOTs in more than 40 states have adopted 
this policy, and many of them have installed more than 100 miles of barrier. Industry experts 
have begun to predict that the installed base of cable median barrier in the U.S. will more than 
double over the next 7 to 10 years. 
Even though cable median barrier has garnered a positive performance record, the high 
number of crashes that occur in narrow medians on high-speed, high-volume freeways still 
produces significant numbers of serious injury and fatal crashes involving cable barrier. A study 
of more than 5,000 cable barrier crashes over a two-year period found 12 fatal and 25 serious 
injury crashes [12]. Surprisingly, only half of the fatal crashes involved vehicles penetrating 
through the barrier and entering opposing traffic lanes. The remaining fatalities appeared to be 
related to impact with the cable barrier itself. Although the rate of six fatal crashes per year 
represented a 90% reduction in fatal crash rates when compared to the time prior to installation 
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of cable barrier, these six fatal crashes per year would indicate that as many as 250 fatal crashes 
occur annually when extrapolated to data nationwide. Furthermore, crashes into the barriers 
indicated in this study had a lower-than-average rate of severe and fatal crashes compared to the 
national average of states surveyed in this study. 
Further, if industry experts are correct and the installed base of cable barrier doubles over 
the next decade, up to 500 motorists could die annually during cable median barrier crashes 
within 10 short years. If this situation is to be avoided, improved cable barrier designs and 
deployment guidelines must be developed while construction of the barriers is still ongoing. The 
first step in developing better barrier designs and placement guidelines is to discover the primary 
causes associated with cable barrier crashes that produce fatalities and serious injuries.  
In recognition of the critical need for a better understanding of the causes of cable barrier 
penetrations and serious injury and fatal crashes, the Mid-America Transportation Center 
(MATC) funded the study described herein. The goal of this study was to take the first step 
toward improving cable median barrier performance by determining the factors, such as impact 
conditions, vehicle type, median slope, and barrier placement, which tend to produce cable 
barrier penetrations and serious injury and fatal crashes. The Mid-America Transportation Center 
and the Midwest Roadside Safety Facility expect to utilize the findings from this study to 
develop better barrier designs and prepare guidelines for barrier implementation that can 
significantly reduce serious injury and fatal crash rates involving cable median barrier. 
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4 STATE BARRIER INSTALLATION GUIDELINES 
4.1 Summary of Barrier Installation Practice by State 
Each state surveyed in this study indicated guidelines by which cable median barriers 
were to be installed in the states. While all current state design standards are reflective of the 
state-of-the-art with respect to cable median barrier placement in divided medians to mitigate 
barrier underride, override, and rollover frequency, some historical systems were constructed 
prior to this important guidance. Those systems may not reflect the standards identified in this 
chapter.  
The information presented in this report is accurate and current to the best knowledge of 
the reporting authors. However, state design and installation guidelines are available from state 
DOTs and should be consulted for the most up-to-date, accurate, and detailed design standards 
available. This guide is not intended for use as a reference manual. It is intended to summarize 
the current practices of states for overall comparison. 
Iowa DOT currently requires cable median barriers to be placed 12 ft (3.7 m) from the 
edge of the travel way. Iowa requires that on narrow ditches approximately 30 ft (9.1 m) or less, 
that ditches be filled and slopes graded to 8:1 in front of the cable median barrier. The barrier is 
then installed adjacent to the median centerline. On wider medians, Iowa DOT requires that the 
approach slope to the barrier from the adjacent travel lanes be graded to 8:1, and the slope behind 
the barrier be tapered to match the existing slope with a slope shallower than or equal to 4:1. The 
grading in front of the cable median barrier is 10 ft (3.0 m) or wider.  
Missouri DOT permits the use of high-tension cable median barriers on 4:1 slopes when 
those systems were eligible for installation based on acceptable crash testing results. Low-
tension cable median barriers on steep slopes are eligible for replacement, and new or existing 
low-tension, 3-cable median barriers may only be installed on 6:1 or flatter slopes. Barriers are 
installed on slopes based on median widths. For medians greater than 30 ft (9.1 m) wide, barriers 
could be installed at least 8 ft (2.4 m) from the edge of the travel way and up to 4 ft (1.2 m) down 
the approach slope. For medians less than 30 ft (9.1 m) wide, median barriers are placed within 1 
ft (0.3 m) of the center of the ditch. Vegetative barriers are located up to 2 ft (0.6 m) behind the 
barrier system. 
Ohio DOT requires barrier installation a minimum of 12 ft (3.7 m) from the travel way 
and 8 ft (2.4 m) from the center of the ditch, on 6:1 or flatter V-ditches. Cable median barrier 
could also be placed adjacent to the shoulder if the shoulder was sufficiently wide. Shoulder 
placement is required on slopes steeper than 4:1. The maximum slope behind the barrier relative 
to adjacent travel lanes is 4:1. The maximum post spacing permitted is 15 ft (4.6 m). 
Oklahoma DOT permits cable median barrier installation on 6:1 V-ditches or flatter. 
Generally, cable median barriers are only placed on medians which permitted at least 8 ft (2.4 m) 
on both sides of the median barrier without encroaching into adjacent travel lanes, but there is 
consideration for narrower medians on the grounds that small encroachments into opposing 
travel lanes are more desirable than cross-median crashes. Barriers are not permitted between 1 ft 
(0.3 m) and 8 ft (2.4 m) of the center of the ditch.  
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Oregon DOT permits limited installations in 4:1 V-ditches where crash testing indicated 
acceptable performance. Oregon DOT prohibited the use of cable median barriers in median V-
ditches between 1 and 8 ft (0.3 and 2.4 m) from the center of the ditch. Barriers are always 
recommended to be placed as far from the travel was as could be practically installed. Median 
slopes are generally clear of debris, smooth, and frequently seeded with grass. 
Texas DOT recommends barrier placement as far from the roadway as practical. Barriers 
may be placed within 1 ft (0.3 m) of the center of the median, or more than 8 ft (2.4 m) from the 
center of the median. Barriers are not permitted for installation in medians less than 24 ft (7.3 m) 
wide. Also, slopes in front of and behind the barrier are not permitted to be steeper than 6:1. On 
tight curves with radii of 650 to 2,500 ft (198 to 762 m), post spacing is required to be 6 ft – 8 in. 
(2.0 m) on center. For radii between 2,501 and 5,500 ft (762 to 1,676 m), cable barrier post 
spacing is 10 ft (3.0 m) on center, and for larger radii standard post spacing was utilized. 
Utah DOT requires that cable median barriers be placed 1 ft (0.3 m) from the ditch 
center, 8 ft (2.4 m) from the ditch center, or between 8 and 16 ft (2.4 and 4.9 m) from one edge 
of the travel way. Utah DOT complies with recommendations from studies which indicated that 
the best capture behavior and rollover management indicated that the optimum placement was 
between 8 and 15 ft (2.4 and 4.6 m) from the edge of the road. In stepped medians, offsets are 
usually made with respect to the higher-elevated roadway. Cable median barriers are not used on 
medians with slopes steeper than 6:1. 
Washington DOT required that cable median barriers be located 0 to 1 ft (0 to 0.3 m) of 
the center of the ditch, beyond 8 ft (2.4 m) from the center of the ditch, or near roadway 
shoulders. Barriers located at ditch shoulders are required to have a minimum clearance of 8 ft 
(2.4 m) from the roadway, and barriers were not permitted between 1 ft and 8 ft (0.3 m and 2.4 
m) of the center of the ditch for slopes between 10:1 and 6:1. Cable median barriers could be 
installed on approach slopes of 6:1 or flatter, but required a minimum of 1 ft (0.3 m) lateral offset 
from the slope break point of a slope steeper than 6:1. Cable median barriers are also required to 
have a minimum top cable height of 35 in. (889 mm) and a bottom cable height not greater than 
19 in. (483 mm). In general, cable barriers are always recommended to be located as far from the 
roadway as practicable. 
Wisconsin DOT required that cable median barrier be placed 4 ft (1.2 m) from the slope 
break point in 4:1 V-ditches, although frequently cable median barrier is not selected for such 
steep terrain. Currently, cable median barrier is limited to installations on 6:1 V-ditches, and 
when cable median barrier is necessary on roadways with 4:1 V-ditches, typically two 
installations of cable median barrier are used adjacent to each shoulder. On 6:1 V-ditches, cable 
median barriers are located a minimum of 8 ft (2.4 m) from the center of the ditch, due to 
drainage and erosion concerns and to reduce risk of underride or override from vehicles 
traversing through the center of the median. 
4.2 Reference Definitions 
Unless defined explicitly, the following definitions were utilized: 
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1. Shoulder 
The shoulder was defined as relatively flat extension of the roadway outside of the travel 
lanes in which no hazards were located. Shoulders could be paved or unpaved. The edge of the 
shoulder was defined as a transition in slopes from the roadway to the median. If no transition 
was present, the median was described as “flat” and the entire median was treated as if the two 
roadway shoulders intersected. 
2. Approach Slope 
Approach slopes were defined as the first slopes encountered by errant vehicles departing 
the roadway into the median after traversing the shoulder. In stepped medians in which there was 
only one median slope, the entire slope was considered an approach slope. Vehicle travel 
direction was always consulted in crash data analysis to determine the correct approach slope and 
vertical grade encountered. The barrier was considered to be on the approach slope if the barrier 
was more than 3 ft (0.9 m) from the edge of the shoulder. 
3. Center of Ditch 
The center of ditch referred to the area of the ditch spanning between 4 ft (1.2 m) on 
either side of the ditch slope transition between approach and back slopes. This definition does 
not necessarily refer to the physical centerline of the V-ditch. For ditches with flat centers more 
than 4 ft (1.2 m) wide and less than 15% of the ditch width, the entire flat center of the ditch was 
considered the ditch center. 
4. Back Slope 
The back slope, if present, was the slope encountered by a vehicle after crossing the 
center of the V-ditch. Back slopes were not relevant on all crashes involving cable median 
barrier redirection if the barriers were installed on traffic-side shoulders, approach slopes, or near 
the center of the ditch. In sawtooth medians in which back slopes had different slope rates than 
the approach slope, distinctions were made between each slope rate. As with approach slopes, 
travel direction of the errant vehicle was consulted when identifying which slope was an 
approach slope and which slope was a back slope. A barrier was considered to be on the back 
slope if the barrier was more than 3 ft (0.9 m) from the opposite-side shoulder.  
5. Penetration 
A barrier penetration was defined as a crash in which the impacting vehicle traversed 
completely from one side of the barrier to the other side, such that no cables were in 
advantageous positions to redirect the vehicle if it continued to move toward opposite travel 
lanes. A potential penetration was similar, except that the vehicle came to a stop before 
completely passing from one side of the cable median barrier to the other; nonetheless, no cables 
were in advantageous positions to redirect the vehicle. 
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6. Rollover 
A rollover was defined as a crash in which the impacting vehicle made a minimum of one 
quarter-revolution about the longitudinal axis. In addition, to be considered a rollover, the 
vehicle must have had at least one side or the top/roof contact the ground to be considered a 
rollover. 
7. Failure 
Cable median barriers are generally designed to safely redirect or capture vehicles with 
controlled lateral displacement of the barrier. As such, barrier failures were defined as crashes in 
which any of the following events occurred:  penetration, rollover, or serious injury or fatality of 
an occupant in a vehicle striking the cable median barrier.  
However, a barrier failure does not necessarily indicate a poor crash result. For example, 
a barrier containment failure consisting of a penetration may result in property damage only to 
the impacting vehicle and potentially one or two cable median barrier posts. If the occupant of 
the impacting vehicle is unharmed, the barrier containment failure would not be considered 
hazardous. Furthermore, if the vehicle which was involved in a penetration event did not traverse 
into opposing travel lanes and the crash injury level was not severe, the barrier may have 
satisfactorily prevented a cross-median crash; in this instance, the barrier containment failure still 
resulted in acceptable overall performance and the crash outcome was positive. 
Though the nature of cross-median crash prevention can be speculative, history has 
shown that even with penetration rates as high as 10% and rollover frequency as high as 8% of 
all crashes, overall median severity on many roadways improved after cable median barrier was 
installed. This was particularly true if a relatively high rate of fatalities was already present due 
to cross-median crashes. Neither penetration nor rollover containment failures indicate that the 
barrier is unsafe, but instead refer only to the breach in containment experienced by the 
impacting vehicle. 
Barrier systems were located consistent with the state design standards. The only 
exceptions to this identification were with respect to systems installed before newer design 
guidelines became available between 2004 and 2007. Such barrier systems were analyzed and 
included in the results because of potential significance to the outcome of this report. 
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5 SUMMARY OF CABLE BARRIER CRASHES 
5.1 Description of Study 
A total of 12 states responded to a survey request for crash data regarding cable median 
barrier crashes. A total of more than 25,000 crashes were received which documented periods 
between 1996 and 2010. In addition, approximately 6,000 crashes with sufficient information 
were extracted for further evaluation. The state DOTs which provided data for this study were:  
Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Washington, Iowa, Illinois, Texas, Oregon, Utah, 
Kentucky, and Wisconsin. 
Between 2007 and 2009, 7,093 cable median barrier crashes were reported in Missouri, 
and of those crashes, 174 involved serious injuries or fatalities. Hence, the combined serious 
injury and fatal crash rate for cable barrier in Missouri was found to be 2.5%. This finding was 
consistent with prior crash studies of cable barriers that indicated low crash severities for cable 
barriers when compared to other types of barriers.  For example, the combined serious and fatal 
injury rates for guardrail and bridge rail crashes in Kansas were 4.9% and 3.6% respectively 
[13].  
Crash reports were obtained for all 174 crashes involving serious or fatal injuries in the 
Missouri database, of which 169 of the crash reports contained detailed drawings of the crash 
scene, including measurements of vehicle position near points of departure and impact and 
vehicle tire marks laid down as the vehicle approached the barrier. A careful examination of 
these crashes revealed that the cable barrier significantly contributed to occupant injury in 128 of 
the crashes. The remaining 46 crashes involved other mechanisms for occupant injury, including 
vehicle rollover prior to the barrier impact, impacts with another vehicle before leaving the 
travelway or after coming to rest, and acute health problems of the driver and occupants 
unrelated to the crash. In addition, some crashes were misreported as cable barrier crashes when 
other barriers, such as W-beam or concrete barriers, were actually involved. After eliminating 
cases which were unrelated to cable barrier performance, the combined serious and fatal injury 
crash rate was reduced to 1.8%.  
Using reported lengths and widths measured by investigating officers at points of vehicle 
departure from the road and at the point of impact with the cable median barrier, crash scene 
diagrams were scaled to account for varying longitudinal and lateral compression to fit the 
boundaries of the scene diagram, which generated approximate, dimensionally representative 
crash scene drawings. Then, approximate scaled crash scenes were used to generate vehicle 
trajectory information up to the point of impact with the barrier system. Trajectory data included 
the vehicle CG trajectory angle, sideslip angle, and the angle between the vehicle's longitudinal 
axis and the barrier. This information was used to build a database of crash impact conditions to 
evaluate vehicle/barrier interaction.  
A set of 22 crashes in North Carolina were provided and had exact scene measurements, 
photographs of the vehicle and system, median slope measurements, median widths, and vehicle 
information. The CG trajectory and orientation angles were also recorded for these crashes. The 
22 crashes consisted only of penetrations; this dataset was not a random sample. 
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An additional 890 cases were extracted from a crash database in the state of Ohio, whose 
locations were observable using the Google Street View application. Slope data digitized from 
topographical surveying were used to obtain median geometries at each crash location, which 
was located using a combination of mile markers, latitudes and longitudes, feature references, 
and information from indicative scene diagram representations. As with the Missouri database, 
unrelated crashes were excluded from the analysis. Photographs of the crash scene and vehicle 
were requested for all crashes in which photographs were taken of the scene, and those photos 
were released through the Ohio Department of Public Safety, with additional cooperation from 
the Ohio State Patrol. 
A tabulated database of crashes was obtained from the Oklahoma DOT, including crash 
results, roadway locations, and barrier types that were struck. Crash reports were not available 
for the crashes listed, and vehicle year, make, and model were not available for release under 
Oklahoma law. Due to limited funding, the purchase of crash report copies was not pursued. 
A tabulated database of cable median barrier crashes was received from the State of 
Washington and covering a period between 1996 and 2008, with an additional tabulated list of 
model, make, and year of the vehicles involved in cable barrier crashes. Crash reports for serious 
injury and fatal crashes in the state were also provided. The database included information 
regarding the crash result and the manner of collision, along with an extensive investigation of 
injury tabulation. As with Oklahoma, the majority of crashes did not have a scene diagram or a 
narrative available to definitively identify crash injury causation, mechanisms of barrier 
containment failures, and potential data overlap. Nonetheless the database was useful for 
evaluating crash statistics, overall barrier performance, and installation practices. 
The Iowa DOT provided a tabulated database of cable median barrier crashes and results 
between 2006 and 2009, along with scene diagrams and crash narratives. Although precise scene 
diagram measurements were not available, make, model, and year of vehicles striking the cable 
median barrier were provided. Precise geographical locational measurements were provided for 
each crash to identify the exact location of the crash site for further investigation. 
The Illinois DOT provided a crash database to evaluate propensities for cross-median 
collisions, as well as a tabulated list of cable barrier crashes between 2005 and 2008 in the state 
of Illinois. Scene diagrams and narratives were not provided, and no median information was 
available. However, precise geographical location measurements were also available and the 
crash sites were located, allowing precise determination of barrier usage at each site. 
The Texas DOT provided a large block of crash data regarding all crashes, not only cable 
median barrier crashes on divided median roadways between 2003 and 2009. Unfortunately 
Texas law, which is similar to Oklahoma, does not permit the free exchange of sensitive crash 
data such as scene diagrams, crash narratives, and occupant information. Because the crash data 
could not be used to determine crash causation or object struck, the Texas data were limited in 
scope to crash statistics for only broad evaluations. 
The Oregon DOT provided a crash summary database for cable median barrier crashes in 
Oregon through 2007. This information included crash severity and relative risk based on the 
total number of crashes, as well as crash statistics measured by DOT researchers.  
June 20, 2013  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13 
14 
Similarly, the Kentucky Department of Public Safety (DPS) provided lists of crash 
reports available for sorting. However, since this information was received later in the analysis, 
the crash results were only used for generating statistical comparisons. 
The Utah DOT provided a database of scene diagrams, crash narratives, impacting 
vehicle makes, models, and years, road segment traffic volumes, and crash statistics. Photos and 
annotated scene diagrams with survey measurements were available for purchase through the 
Department of Public Safety, but the available funding for the project prohibited this extra 
expense. Utah also provided information regarding barrier type for installations throughout the 
state. 
The Wisconsin DOT provided crash reports, scene diagrams, and a webcam video of a 
single cable barrier penetration event in the state of Wisconsin. Each cable barrier crash was 
located using a geographical state surveying tool, and locations of each crash were identified. 
Included in the crash reports were vehicle make, model, and year. 
It is possible that a number of critical injury and fatal crashes involving cable median 
barriers were incorrectly coded and therefore excluded from the database. However, prior 
experience with crash reports associated with barrier crashes would indicate that it is not 
common that a police officer fails to indicate the barrier was struck for a crash involving serious 
injuries and fatalities. Therefore, it was assumed that the number of crashes missing from the 
database was relatively low. Further, even if a significant number of unreported severe crashes 
do occur, there is no reason to believe that omitted cases would have a bias in any characteristic 
other than injury severity. Because police officers are likely to spend more time investigating 
serious injury and fatal crashes, the bias would reduce the risk of case omission as the severity 
increased. 
5.2 Cable Barrier Impacts 
In each state, cable barrier crashes were examined to determine if the barrier failed to 
adequately capture or redirect the vehicle without subjecting occupants to serious injury or 
fatality. For the purpose of analysis, three categories were created:  penetration crashes, rollover 
crashes, and severe injury or fatality (A+K) crashes.  
Severe A+K crashes were defined as crashes when at least one occupant of the vehicle 
impacting the cable barrier experienced a severe or disabling injury or fatality. An effort was 
made to exclude crashes in which the fatality or severe injury was not caused at least in part by 
the reaction of the cable barrier. Cable barrier crashes in which the vehicle was not redirected 
and passed from the impact side to non-impact side of the barrier were classified as penetration 
crashes. Crashes in which the vehicle either protruded under, between, or over the top of the 
barrier but came to rest before all four tires passed to the non-impact side were classified as 
potential penetrations, which displayed the propensity for a penetration to occur. Rollover 
crashes were defined as those in which impacting vehicles experienced at least a one-quarter 
revolution about the longitudinal axis before coming to rest. Rollover crashes in which the 
vehicle tripped before impacting the barrier or in which the rollover was unrelated to cable 
barrier performance were excluded.  
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The crash set was further segregated in the event that a rollover occurred contingently 
with a penetration. The overlapping data set was segregated into mutually exclusive causative 
factors, using scene diagrams, crash narratives, vehicles, and median information to determine 
which factor was the predominant or causative factor in penetration and rollover crashes. If a 
vehicle penetrated through the barrier before rolling over on the median back slope, opposing 
travel lanes, or other post-penetration impact location, the major causative factor was determined 
to be a penetration. However, if it was determined that the vehicle overturning caused or 
contributed to the vehicle penetrating through or over the top of the barrier, the major causative 
factor was identified to be a rollover. Separate efforts were made to determine the injury causes 
of A+K crashes due to contact with a barrier element, rollover, ejection, or other factors. 
5.2.1 Weather and Road Conditions 
Cable barrier crashes tabulated from each state DOT were investigated to evaluate the 
frequency of weather-related crashes compared to annual numbers of days with rainfall and 
snowfall in each state. The frequency of adverse weather effects in surveyed states are shown in 
Tables 2 and 3. Some states were characterized by a wide variation in regional annual snowfall 
and rainfall, based on data by NOAA National Climate Data Center for annual precipitation.  
The standard deviations in average days with snowfall were as large as the average 
number of days with snowfall for some states. In some locations, the number of days with snow 
or rain could vary from one region to another by a factor of 10 [14]. Conversely, states in the 
lower Midwest and coastal regions did not have large variations in days with rainfall or snowfall, 
such as Missouri, North Carolina, and Washington.   
Oklahoma averaged only 61 days with minimum rainfall of 0.01 in. (0.25 mm) and three 
days with minimum snowfall of 0.1 in. (2.5 mm). States with the lowest relative deviation based 
on the norm were located in the Midwest, including Ohio, Illinois, Missouri, and Iowa, with the 
one notable exception of Washington.  
Table 2. Average Number of Days with Rainfall in Select Surveyed States 
 
0.01 in. (0.3 mm) 0.1 in. (3 mm) 0.5 in. (13 mm) 0.01 in. (2.5 mm) 0.1 in. (2.5 mm) 0.5 in. (2.5 mm)
Illinois 94.5 64.1 26.2 25.9% 17.5% 7.2% 10.2%
Iowa 82.2 53.1 21.4 22.5% 14.5% 5.9% 11.1%
Missouri 89.6 63.8 28.5 24.6% 17.5% 7.8% 10.4%
North Carolina 115.5 79.1 33.1 31.6% 21.7% 9.1% 11.9%
Ohio 118.7 75.4 25.5 32.5% 20.6% 7.0% 10.4%
Oklahoma 61.4 44.6 24.2 16.8% 12.2% 6.6% 21.6%
Utah 55.0 25.1 4.9 15.1% 6.9% 1.3% 57.7%
Washington 104.9 62.1 19.9 28.7% 17.0% 5.5% 8.9%
Wisconsin 123.3 75.4 23.3 33.8% 20.7% 6.4% 66.0%
Average Number of Days with Minimum Rainfall of
State
Frequency of Days with Minimum Rainfall of Average 
Deviation
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Table 3. Average Number of Days with Snowfall in Select Surveyed States 
 
Monthly and annual precipitation totals of each participating state were also recorded, as 
shown in Tables 4 and 5. Since most states surveyed were in the central plains to Midwest 
region, the annual yearly precipitation is similar for Iowa, Illinois, Missouri, and Wisconsin, 
though Wisconsin had locally larger rain and snow accumulation due to proximity to Lakes 
Superior and Michigan. However, because Wisconsin is west and south of the Great Lakes, the 
additional precipitation is highly localized, with as much as 140 in. (3,556 mm) of snow falling 
annually at the southern-central portion of Lake Superior and 40 to 50 in. (1,016 to 1,270 mm) 
falling in most of the remainder of the state. Most cable median barrier crash data available from 
Wisconsin occurred in close proximity to Fon du Lac, Wisconsin.   
Table 4. Average Monthly Precipitation in Select Surveyed States 
 
Table 5. Average Monthly Snowfall in Select Surveyed States 
 
 
0.1 in. (3 mm) 1.0 in. (25 mm) 5.0 in. (127 mm) 0.01 in. (2.5 mm) 0.1 in. (2.5 mm) 0.5 in. (2.5 mm)
Illinois 11.9 6.9 0.8 3.3% 1.9% 0.2% 47.6%
Iowa 16.9 11.0 1.3 4.6% 3.0% 0.4% 22.6%
Missouri 6.5 4.2 0.5 1.8% 1.2% 0.1% 42.5%
North Carolina 2.7 1.9 0.4 0.7% 0.5% 0.1% 172.2%
Ohio 17.9 9.4 0.8 4.9% 2.6% 0.2% 68.9%
Oklahoma 3.0 2.1 0.3 0.8% 0.6% 0.1% 75.2%
Utah 19.2 15.5 3.0 5.3% 4.3% 0.8% 113.6%
Washington 27.2 17.2 2.1 7.5% 4.7% 0.6% 39.3%
Wisconsin 11.8 8.4 1.9 3.2% 2.3% 0.5% 195.0%
State
Average Number of Days with Minimum Snowfall of Frequency of Days with Minimum Snowfall of Average 
Deviation
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
Illinois 1.8 1.9 2.6 3.4 4.4 3.8 3.6 3.2 2.7 2.7 3.2 2.3 35.7
Iowa 0.9 1.0 1.8 3.2 4.3 4.5 3.9 3.6 3.0 2.2 1.8 1.2 31.3
Missouri 1.8 2.0 2.9 3.8 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 3.3 3.1 3.2 2.4 38.7
North Carolina 3.8 3.5 4.1 3.4 3.6 4.1 4.7 4.6 3.9 3.2 3.4 3.6 45.8
Ohio 2.3 2.1 2.9 3.5 4.3 3.9 3.8 3.2 2.8 2.6 3.0 2.8 37.1
Oklahoma 1.5 1.6 2.8 3.1 4.6 4.2 2.6 2.6 3.2 2.9 2.2 1.8 33.0
Utah 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.1 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.0 12.2
Washington 5.9 3.7 3.9 2.9 2.3 1.8 0.7 0.7 1.5 3.6 6.2 5.6 38.9
Wisconsin 1.0 1.0 1.7 2.8 3.4 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.3 2.6 1.9 1.3 30.1
State
Average Monthly Precipitation, 50th Percentile (in.)
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
Illinois 5.1 3.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 3.8 13.1
Iowa 6.7 5.6 3.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 6.5 23.7
Missouri 2.3 2.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 6.2
North Carolina 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 2.0
Ohio 7.0 4.3 2.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 4.3 19.1
Oklahoma 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.7
Utah 9.1 8.2 5.8 2.8 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 4.5 9.0 40.5
Washington 5.6 2.9 1.5 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 2.4 6.9 20.4
Wisconsin 10.6 8.7 7.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 3.0 9.8 40.6
State
Average Monthly Snowfall, 50th Percentile (in.)
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Whereas the average precipitation in Oklahoma varied from moderate annual rainfall to 
relatively arid conditions, most of the cable median barrier was located around the Norman and 
Oklahoma City areas. Rainfall in these regions is less frequent and with lower accumulation 
compared to the eastern parts of the state. 
The approximate geographical distribution of cable median barrier locations with 
surveyed crash data were located on a NOAA precipitation map and is shown in Figure 1. Ohio’s 
annual precipitation was higher because of close proximity to Lake Erie, which occasionally 
resulted in more than 5 in. (127 mm) of rain or 12 in. (305 mm) of snow within a span of a few 
days in some cable median barrier locations. In general, southern parts of the state recorded 
higher precipitation totals, due to contributions from gulf and coastal storm systems. 
 
Figure 1. Selected Approximate Barrier Locations with Annual Precipitation Estimates [15] 
Besides Ohio, both Washington and North Carolina experienced higher cumulative 
precipitation than other states in this survey. Both Washington and North Carolina are coastal 
states which experience significant rainfall, without much snowfall in the areas around cable 
barrier locations. In contrast, Utah was largely dry, except for the I-15 corridor. However, the I-
15 corridor was also the site of much of the cable median barrier installed in Utah.  
Barrier performance was tabulated for each impact in the available database of crashes; 
however, crashes in which a penetration or rollover occurred were subjected to additional 
scrutiny to identify the cause of the poor barrier performance. The process of selection and 
causality used in this study is described in greater detail in Chapters 8 and 11. 
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Results of each state were segregated by weather conditions (i.e., snowing, raining), road 
conditions at the time of the crash (i.e., wet, snow-covered, slush), crash severity, type of cable 
barrier system that was struck, the date of crash, and the barrier’s performance. The results are 
tabulated in Tables 6 through 11. Primary barrier containment failures were identified and 
segregated by predominant weather and road conditions. By considering only primary barrier 
failures, secondary events such as penetration following rollover were excluded from the 
analysis. Primary barrier failure segregation also served the purpose of establishing mutually 
exclusive categories of penetration or rollover crashes; this was useful in determining what 
driving conditions were associated with the predominant cause of barrier containment failures. 
Since some states had significant volumes of data and others had smaller data sets, a 
crash volume weighting factor was used to bias results toward states with more crashes when 
each state’s crash results were averaged together. Weighting factors applied to determine the 
approximate average rate of cable barrier containment failures consisted of an average of the 
individual percentage of failures occurring in each state with the total percentage of failures of 
all states based on all crash data. This process weighted data from states with large volumes of 
crash data, but still incorporated data from states with limited available crash databases to draw 
from. The average rate of vehicular penetration through the barrier was approximately 9.3% 
when penetrations were the primary barrier containment failure. In contrast, the composite 
average rate of vehicle rollover as a primary containment failure mechanism was approximately 
5.1%. When considering the rates of actual vehicle rollover and penetration over the barrier and 
relaxing the mutually-exclusive primary failure mechanism restriction, the composite rate of 
penetrations and rollovers rose to approximately 9.9% and 8.1%, respectively.  
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Table 6. Crash Result in States by Predominant Weather Condition 
 
Table 7. Crash Result in States with Complete Data Sets by Predominant Weather Condition 
 
Crashes Penetration
1
Rollover Crashes Penetration Rollover Crashes Penetration Rollover Crashes Cross-Median
2
Rollover Crashes Penetration Rollover Crashes Penetration Rollover Crashes Penetration Rollover
No Adverse Effects 150 - 8 60 4 1 404 46 30 1147 26 48 479 26 42 1105 139 94 44 7 4
Rain 48 - 0 10 1 0 164 10 3 415 7 6 43 2 1 290 45 7 3 0 0
Snow or Sleet 100 - 3 52 4 1 274 18 1 190 1 4 397 10 8 225 24 11 49 5 2
Fog or Mist 4 - 0 1 0 0 7 2 1 13 0 1 3 0 0 20 2 3 0 0 0
Strong Crosswind 2 - 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Unknown or Other 1 - 0 0 0 0 9 2 2 11 0 0 2 0 0 6 0 0 1 0 0
Total 305 - 11 126 9 2 858 78 37 1780 34 60 927 38 51 1647 210 115 97 12 6
Crashes Penetration
1
Rollover Crashes Penetration Rollover Crashes Penetration Rollover Crashes Cross-Median
2
Rollover Crashes Penetration Rollover Crashes Penetration Rollover Crashes Penetration Rollover
No Adverse Effects 150 - 5.3% 60 6.7% 1.7% 404 11.4% 7.4% 1147 2.3% 4.2% 479 5.4% 8.8% 1105 12.6% 8.5% 44 15.9% 9.1%
Rain 48 - 0.0% 10 10.0% 0.0% 164 6.1% 1.8% 415 1.7% 1.4% 43 4.7% 2.3% 290 15.5% 2.4% 3 0.0% 0.0%
Snow or Sleet 100 - 3.0% 52 7.7% 1.9% 274 6.6% 0.4% 190 0.5% 2.1% 397 2.5% 2.0% 225 10.7% 4.9% 49 10.2% 4.1%
Fog or Mist 4 - - 1 - - 7 28.6% 14.3% 13 - 7.7% 3 - - 20 10.0% 15.0% 0 - -
Strong Crosswind 2 - - 3 - - 0 - - 4 - 25.0% 3 - - 1 - - 0 - -
Unknown or Other 1 - - 0 - - 9 22.2% 22.2% 11 - - 2 - - 6 - - 1 - -
Total 305 - 3.6% 126 7.1% 1.6% 858 9.1% 4.3% 1780 1.9% 3.4% 927 4.1% 5.5% 1647 12.8% 7.0% 97 12.4% 6.2%
Weather Condition 
at Time of Crash
Weather Condition 
at Time of Crash
Oklahoma
Oklahoma
Wisconsin
WisconsinIllinois Iowa Ohio Utah Washington
Illinois Iowa Ohio Utah Washington
Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers
60 4 1 404 46 30 479 26 42 44 7 4 987 83 77
10 1 0 164 10 3 43 2 1 3 0 0 220 13 4
52 4 1 274 18 1 397 10 8 49 5 2 772 37 12
1 0 0 7 2 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 11 2 1
3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0
0 0 0 9 2 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 12 2 2
126 9 2 858 78 37 927 38 51 97 12 6 2008 137 96
Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers
60 6.7% 1.7% 404 11.4% 7.4% 479 5.4% 8.8% 44 15.9% 9.1% 987 8.4% 7.8%
10 10.0% - 164 6.1% 1.8% 43 4.7% 2.3% 3 - - 220 5.9% 1.8%
52 7.7% 1.9% 274 6.6% 0.4% 397 2.5% 2.0% 49 10.2% 4.1% 772 4.8% 1.6%
1 0.0% - 7 28.6% 14.3% 3 - - 0 - - 11 18.2% 9.1%
3 0.0% - 0 - - 3 - - 0 - - 6 - -
0 - - 9 22.2% 22.2% 2 - - 1 - - 12 16.7% 16.7%
126 7.1% 1.6% 858 9.1% 4.3% 927 4.1% 5.5% 97 12.4% 6.2% 2008 6.8% 4.8%
WisconsinUtahOhioIowa
Iowa Ohio Utah Wisconsin Total
Total
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Table 8. Crash Result in States by Predominant Road Condition 
 
Table 9. Crash Result in States with Complete Data Sets by Predominant Road Condition 
 
Crashes Penetrations
1
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Cross-Median
2
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers
127 - 8 44 4 2 333 40 30 1575 24 56 364 21 35 888 115 79 26 5 1
63 - 1 15 2 0 260 18 5 39 9 0 99 5 3 398 57 12 7 1 0
113 - 2 67 3 0 261 20 2 164 1 4 457 12 13 344 38 23 63 6 5
2 - 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 0 0 7 0 0 17 0 1 1 0 0
305 0 11 126 9 2 858 78 37 1780 34 60 927 38 51 1647 210 115 97 12 6
Crashes Penetrations
1
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Cross-Median
2
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers
127 - 6.3% 44 9.1% 4.5% 333 12.0% 9.0% 1575 1.5% 3.6% 364 5.8% 9.6% 888 13.0% 8.9% 26 19.2% 3.8%
63 - 1.6% 15 13.3% - 260 6.9% 1.9% 39 23.1% - 99 5.1% 3.0% 398 14.3% 3.0% 7 14.3% -
113 - 1.8% 67 4.5% - 261 7.7% 0.8% 164 0.6% 2.4% 457 2.6% 2.8% 344 11.0% 6.7% 63 9.5% 7.9%
2 - - 0 - - 4 - - 2 - - 7 - - 17 - - 1 - -
305 0.0% 3.6% 126 7.1% 1.6% 858 9.1% 4.3% 1780 1.9% 3.4% 927 4.1% 5.5% 1647 12.8% 7.0% 97 12.4% 6.2%
Washington Wisconsin
Illinois Iowa Ohio Oklahoma Utah Washington
Illinois Iowa Ohio Oklahoma Utah
Wisconsin
Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers
No Adverse Effects 44 4 2 333 40 30 364 21 35 26 5 1 767 70 68
Wet or Pooling Water 15 2 0 260 18 5 99 5 3 7 1 0 381 26 8
Snow, Slush, or Ice 67 3 0 261 20 2 457 12 13 63 6 5 848 41 20
Unknown or Other 0 0 0 4 0 0 7 0 0 1 0 0 12 0 0
Total 126 9 2 858 78 37 927 38 51 97 12 6 2008 137 96
Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers
No Adverse Effects 44 9.1% 4.5% 333 12.0% 9.0% 364 5.8% 9.6% 26 19.2% 3.8% 767 9.1% 8.9%
Wet or Pooling Water 15 13.3% - 260 6.9% 1.9% 99 5.1% 3.0% 7 14.3% - 381 6.8% 2.1%
Snow, Slush, or Ice 67 4.5% - 261 7.7% 0.8% 457 2.6% 2.8% 63 9.5% 7.9% 848 4.8% 2.4%
Unknown or Other 0 - - 4 - - 7 - - 1 - - 12 - -
Total 126 7.1% 1.6% 858 9.1% 4.3% 927 4.1% 5.5% 97 12.4% 6.2% 2008 6.8% 4.8%
Road Conditions
at Time of Crash
Road Conditions
at Time of Crash
Iowa Ohio
Iowa Ohio
Utah Wisconsin Total
Utah Wisconsin Total
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Table 10. Average Rates of Barrier Containment Failure by Predominant Weather Condition 
 
Table 11. Average Rates of Barrier Containment Failure by Predominant Road Condition 
 
Three key conclusions were drawn from the data:   
(1) Dry, clear conditions were associated with the highest rates of penetration or rollover. 
Travel speeds and vehicle-to-ground friction values were the highest during dry, clear 
weather and road conditions. The increased travel speeds and greater friction 
generally contributed to more energetic impacts with cable median barrier systems 
due to a combination of high speed and high CG trajectory and orientation angles at 
impact. 
(2) Reduced tire ground friction, which is the reason for lower travel speeds during 
inclement weather, also affected barrier interaction by influencing impact CG 
trajectory and orientation angles. When contact friction was decreased, the roll 
moment applied to the vehicle in sliding conditions was significantly reduced, which 
largely explains the reduction in rollover occurrences. The largest rate of reduction of 
penetration crashes related to adverse weather events is due to reduced travel speeds 
and a reduction in the CG trajectory angle present at the time of the crash, which is 
caused by less tire-ground friction. However, after storms struck and the roadsides 
were snowy or wet but road conditions improved, travel speeds were typically 
increased. Errant vehicles departing the road during these conditions were unable to 
slow down as quickly before impacting the barrier, which could explain the 
discrepancy observed between road and predominant weather condition data relevant 
to penetration rates.  
(3) Although states with higher annual precipitation experienced higher annual rates of 
vehicle penetration through the barrier systems, the locations of the cable median 
barriers in wetter states affected crash likelihood. States with significant rainfall or 
snowfall and with relatively narrow medians frequently installed cable median 
barriers at or near roadside shoulders to accommodate generally steeper median 
No Adverse Effects 9.8% 6.7%
Rain 6.9% 2.1%
Snow or Sleet 6.7% 2.1%
Average Failure Rate 9.3% 5.1%
Weather Condition Penetration Rollover
No Adverse Effects 11.5% 6.8%
Wet or Pooling Water 9.9% 2.5%
Snow, Slush, or Ice 6.1% 3.8%
Average Failure Rate 9.3% 5.1%
Road Condition Penetration Rollover
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slopes. Cable median barrier installations near shoulders had higher rates of 
penetration and rollover than barrier installations placed on approach or back slopes. 
5.2.2 Weather Conditions and Barrier Type 
Rates of barrier containment failures by type of barrier were also investigated to evaluate 
the effect of weather on vehicle redirection by system type. A comparison of crash results by 
barrier make and weather condition is shown in Table 12. Additionally, a comparison of crash 
result by barrier make and road condition is shown in Table 13. Since rollovers were frequently 
coded with crash results in DPS reports, rollover characteristics were available even when no 
scene diagrams were provided in some states. However, penetrations are not currently tabulated 
explicitly by most responding officers or DOTs, and thus a scene diagram was required to make 
the proper crash result determination. As a result, the total number of applicable crashes in the 
penetration database was substantially lower than the number of crashes in the rollover database. 
It was observed that various proprietary barrier systems had markedly different rates of 
penetration and rollover. Although its database was limited in scope, the Brifen Wire Rope 
Safety Fence (WRSF) had the lowest rate of penetration when compared to other high-tension 
systems. Conversely, Nucor Marion Steel’s NU-CABLE system with three cables had a large 
database of hits and a considerable number of penetrations, with a penetration frequency of 
9.7%. Additionally, the CASS and generic systems had intensive crash histories covering a broad 
geographical area, whereas the Nucor, Brifen, and Gibraltar systems were largely restricted to 
narrow geographical regions which affected distributions of weather patterns. Although 
Gibraltar’s penetration frequency was higher than the Nucor system, the Gibraltar database too 
small in size to concretely determine penetration frequency and thus potential “outlier” cases 
contributed significant uncertainty. Other recent studies involving individual state data indicated 
penetration rates for Gibraltar and CASS systems as high as 16% [30]. 
Unfortunately, it was misleading to separate barrier statistics by manufacturer without a 
more intensive investigation into site details and state crash histories. Some states primarily use 
one type of barrier system. Since impact conditions and vehicle type can vary widely, these 
factors can lead to different propensities for penetration or rollover due to median geometries, 
traffic volumes, weather patterns, and barrier placement. 
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Table 12. Crash Result per System in States with Complete Data Sets by Predominant Weather Condition 
 
Table 13. Crash Result per System in States with Complete Data Sets by Predominant Road Condition 
 
Crashes Penetrations Frequency Crashes Penetrations Frequency Crashes Penetrations Frequency Crashes Penetrations Frequency
No Adverse Effects 3020 224 7.4% 56 3 5.4% 333 40 12.0% 1134 112 9.9%
Rain 969 59 6.1% 29 2 6.9% 131 8 6.1% 189 26 13.8%
Snow or Sleet 243 13 5.3% 33 3 9.1% 213 15 7.0% 652 33 5.1%
Fog or Mist 28 6 21.4% 0 0 - 7 2 28.6% 16 2 12.5%
Strong Crosswind 0 0 - 1 0 - 0 0 - 6 0 -
Unknown or Other 8 0 - 0 0 - 8 2 25.0% 5 0 -
Total 4268 302 7.1% 119 8 6.7% 692 67 9.7% 2002 173 8.6%
Crashes Rollovers Frequency Crashes Rollovers Frequency Crashes Rollovers Frequency Crashes Rollovers Frequency
No Adverse Effects 542 53 9.8% 991 39 3.9% 446 29 6.5% 1183 94 7.9%
Rain 159 7 4.4% 338 3 0.9% 168 3 1.8% 209 1 0.5%
Snow or Sleet 81 3 3.7% 194 4 2.1% 288 2 0.7% 661 18 2.7%
Fog or Mist 8 2 25.0% 9 1 11.1% 11 1 9.1% 17 1 5.9%
Strong Crosswind 0 0 - 3 1 33.3% 3 0 - 6 0 -
Unknown or Other 5 0 - 9 0 - 9 2 22.2% 5 0 -
Total 795 65 8.2% 1544 48 3.1% 925 37 4.0% 2081 114 5.5%
Weather Conditions
at Time of Crash
Low-Tension 3-Cable
Trinity CASSWeather Conditions
at Time of Crash
Low-Tension 3-Cable Brifen WRSF Nucor NU-CABLE
Brifen WRSF Nucor NU-CABLE Trinity CASS
Crashes Penetrations Frequency Crashes Penetrations Frequency Crashes Penetrations Frequency Crashes Penetrations Frequency
No Adverse Effects 437 53 12.1% 37 3 8.1% 278 34 12.2% 879 93 10.6%
Wet or Pooling Water 214 28 13.1% 36 2 5.6% 212 15 7.1% 313 37 11.8%
Snow, Slush, or Ice 135 14 10.4% 46 3 6.5% 199 18 9.0% 793 43 5.4%
Unknown or Other 9 0 - 0 0 - 3 0 - 17 0 -
Total 795 95 11.9% 119 8 6.7% 692 67 9.7% 2002 173 8.6%
Crashes Rollovers Frequency Crashes Rollovers Frequency Crashes Rollovers Frequency Crashes Rollovers Frequency
No Adverse Effects 437 45 10.3% 1269 45 3.5% 374 30 8.0% 951 76 8.0%
Wet or Pooling Water 214 9 4.2% 80 1 1.3% 262 4 1.5% 313 7 2.2%
Snow, Slush, or Ice 135 10 7.4% 193 2 1.0% 284 3 1.1% 800 31 3.9%
Unknown or Other 9 1 - 2 0 - 5 0 - 17 0 -
Total 795 65 8.2% 1544 48 3.1% 925 37 4.0% 2081 114 5.5%
Trinity CASSRoad Conditions
at Time of Crash
Low-Tension 3-Cable Brifen WRSF Nucor NU-CABLE
Trinity CASSRoad Conditions
at Time of Crash
Low-Tension 3-Cable Brifen WRSF Nucor NU-CABLE
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5.2.3 Weather and Time of Year 
The number of crashes into cable barriers was plotted with severity against week number 
of each crash to determine if there was any additional adverse effect from the time of year, and 
by extension specific weather patterns, on crash severity and frequency. The result is shown in 
Figure 2. A significant spike in crashes was noted between December (beginning in week 47) 
and February (ending week 9), which was likely related to an increase in low-severity crashes 
during snowy or icy conditions. Crash frequency was also largely related to cultural patterns as 
well. For example, the spike in crashes during week 12 corresponds to the approximate time 
frame for collegiate spring breaks. Between weeks 13 and 47 during the year, crash rates were 
relatively constant and crash frequency distributions were random. However, no distinct pattern 
of fatalities could be discerned except for a rise during the middle of the year, which may be due 
to an increased number of vehicle miles traveled. 
 
Figure 2. Crash Frequency and Severity by Week Number 
For a different perspective, crash severity was also plotted by month, as shown in Figure 
3. The number of crashes was significantly higher in the winter months, especially in December, 
when the first snows of each winter season usually fell. Monthly averages of fatalities rose 
slightly between January and April, with large increases in fatalities during June, July, and 
September. This is likely the result of summer vacations and travel which is more common in the 
summer. The analogous drop in fatalities and crashes in August is likely due to the end of 
summer travel and vacations and correspond to the impending start of the school year. 
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Figure 3. Crash Frequency and Severity by Month 
5.2.4 Slope Characteristics 
A frequently-cited parameter for the likely cause of barrier containment failures was 
related to median slopes and barrier placement within medians. Median slopes were investigated 
in several different states to determine the relative contribution to the crash result. Whenever it 
was possible, median geometries were obtained exactly using site details collected by DOT 
personnel or using geotechnical surveying equipment. Ohio DOT was able to provide geodetic 
survey information for all roadways with cable median barrier installed. In other states, selected 
site tours and investigation using barrier geometries, photogrammetry, and reference 
configurations were applied to photographs of cable barriers at crash sites observable using the 
Google Maps street view application. 
The 857 cable median barrier crash records between 2007 and 2010 from Ohio were 
tabulated to determine the relative frequency of penetration and rollover crash events by median 
geometry. Crash results were tabulated by median geometries at the crash sites and are shown in 
Tables 14 through 16. Higher slope rates tended to increase penetration propensity, but there was 
a large number of penetrations which occurred on flat slopes or near roadway shoulders. Crashes 
into cable median barriers located on the back-side median ditch resulted in fewer penetrations 
than when the barrier was installed in either the ditch center or on the approach slope of the 
median. However, independent of barrier placement in the median, barriers placed in medians 
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with flat approach slopes always had an equal or higher rate of penetration than barriers located 
on an approach slopes with slope rates between 6:1 and 8:1. Since FHWA currently permits 
barriers to be placed on 6:1 or shallower approach slopes, these findings suggest that sloped 
median crashes occurring in medians wider than 40 ft (12 m) may not be as critical as was first 
estimated. 
Very few rollovers occurred on moderately steep slopes between 6:1 and 8:1. Rollovers 
were more frequent on the shallower slopes. More than 71% of the rollovers occurred on 
approach slopes of 8:1 or flatter. Alternatively, 13% of rollovers occurred on medians with 
approach slopes steeper than 6:1. However, 56.7% of all crashes on Ohio roadways occurred on 
roads with slopes of 8:1 or flatter, and steep median crashes constituted 13.9% of all crashes. 
Table 14. Crash Results for Flat or V-Ditch Medians with Barriers on Traffic-Side Slopes 
 
Table 15. Crash Results with Barriers Located Less than 4 ft (1.2 m) from Bottom of V-Ditch 
 
Approach Slope Crashes Penetrations % Penetrations Rollovers % Rollovers
Steeper than 6:1 74 11 14.9% 4 5.4%
6:1-8:1 128 8 6.3% 2 1.6%
8:1-10:1 118 6 5.1% 7 5.9%
Flatter than 10:1 174 18 10.3% 9 5.2%
All Crashes 494 43 8.7% 22 4.5%
Barrier on Traffic-Side Shoulder or Slope
Approach Slope Backside Slope Crashes Penetrations Penetrations Rollovers Rollovers
Steeper than 6:1 1 1 100.0% 0 -
6:1-8:1 5 0 - 0 -
8:1-10:1 6 2 33.3% 0 -
Flatter than 10:1 3 0 - 0 -
15 3 20.0% 0 -
Steeper than 6:1 7 1 14.3% 0 -
6:1-8:1 20 1 5.0% 0 -
8:1-10:1 11 1 9.1% 0 -
Flatter than 10:1 7 2 28.6% 0 -
45 5 11.1% 0 -
Steeper than 6:1 6 0 - 0 -
6:1-8:1 14 1 7.1% 0 -
8:1-10:1 10 2 20.0% 0 -
Flatter than 10:1 10 3 30.0% 0 -
40 6 15.0% 0 -
Steeper than 6:1 2 0 - 0 -
6:1-8:1 2 0 - 0 -
8:1-10:1 19 3 15.8% 3 15.8%
23 3 13.0% 3 13.0%
123 17 13.8% 3 2.4%
Total
Steeper than 6:1
6:1-8:1
Total
Barrier within 4 ft (1.2 m) of Ditch Bottom
Total
All Crashes
Total
8:1-10:1
Flatter than 10:1
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Table 16. Crash Results for V-Ditch Medians with Barriers Installed on Back Slope 
 
For moderately steep slopes of 6:1 to 8:1, the vehicle tended to travel toward the center of 
the ditch (i.e. to the lowest point), since that is an energetically favorable position due to 
minimization of gravitational potential energy. Barriers installed on these slopes applied 
redirective forces which were largely parallel with the slope because of the orientation of the 
vehicle at impact. Whereas the initial applied load on the vehicle due to cable barrier systems 
was large, if the vehicle’s orientation angle was not excessive, the slope tended to counteract the 
roll moment applied by the barrier on the vehicle. This was historically evident in most full-scale 
crash tests conducted on level and sloped terrain. Following redirection, vehicles departing cable 
barrier systems tended to redirect at very low angles [17-19]. Low-angle redirection on a 6:1 
slope caused a subsequent continued engagement between the vehicle and the barrier, and the 
reactive force from the cable barrier largely balanced the overturning moment from the slope, 
improving vehicle stability. The competing roll influences are explained in greater detail in 
Chapter 11. 
Occasionally, based on orientation angle, the vehicle yawed counterclockwise toward 
higher orientation angles (i.e., yawing with the left-front and right-rear corners leading) near a 
post location. When the yaw occurred on a slope, the vehicle pitched forward to allow the rear 
wheels to rise consistent with the slope, which increased local front tire-ground friction. On 
shallower slopes, the resistance was decreased, and on steeper slopes, resistance increased 
significantly. For moderate slopes such as 6:1 to 8:1 slopes, the increase in resistance due to yaw 
motion on the slope was not trivial but frequently did not contribute to rollover; instead, these 
slope rates tended to resist yaw rotations to 90 degree orientation angles, then increased yaw 
Approach Slope Backside Slope Crashes Penetrations Penetrations Rollovers Rollovers
Steeper than 6:1 12 0 - 0 -
6:1-8:1 9 1 11.1% 0 -
8:1-10:1 4 2 50.0% 0 -
Flatter than 10:1 5 2 40.0% 1 20.0%
30 5 16.7% 1 3.3%
Steeper than 6:1 7 0 - 0 -
6:1-8:1 31 1 3.2% 0 -
8:1-10:1 14 2 14.3% 0 -
Flatter than 10:1 14 2 14.3% 1 7.1%
66 5 7.6% 1 1.5%
Steeper than 6:1 11 0 - 0 -
6:1-8:1 19 2 10.5% 0 -
8:1-10:1 24 4 16.7% 4 16.7%
Flatter than 10:1 15 1 6.7% 1 6.7%
69 7 10.1% 5 7.2%
Steeper than 6:1 3 0 - 0 -
6:1-8:1 14 0 - 1 7.1%
8:1-10:1 58 7 12.1% 2 3.4%
75 7 9.3% 3 4.0%
240 24 10.0% 10 4.2%All Crashes
Total
Total
Total
Total
Steeper than 6:1
Flatter than 10:1
6:1-8:1
8:1-10:1
Barrier on Opposite Slope of V-Ditch
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tendency thereafter. If the vehicle did not trip as the vehicle orientation approached 90 degrees to 
the barrier, the vehicle stabilized and the trailing end of the vehicle rotated into the barrier and 
became the leading end. On flat or nearly flat slopes, there was no re-stabilizing slope which 
could shift the vehicle toward tracking in either frontal or rear directions. Instead, the increase in 
trailing-end tire friction due to tire slip tended to arrest the yaw motion of the vehicle near an 
orientation angle of 90 or 270 degrees and initiate rollover. 
A statistical analysis was conducted on the slope data to determine how crash outcome 
depended on median approach slope rate. A chi-squared test on crashes in Ohio indicated that 
occupants of vehicles involved in penetration or rollover crashes were 5 times more likely to be 
seriously injured or killed than occupants involved in non-penetration or non-rollover crashes. 
Further segregation of the crash data and additional statistical tests indicated that penetration 
crashes were 3-times more likely to produce serious injury or fatality, and rollover crashes were 
10-times more likely to involve A+K injuries, than non-penetration or non-rollover crashes.  
Other chi-squared tests for independence were performed on the penetration and rollover 
frequency as a function of slope steepness. The chi-squared test for independence indicated that 
penetration frequency was not independent of slope steepness at the 10% confidence level, and 
rollover frequency was not independent of slope steepness at the 4% confidence level. An 
analogous but equally true statement would be that the risk of penetration would be correlated to 
slope steepness in no less than 90% of the cable median barrier crashes, and the risk of rollover 
would be correlated to slope steepness in no less than 96% of the crashes. However, the 
functional nature of the correlation was not a factor in this test. 
Further investigation of the correlation demonstrated two trends which were supported by 
crash data in all of the participating states. In general, the highest risk of barrier penetration and 
rollover risk either occurred on slopes steeper than 6:1 or slopes flatter than 10:1. When the 
relative risk of rollover in each category was plotted against slope steepness, an asymptotic-like 
relationship was obtained in both system failure types. The penetration and rollover risk plots 
and interpolated risk curves obtained from this effort are shown in Figures 4 through 6. The 
lowest risk for both penetration and rollover combined occurred on median slopes between 7:1 
and 6:1, and the risk increased for both steeper and flatter slopes. Rollovers were more frequent 
on level ground than on steep slopes in this study, although there were a limited number of very 
steep slopes in this database. Penetrations were much more frequent on steeper slope rates; this 
was expected and was consistent with the current state-of-knowledge of cable barrier design with 
respect to vehicle motion on slopes. Median slope crash data is summarized in Tables 17 and 18. 
However, divided medians in Ohio were frequently wider than 50 ft (15 m). As a result, 
the bouncing and underride tendencies aggravated in narrow medians less than 40 ft (12 m) wide 
were not present in this database. Caution should be used when applying these results to narrow 
median applications.  
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Figure 4. Statistical Analysis of Penetration and Rollover Risk by Median Slope 
 
Figure 5. Estimated Ohio Median Approach Slope Risk Curves by Approach Slope Grade 
(Relative to Nucor Systems) 
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Figure 6. Estimated Ohio Median Approach Slope Risk Curves by Approach Slope Steepness 
(Relative to Nucor Systems) 
Table 17. Crash Result and Median Slope Summary 
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Barrier Position Approach Slope Crashes Penetrations % Penetrations Rollovers % Rollovers
Steeper than 6:1 74 11 14.9% 4 5.4%
6:1-8:1 128 8 6.3% 2 1.6%
8:1-10:1 118 6 5.1% 7 5.9%
Flatter than 10:1 174 18 10.3% 9 5.2%
TOTAL 494 43 8.7% 22 4.5%
Steeper than 6:1 15 3 20.0% 0 -
6:1-8:1 45 5 11.1% 0 -
8:1-10:1 40 6 15.0% 0 -
Flatter than 10:1 23 3 13.0% 3 13.0%
TOTAL 123 17 13.8% 3 2.4%
Steeper than 6:1 30 5 16.7% 1 3.3%
6:1-8:1 66 5 7.6% 1 1.5%
8:1-10:1 69 7 10.1% 5 7.2%
Flatter than 10:1 75 7 9.3% 3 4.0%
TOTAL 240 24 10.0% 10 4.2%
857 84 9.8% 35 4.1%
Summary of Median Slope Results
Traffic-Side 
Approach Slope
< 4 ft from Ditch 
Bottom
Opposite-Side 
Back Slope
All Crashes
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Table 18. Summary of Crash Result and Severity by Barrier Location and Median Slope 
 
Approximately 80% of the crashes in the Ohio database occurred on Nucor NU-CABLE 
barrier systems. Precise slope data were not available at the time of this study from most of the 
other states and barrier systems involved in this research effort. Nonetheless, a concerted effort 
was made to tabulate approximate median conditions in other states with different barrier 
systems.  
A database of Missouri median conditions available at all sites was beyond the scope of 
this study, but median geometries for serious crashes involving penetrations or rollovers were 
tabulated. The Missouri DOT had approximately 950 miles of low-tension, 3-cable median 
barrier installed on interstate roadways. Even though the vast majority of Missouri’s interstate 
system has V-ditches with slopes as steep as 4:1, many severe penetration and rollover crashes 
occurred on shallower slopes. Missouri’s severe crash data is shown in Tables 19 and 20. Unlike 
Ohio, many Missouri medians were relatively narrow, with widths of 40 ft (12 m) or less. 
Table 19. Missouri’s Severe Penetration Crash Median Slope Summary 
 
Barrier Location Crashes Penetrations Rollovers A+K Injuries
Shoulders (Either Side) 20 20.0% 5.0% 15.0%
Traffic-Side Slope 485 8.5% 4.3% 4.5%
Within 4 ft of Ditch Bottom 123 13.8% 2.4% 0.8%
Opposite-Side Slope 229 8.3% 4.4% 3.5%
All Traffic-Side Crashes 494 8.7% 4.5% 4.9%
All Opposite-Side Crashes 240 8.8% 4.2% 3.8%
All Crashes Not in Ditch Center 734 8.7% 4.4% 4.5%
All Crashes 857 9.5% 4.1% 4.0%
Shoulders (Both) Approach Slope Center Opposite Slope
4:1-6:1 1 4 5 1 11 26%
6:1-8:1 1 5 9 1 16 38%
8:1-10:1 0 2 6 1 9 21%
Flatter than 10:1 1 2 2 1 6 14%
3 13 22 4
7% 31% 52% 10%
Severe Penetration Crashes
All Severe 
Penetrations
All Severe 
Penetrations
Approach Slope
Barrier Installed On
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Table 20. Missouri’s Severe Rollover Crash Median Slope Summary 
 
Despite the limited data set, some tendencies were clear. Barriers installed on approach 
slopes relative to traffic flow of encroaching vehicles in Missouri were more frequently involved 
in penetration crashes, and the most common location for penetration was when the median 
barrier was located near the center of the slope. This is not surprising, and the same effect was 
observed in the Ohio median slopes database. Barriers installed on approach slopes, back slopes, 
and the center of the V-ditch were subject to the greatest variation in front-end height and impact 
orientation angles of the impacting vehicle [20]. Since a large number of low-tension, 3-cable 
median barrier installations in Missouri were located near the center of relatively steep, narrow 
V-ditches, it was not surprising that center impacts were most common in both the severe 
penetration and severe rollover crashes. However, a proportionate distribution of crashes on each 
slope type was not available, so estimates of the rates of penetrations or rollovers based on slope 
steepness were not applicable. 
Approximately 46% of all severe rollover crashes and 64% of all severe penetration 
crashes occurred on slope steeper than 8:1; this indicates that rollovers were less frequent on the 
steeper slopes than penetrations were. The slopes flatter than 8:1 were relatively infrequent in 
Missouri where cable median barriers were installed, but still accounted for 54% of all severe 
rollover crashes. General observations about median slope performance were not applicable in 
Missouri, since the database did not incorporate non-severe crashes. However, variations in the 
results of the Ohio and Missouri databases were likely due to four reasons:  (1) Missouri used a 
standard low-tension, 3-cable median barrier with S3x5.7 (S76x8.5) steel posts, which are 
stronger in weak-axis and strong-axis bending than most proprietary system posts; (2) the 
Missouri database was limited to only severe crashes; (3) slopes flatter than 6:1 were infrequent; 
and (4) medians were typically narrower in Missouri than in Ohio.  
5.2.5 Impact Conditions 
Vehicular impact conditions were investigated by performing crash reconstructions with 
available scene diagrams and photographic evidence, when available. A total of 110 severe 
crashes with enough information to reconstruct the crash were analyzed in the State of Missouri. 
Vehicle CG trajectory, orientation, and sideslip angles were calculated. Unfortunately, roadway 
curvature data were not available, which would allow for comparison of expected and actual CG 
trajectory angles; however, most roadways were straight in this study. 
Shoulders (Both) Approach Slope Center Opposite Slope
4:1-6:1 1 0 3 0 4 14%
6:1-8:1 2 1 6 0 9 32%
8:1-10:1 0 3 3 4 10 36%
Flatter than 10:1 0 2 3 0 5 18%
3 6 15 4
11% 21% 54% 14%
All Severe 
Rollovers
Severe Rollover Crashes
All Severe 
Rollovers
Approach Slope
Barrier Installed On
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The CG trajectory angle was defined as the angle formed between the vehicle CG path 
and a tangent line to the barrier at the point of impact (POI). Vehicle orientation angle was 
defined as the angle formed by a driver’s line of sight (LOS) and a tangent line to the barrier at 
the POI or equivalently, the angle between the vehicle’s centerline and the barrier tangent. The 
sideslip angle represented the degree to which a vehicle was “tracking,” a condition in which the 
rear tires follow the tracks of the front tires. Sideslip angles were measured between the CG 
trajectory angle and the orientation angle of the vehicle at the POI. For both trajectory and 
orientation angles, vehicle heading toward the median was positive ranging between 0 and 180 
degrees; heading angles directed away from the median ranged between 180 and 360 degrees. 
Trajectory angles were plotted by orientation angle and sideslip angle, and are shown in 
Figures 7 and 8. Although sideslip angles between the path of the vehicle and heading can 
exceed 90 deg, high sideslip angles were generated by non-zero yaw rates; this is assumed to be 
an effectively non-tracking impact condition. Moreover, if the driver was conscious and aware to 
steer the vehicle in avoidance maneuvers, a large number of drivers will also instinctively apply 
the brakes and attempt to stop an errant vehicle, which further contributes to non-tracking 
behavior. The threshold between when a vehicle was considered tracking and non-tracking was 
determined to be approximately 20 degrees based on analysis of non-tracking behavior on crash 
results [21]. 
The trajectory angle distribution was very high relative to other studies conducted on 
severe crash results. The severe CMB crash results were compared to the distribution of severe 
crash results in the 2010 NCHRP Report No. 665 database [22]. The 50th, 75th, 85th, and 95th 
percentiles of the severe CMB crash distributions corresponded to 18, 30, 38, and 53 degrees, 
respectively. By contrast, the 50th, 75th, 85th, and 95th percentile departure angles measured from 
the database of severe crashes in NCHRP Report No. 665, which was used to determine the test 
speed and angles for full-scale test criteria for assessing safety hardware, corresponded to 15, 22, 
26, and 36 degrees, respectively. 
 
Figure 7. CG Trajectory and Orientation Angles in Severe Cable Median Barrier Crashes 
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Figure 8. CG Trajectory and Sideslip Angles in Severe Cable Median Barrier Crashes 
 
Figure 9. Comparison of Trajectory Angle Distributions 
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Historically, the roadside safety community collectively agreed that the 85th percentile 
impact condition for both speeds and angles could be regarded as a practical worst-case impact 
scenario to evaluate roadside hardware. As has been discussed in depth, selection of practical 
impact conditions should not be subjective and should evaluate a system’s capacity to capture, 
contain, or redirect the majority of impacting vehicles [23]. Although the 25 degree impact angle 
previously used for crash tests using 4,400-lb (2,000-kg) pickup trucks was approximately 0.6 
degrees lower than the 85th percentile roadside departure condition identified in NCHRP Report 
No. 665, the small difference between testing and actual impact conditions suggested that the 
historical impact angle was sufficiently accurate for continued evaluation of roadside features. 
The departure angle was selected in lieu of the impact angle when determining appropriate 
testing conditions. This angle was selected for many reasons, including:   
(1) Initial impact location was affected by proximity of the struck object to the sides of 
the road. Impacts far from the road permit the vehicle to slow down to low speeds, 
reducing the crash severity that would normally occur with a barrier or roadside 
feature at much closer proximity. Because there are currently no required crash tests 
to evaluate vehicular braking in advance of a barrier system, impact conditions 
currently do not accommodate driver inputs prior to impact. 
(2) In many multiple-impact events, selection would have to be applied to determine 
which event was most significant, which introduces both subjectivity and error. Crush 
energy contributions were frequently very difficult to partition to individual impacts. 
(3) Barrier crashes were undersampled in the NCHRP Report No. 665 database. The 
small barrier crash data set prohibited meaningful statistical analysis out of barrier 
crash results. Furthermore, the majority of the barrier impact events were at much 
higher speeds than occurred in non-barrier crashes. 
(4) Some roadside departures resulting in disabling vehicle damage, such as rollovers, 
did not have a clearly defined orientation angle prior to impact. Interpretations of the 
effective location of impact varied widely, and vehicle orientation during these types 
of crashes was frequently difficult to determine. Orientation and departure angles 
were not only easier to measure at departure, they were often more meaningful, since 
crash testing has historically been conducted with fully-tracking vehicles.  
CG trajectory and orientation angles measured at the first recorded location of impact 
obtained from the NCHRP 665 database were much closer to the corresponding angles at impact 
measured in the severe cable median barrier crashes in Missouri. If current MASH [24] crash 
tests were conducted at the same speed but the angle was increased from 25 degrees to 39 
degrees, the impact severity (IS) of the crash would increase by 120%. Few barriers have ever 
been subject to this level of scrutiny. 
The CG trajectory and orientation angle plot was segregated by crash result into 
“Penetration”, “Rollover”, or “Other” categories. The segregated database is shown in Figure 10, 
and a detail view for vehicle orientation angles greater than -10 degrees is shown in Figure 11.  
Of all the severe cable median barrier crashes, 43% occurred with sideslip angles in 
excess of 20 degrees. Approximately 40% of penetration crashes were non-tracking at impact 
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with the barrier. Severe penetrations occurred more commonly at higher CG trajectory angles 
than severe rollovers. The median CG trajectory angle in severe penetration crashes in Missouri 
was 24 degrees, and the 85th percentile angle was 46 degrees.  
In Missouri, 63% of the severe rollover crashes that were caused by the cable median 
barrier occurred with CG trajectory angles less than 20 degrees. The median CG trajectory angle 
for the severe rollover crashes was 16 degrees, and the 85th percentile CG trajectory angle was 35 
degrees.  
Very few crashes occurred with “overcorrecting” and non-tracking impact conditions in 
which the driver of the vehicle was attempting to steer the vehicle away from the barrier. This 
type of orientation tended to promote a more “broadside” impact condition, where the side of the 
vehicle makes first contact with the barrier instead of the front end. This was likely a product of 
the generally steep terrain found in Missouri’s medians, and relatively narrow medians typically 
measuring 40 ft (12.2 m) wide. Drivers who steered into the median would then find it very 
difficult to steer away from the barrier and back up the approach slope, which could have 
contributed to fewer “overcorrecting” impacts.  
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Figure 10. CG Trajectory and Orientation Angles by Crash Result 
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Figure 11. Detail View of Severe Crash CG Trajectory and Orientation Angles in Missouri  
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Alternatively, “oversteering” impacts, in which the orientation angle of the vehicle was 
larger than the CG trajectory angle, were very common. Approximately 51% of severe 
penetration crashes, 53% of severe rollover crashes, and 49% of all severe crashes had 
“oversteering” conditions. Comparatively, 83% of severe penetrations, 85% of severe rollovers, 
and 82% of severe non-penetration, non- rollover crashes with non-tracking impact conditions 
were “oversteering” crashes. The high number of oversteering crashes in the median was a 
reflection of median geometry and roadway conditions. Vehicles which strike a cable median 
barrier located near the center of a V-ditch have a minimum lateral offset that must be traversed 
before impact, which tends to bias crash results toward higher CG trajectory angles. This crash 
condition was reflected in real-world crash results, but suggests that future testing of cable 
median barriers should be conducted for both tracking and non-tracking impact conditions. 
The crash set was further evaluated by considering the relationship between CG 
trajectory angle and containment rate for severe crashes. A cumulative distribution plot of CG 
trajectory angle for severe penetration and rollover crashes as well as severe non-penetration, 
non-rollover crashes is shown in Figure 12. A statistical analysis was conducted on the CG 
trajectory angle distributions, and a probability curve for likelihood of penetration or rollover 
crash results in severe cable median barrier crashes is shown in Figure 13.  
In all severe crashes, there was a minimum of a 49% risk of penetration or rollover at 
very small CG trajectory angles to a high risk of penetration or rollover at large CG trajectory 
angles. As the CG trajectory angle approached 90 degrees, the risk of penetration or rollover 
crash results in severe cable median barrier crashes approached 100%, indicating that with a 90 
degree CG trajectory angle and a severe crash result, every crash would be expected to be either 
a penetration or rollover.  
 
Figure 12. Cumulative Distribution of CG Trajectory Angles by Severe Crash Result 
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Figure 13. Probability Distribution of Containment Failure in Severe Crashes 
5.2.6 Comparison of Missouri and North Carolina 
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orientation angles, and observed a higher number of “backside” penetration crashes, in which the 
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Figure 14. Comparison of North Carolina, Missouri, and NCHRP Crashes 
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non-penetration and non-rollover crashes. The aggregate A+K crash severities for each system 
were reported, even when PSCC, RSCC, PSIF, and RSIF were not available.  
When data were not available for either rollover or penetration data sets, data subsets 
were created for each group and the results were compared to the composite totals. For every 
barrier except the low-tension cable median barrier, the subset distributions were nearly identical 
to the aggregate. Subsets of the low-tension cable median barrier crash results are compared in 
Tables 21 through 23.  
Although Gibraltar barrier systems were represented in the database, less than 100 total 
crashes and less than 15 total penetration crashes were available for analysis on the Gibraltar 
data. The Safence database was at the level of statistical significance (295 crashes); however, the 
number of penetrations was unknown and the tolerance on the number of A+K crashes in the 
rollover database was significant; the variation in a single crash at the A+K level would produce  
0.4% difference in net A+K rate. Therefore, PSCC, RSCC, PSIF, and RSIF were not calculated 
for these systems. Additionally, very few Brifen crashes were available for examination with 
respect to penetration frequencies, which rendered the PSCC and PSIF less useful. 
The “effective” A+K rate was a obtained by averaging the A+K ratios in the datasets, if 
average state-level data were available; otherwise it was equal to the sum of severe crashes 
divided by the total number of crashes. Since Missouri’s A+K ratio was known, it was included 
when calculating the effective A+K ratio, even though all cable median barrier crashes were not 
included in the data set. 
Based on the metrics created to analyze the crash results, several important but surprising 
conclusions were made. First, the barrier system with the lowest average severity was the low-
tension, 3-cable median barrier system. The maximum state-reported frequency of severe crashes 
on the low-tension, 3-cable median barrier was 2.0%. Even this maximum number was lower 
than every other barrier type analyzed in every other state.  
Second, rollover severity was higher on high-tension systems than on the low-tension, 3-
cable median barrier, on average. This was unexpected since the low-tension, 3-cable median 
barriers have the highest rates of rollover of all barrier systems. Although the proportionate 
number of rollovers was high, these crashes included “tip-overs” in which vehicles made less 
than 3 quarter-turns. When rollover crashes involved less than 3 quarter-turns, the rollovers were 
generally low-speed, and as such had a significantly lower risk of severe injury than higher-
speed rollovers. The rollover mechanism most commonly associated with low-speed rollovers 
was contact with post members. Since the low-tension cable median barrier uses the stiffest post 
in weak-axis bending, it is not surprising that rollovers occurred more frequently, but with lower 
average severity, than high-tension systems. A more complete discussion of rollover crashes is 
provided in Chapter 11. 
Third, severe penetration and rollover crashes had the highest representation of all severe 
crashes on low-tension cable median barriers. This indicated that the number of non-rollover, 
non-penetration severe crashes on low-tension cable median barrier was the lowest of all barrier 
types evaluated. Alternatively, this statistic indicated that uncontrolled or unknown types of 
serious injury mechanisms, such as occupant contact with system components or high-exit angle 
redirection crashes, were minimal.  
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Table 21. Crash Severities by System Type and Penetration Crash Outcome 
 
Table 22. Crash Severities by System Type and Rollover Crash Outcome 
 
PSCC = Penetration Severe Crash Contribution; ratio of number of severe penetration crashes to number of all severe crashes 
PSIF = Penetration Severity Increase Factor; ratio of percent risk of A+K crash in penetration crashes to non-penetration crashes 
RSCC = Rollover Severe Crash Contribution; ratio of number of severe rollover crashes to number of all severe crashes 
RSIF = Rollover Severity Increase Factor; ratio of percent risk of A+K in rollover crashes to non-rollover crashes 
Crashes Freq Penetrations Freq Crashes Freq Penetrations Freq Crashes Freq Penetrations Freq Crashes Freq Penetrations Freq Crashes Freq Penetrations Freq
Killed (K) 3 0.4% 3 100.0% 19 0.6% 10 52.6% 6 0.4% - - 3 0.4% 0 - 19 1.0% 7 36.8%
Disabling Injury (A) 13 1.6% 7 53.8% 25 0.7% 9 36.0% 34 2.2% - - 26 3.7% 7 26.9% 33 1.7% 5 15.2%
Moderate Injury (B) 59 7.4% 12 20.3% 164 4.9% 33 20.1% 109 7.0% - - 81 11.4% 10 12.3% 125 6.4% 13 10.4%
Slight Injury (C) 76 9.6% 12 15.8% 462 13.8% 37 8.0% 139 9.0% - - 58 8.2% 5 8.6% 173 8.9% 19 11.0%
Property Damage Only (O) 644 81.0% 63 9.8% 2688 80.0% 110 4.1% 1263 81.4% - - 543 76.4% 43 7.9% 1593 82.0% 129 8.1%
Severe Crashes (A+K) 16 2.0% 10 10.3% 44 1.3% 19 9.5% 40 2.6% - - 29 4.1% 7 10.8% 52 2.7% 12 6.9%
Total Applicable Crashes 795 - 97 12.2% 3358 - 199 5.9% 1551 - - 711 - 65 9.1% 1943 - 173 8.9%
CONTRIBUTION
PENETRATION FACTOR
Trinity CASS 3-Cable
13.7 PSIF - 3.5 PSIF 2.6 PSIF
Nucor NU-CABLE TL-3
62.5% PSCC - 24.1% PSCC 23.1% PSCC
Injury Severity
Low-Tension 3-Cable Set 1 Brifen WRSF TL-3Low-Tension 3-Cable Set 2
43.2% PSCC
12.8 PSIF
Crashes Freq Rollovers Freq Crashes Freq Rollovers Freq Crashes Freq Rollovers Freq Crashes Freq Rollovers Freq Crashes Freq Rollovers Freq
Killed (K) 3 0.4% 0 - 19 0.6% - - 6 0.4% 1 16.7% 3 0.3% 1 33.3% 20 1.0% 6 30.0%
Disabling Injury (A) 13 1.6% 3 23.1% 25 0.7% - - 34 2.2% 10 29.4% 35 3.7% 7 20.0% 35 1.7% 9 25.7%
Moderate Injury (B) 59 7.4% 22 37.3% 164 4.9% - - 109 7.0% 13 11.9% 93 9.9% 12 12.9% 130 6.4% 26 20.0%
Slight Injury (C) 76 9.6% 10 13.2% 462 13.8% - - 139 9.0% 7 5.0% 64 6.8% 7 10.9% 176 8.7% 13 7.4%
Property Damage Only (O) 644 81.0% 27 4.2% 2688 80.0% - - 1263 81.4% 18 1.4% 749 79.3% 7 0.9% 1661 82.1% 44 2.6%
Severe Crashes (A+K) 16 2.0% 3 4.8% 44 1.3% - - 40 2.6% 11 22.4% 38 4.0% 8 23.5% 55 2.7% 15 15.3%
Total Applicable Crashes 795 - 62 7.8% 3358 - - - 1551 49 3.2% 944 - 34 3.6% 2022 - 98 4.8%
CONTRIBUTION
ROLLOVER FACTOR 7.4 RSIF 7.7 RSIF
18.8% RSCC 27.5% RSCC 21.1% RSCC 27.3% RSCC
-3.0 RSIF 12.0 RSIF
-
Trinity CASS 3-CableLow-Tension 3-Cable Set 1 Brifen WRSF TL-3 Nucor NU-CABLE TL-3
Injury Severity
Low-Tension 3-Cable Set 2
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Table 23. Risk Factor Summary for Barrier Systems 
 
A closer examination of the non-penetration and non-rollover severe crashes with cable 
median barriers frequently incorporated occupant contact with posts supporting cables, unbelted 
occupant ejection, occupant compartment intrusion not caused by penetration or rollover events, 
and high lateral or longitudinal accelerations due to cable tension. All of these factors were more 
pronounced in the high-tension cable barrier system crashes than in low-tension system crashes, 
indicating that increased cable tension may have led to an increase in A+K crashes. 
Consideration of barrier placement may explain some of the differences in barrier 
performance. An analysis on the severity of crashes based on barrier location was conducted in 
Ohio. Crashes were tabulated based on barrier location in the median as Traffic Side, Center, or 
Opposite Side positions. Crashes with barriers included in the Center category were within 4 ft 
(1.2 m) of the center of the median. All installations further than 4 ft (1.2 m) from the median 
were either classified as Traffic Side or Opposite Side installations, depending on the vehicle’s 
direction of travel. A summary of the performance evaluation of crashes in Ohio is shown in 
Table 24. 
Table 24. Crash Severity by Barrier Location 
 
It was determined that the highest crash severity occurred with traffic-side installations, 
with an effective A+K rate of 4.9%. Barriers installed in the median center had an effective A+K 
rate of 1.6%, whereas barriers installed on the opposite side had an effective A+K rate of 3.4%. 
Chi-squared tests conducted comparing the Traffic and Opposite Side crashes to Center crashes 
were on the bounds of significance. The p-value of the severe crash comparison was 0.118, 
which was significant at the 12% confidence level. Comparison of the distribution of penetration 
and rollover crashes was much more significant, with a p-value of 0.002; this is very statistically 
significant. Likewise, if the injury distributions were shifted, and A, B, and K injuries were 
compared, the distributions were statistically different with p-value 0.020, and was statistically 
Low-Tension 
3-Cable
Brifen 
WRSF
Nucor 
NU-CABLE
Trinity CASS Gibraltar
Safence
(4-Cable)
PSCC 48.1% - 24.1% 23.1% - -
RSCC 22.8% 27.5% 21.1% 27.3% - -
TOTAL 70.8% - 45.2% 50.3% - -
PSIF 13.2 - 3.5 2.6 - -
RSIF 3.0 12.0 7.4 7.7 - -
AVERAGE 8.1 - 5.4 5.2 - -
EFFECTIVE A+K 1.8% 2.6% 4.1% 2.7% 2.9% 2.2%
Barrier Location Crashes Penetrations Rollovers A+K Injuries
Traffic-Side 235 8.7% 4.5% 4.9%
Center 128 14.1% 3.1% 1.6%
Opposite-Side 494 7.7% 3.8% 3.4%
Traffic- and Opposite-Sides 729 8.4% 4.3% 4.4%
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significant at the 2% level. Therefore, it can be conclusively determined that the distributions of 
crashes are not similar, and it is very likely that barriers placed in the center of medians are 
associated with fewer severe crashes than installations on the traffic- or opposite sides of the 
roadway. Although it was beyond the level of statistical significance, the analysis also suggested 
a higher rate of severe crash outcomes with installations placed near either shoulder. 
5.3 Discussion 
Results from this study were groundbreaking in several facets. To date, few studies were 
available which have applied a broad cross-section evaluation of any barrier type to determine 
weaknesses, barrier containment failures, and potential improvements which could be made on 
the barrier systems. As such, there was little precedent on which to build in this crash study, and 
many recommendations made previously were determined to be less advantageous than 
originally believed. 
With the lack of precedent, surveyed state DOTs could not supply all of the information 
desired by researchers. No single state could supply a comprehensive data set with crash reports 
filed by responding emergency personnel and DOT staff, photos of crash scenes, measurements 
from crash sites, vehicle information, and slope geometries. Most states dedicated effort to assist 
with individual portions of the data requested even at cost to the state DOTs. The information 
presented in this report represents the best-effort and broad cooperation of state DOTs pooling 
information together to solve problems and improve cable barrier safety performance. As a 
result, some interpolation and extrapolation was necessary, which introduced uncertainty in the 
analysis. 
One element of cable barrier serious crash risk included risk due to motorcyclist travel. 
Motorcyclist impacts with cable median barriers have historically caused concern. A study 
completed in 2011 determined that although motorcyclist traffic accounted for approximately 2% 
of all cable median barrier crashes, over 40% of those crashes were severe [25]. Out of states 
with complete data sets in this study, 13 motorcyclists were involved in crashes with cable 
median barriers, and 10 of those crashes were severe, with 4 fatalities. In Missouri, out of 127 
severe crashes, motorcyclists accounted for 3 crashes, or 2.4% of all serious and fatal crash 
events. Motorcyclist safety will continue to be a concern for roadside safety engineers. 
Lastly, it should be noted that high-severity crashes which occurred with barrier systems 
installed on roadway shoulders were not caused by problems with construction. No cable median 
barrier installation observed was found to be deficient with respect to manufacturer’s installation 
recommendations. However, site-specific analysis was limited to detailed narrative, site drawing, 
photographic, and scene diagram evidence. Future improvements to cable median barrier designs 
must be accomplished to realize the maximum safety improvement potential. 
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6 CASE STUDY 
One distinctive discrepancy in the data set in particular was centered around the Trinity 
Cable Safety System (CASS) performance in Utah versus Washington. Both states had a 
significant number of miles of CASS system installed yet the rates of penetration on this system 
were markedly different between the states. In fact, the average rate of penetration due to the 
combined effects of vehicle underride, override, and rollover on CASS systems in Utah was only 
6.1% on a per-crash basis. However, in Washington, the rate of penetration was much higher, 
with a possible net frequency of 14.5%. Cross-median events in which the vehicle entered 
opposing lanes totaled 4.6% of all cable median barrier crashes in Washington, and CMCs 
resulting from cable median barrier penetrations occurred in 2.0% of all CMB crashes. Yet, 
based on images of barrier installations along Washington and Utah roadways using Google 
Street View, there were no apparent differences between the states with respect to barrier 
construction using the C-channel post, and both states rigorously maintained recommended 
barrier placement guidelines provided by FHWA and research reports. An analysis of the 
differences between Utah and Washington results is provided below. 
6.1 Weather Conditions 
Along the I-15 corridor in Utah, annual snowfall totals can exceed 200 in. (5,080 mm) 
per year, more than 10 times greater than the state average. The precipitation totals along I-15 are 
much higher than the remainder of the state, as shown in Figure 1. More than 50% of all crashes 
reported in Utah involved snowfall. This was more than twice as large as the snow representation 
in Washington. Although some locations in Washington received high snow totals, particularly at 
higher-elevation locations near the mountains, the majority of the crashes into cable median 
barrier occurred in coastal regions where snowfall was infrequent. Snowfall tended to decrease 
both penetration and rollover propensity, whereas frequent rain near cable barrier locations could 
contribute to weak post-soil interaction in Washington, increasing penetration propensity. 
6.2 Traffic Volumes 
Typical ADT counts in Washington on roadways with cable median barriers varied 
between 20,000 vehicles per day to over 100,000 vehicles per day throughout the state. In Utah, 
traffic volumes ranged from less than 10,000 vehicles per day to over 100,000 vehicles per day 
on similar roadways with cable median barrier. More crashes in Utah occurred on roadways with 
lower traffic volumes than in Washington. The average difference in traffic volumes between 
crashes in Utah and Washington was over 20%. Furthermore, a larger percentage of heavy trucks 
were present in Washington relative to Utah. Thus, cross-median and penetration crash events 
which were not within the design limits of the barrier occurred. Although these crashes were not 
part of the failure analysis study since these barriers were not designed to withstand impact from 
larger trucks, these crashes nonetheless contributed to some severe injuries. 
6.3 Avoidance Maneuvers 
In Utah, most cable barrier crashes were caused by vehicles losing control due to wet, 
snow-covered, or icy road conditions. Crashes in which the vehicle striking the cable median 
barrier encountered dry roads and clear weather conditions in addition to being involved in 
avoidance maneuvers, were relatively sparse. For example, the frequency of avoidance-related 
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crashes in Utah was approximately 9.0%, and at least one additional vehicle contributed to the 
crash sequence in 19.8% of the cable barrier crashes. Although avoidance maneuver statistics 
could not be obtained for Washington crashes, approximately 37.2% of crashes involved more 
than one vehicle, which was nearly twice the rate of Utah. This suggests that due to large traffic 
volumes, avoidance maneuvers occurred more frequently in Washington than in Utah, and fewer 
severe crashes occurred in Utah as a result. 
Avoidance maneuvers generally resulted in higher CG trajectory and orientation angles 
because of highly-dynamic, large steering angle motions. These motions can alter a vehicle’s 
travel path and cause a non-tracking skid engagement. As was observed in the Missouri cable 
median barrier impact angle analysis, high CG trajectory and orientation angles frequently led to 
severe penetration crash events. The lower number of avoidance-related crashes in Utah 
indicated that many cable barrier crashes were likely low-angle events caused by loss of control, 
not avoidance from an adjacent or encroaching vehicle.  
6.4 Median Geometries 
Medians on Washington roadways frequently ranged between 35 and 50 ft (10 and 15 m) 
wide. Over 63% of the crashes in Washington occurred with maximum median widths less than 
45 ft (13.7 m). In Utah, however, average median widths exceeded 50 ft (15 m) in many sample 
sites measured from satellite images with map scaling using CAD programs. Some median 
widths on roadways with cable median barrier installed approached 80 ft (24.3 m).  
Cross-median crashes occurred on roads with median widths exceeding 70 ft (21 m), as 
recorded in the California, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Missouri studies mentioned previously 
[2,6,8,12]. By placing a barrier in the median, the barrier impact absorbs some energy from a 
crash even if a penetration occurs. By decreasing vehicle energy and providing some lateral 
resistance during impact, the tendency for cross-median crashes to occur on roads with wide 
medians drops significantly. With this reduction in CMCs, severe crash risks are also reduced. 
In Utah, with larger medians and relatively flat slopes (most slopes were between 6:1 and 
10:1), a higher proportion of impacts occurred on the median slopes with lowest risk of 
penetration than in Washington, based on the median slope results shown in Figure 6. Site-
specific estimates in Washington indicated that the roads with the highest rates of penetration 
were sites with either fairly flat (i.e., flatter than 8:1) or steep (i.e., greater than 6:1) median 
slopes. The two roads with the lowest rates of penetration had estimated slope rates of between 
6:1 and 8:1 over much of the protected length, and much of that roadway was at 8:1.  
6.5 Barrier Placement 
Cable median barriers were also frequently placed near the edge of median shoulders in 
Washington, adjacent to the travel lanes. In Utah, many cable median barrier installations were 
located in the median, either 1 ft (0.3 m) or 8 ft (2.4 m) from the ditch centerline, or up to 16 ft 
(4.9 m) from the road. Barrier installations near the ditch center can reduce the number of 
nuisance hits by allowing an opportunity for vehicles to correct from errant maneuvers. When 
vehicles are engaged in avoidance maneuvers, CG trajectory angles tend to increase relative to 
the barrier proportionately with the distance between the travel lanes and the barrier installation. 
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During loss of control, however, vehicle speeds at impact were typically lower when barriers 
were far from the roadway due to heavy braking and skidding.  
Swerving, avoidance, or over-correcting maneuvers in Washington caused more vehicles 
to strike the barrier at higher orientation angles and CG trajectory angles. Barriers located on the 
shoulder permitted the vehicle striking the barrier from adjacent travel lanes to pry under or 
override the cables, and vehicles impacting from the opposite direction to pry underneath or 
launch over the barrier. Crash outcomes depended on the impact angles, impact speeds, slope 
rates, and vehicle profiles.  
6.6 Conclusions 
As a result, it was reasonable to assume that average impact CG trajectory angles and 
speeds during cable barrier impacts in Washington were higher than the average impact CG 
trajectory angles and speeds in Utah. This determination was based on the frequencies in snow-
related crashes, as well as differences in median widths, traffic volumes, and the number of lanes 
on each roadway where crashes occurred. Similar arguments can also be provided for many of 
the states participating in this study.  
However, Washington provided a tabulated list of only whether or not a rollover 
occurred, as well as the maximum injury level sustained in a crash, in lieu of which vehicle 
rolled and which vehicle had the highest severity. Rollovers occurred in 12% of all crashes 
involving more than one vehicle in Washington, and data from other states suggested that in at 
least 15% of multi-vehicle crashes involving cable median barrier, and possibly up to 30%, the 
vehicle which does not strike the cable median barrier was involved in the rollover. This could 
reduce the actual rate of rollover on Washington systems by 1.8% to 3.6%. Similarly, multiple 
vehicles were involved in most of the severe crashes in Washington. Approximately 1.5% of all 
Washington crashes were A+K crashes not involving head-on collisions with vehicles in 
opposing travel lanes. Approximately 20% of the non-cross-median serious crashes in which 
multiple vehicles were involved should not have been classified as serious crashes due to higher 
injury severity to an occupant in the vehicle which did not strike the barrier than in the vehicle 
which did. Accounting for this adjustment, the average rate of severe crashes caused by the cable 
median barrier would be reduced to 2.1% in Washington, which compares favorably with all 
other states in this study. Unfortunately, these adjustments cannot be made on the individual case 
level, which could affect one installed system to a greater degree than another. 
However, none of the aforementioned factors should increase liability to any state 
participating in this study. As stated, this study was both groundbreaking and unique, and the 
recommendations provided in this research establish a precedent for future research and 
consideration. Barrier installations already constructed or in construction prior to the publication 
of this report cannot be treated with the same scrutiny as future barrier installations. Benefit-to-
cost analyses are required to provide improved guidance in the future changes to policy and 
construction. Furthermore, all states participating in this study indicated that the findings would 
be helpful to guide future policy and construction, as part of a very active attempt to improve 
roadside safety. For this reason, states participating in this study should be lauded for their 
enduring commitments to safety. 
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For example, expanding median widths and regrading medians of established roadways 
can be often impossible due to constraints on the right-of-way, drainage, and prohibitively large 
construction costs in these locations. The benefit-to-cost ratios of many of these efforts are often 
much less than 1. Future construction projects may not have a sufficient budget to address these 
needs as well. Furthermore, no median slope was “immune” to either penetration or rollover 
crashes; only a minimization was observed. Instead, it is generally desirable that modifications 
can be made to existing cable median barrier systems to improve performance regardless of 
placement or median slope rate, since this generally has a lower net cost to the state and a higher 
propensity for better overall barrier performance. However, such developments require extensive 
crash-testing, design and validation work, marketing, and production, and it will require time for 
manufacturers to develop products to address these newly-identified needs. 
In every state, significant effort was expended to adhere to the current state of knowledge 
of cable median barrier construction and recommendations at the time of barrier installation [26-
28]. It has been frequently re-iterated in roadside safety conversations that barrier installations at 
or near the shoulder should decrease impact severity; the opposite effect was observed. Most 
cable median barrier placement guidelines have been developed based on case studies and 
simulations of cable median barrier impacts, and have led to some important and meaningful 
conclusions about improper placement and practices. However, in nearly every design simulation 
utilized by roadside safety research organizations, modeled cable properties were not reflective 
of actual cable material and physical properties [29]. However, since replacing systems installed 
on the shoulder could also be cost-prohibitive compared to the safety benefit realized; a better 
solution would be to improve barrier design for systems installed on shoulders. 
Every cable median barrier system evaluated in this study has passed NCHRP Report No. 
350 crash test standards at the TL-3 impact conditions. Currently, there are no standards or 
requirements for agencies or states to test barriers to non-standard impact conditions, and 
systems are currently in testing according to MASH standards. However, impact conditions 
which led to an increased propensity for penetration through the barrier or rollover were not 
consistent with NCHRP Report 350 or MASH crash-testing standards. Oversteering crashes 
dominated the database, occurring more frequently than even low-sideslip crashes. Since no 
cable median barrier has been tested with these impact conditions to date, and these impact 
conditions are not required for a barrier system to be installed in the median of a roadway in the 
National Highway System (NHS), there is no meaningful argument that states or barrier 
manufacturers have acted negligently with respect to any existing barrier installation or barriers 
currently under construction.  
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7 VEHICLE ANALYSIS 
7.1 Introduction 
Vehicle profiles have often been cited as critical factors in the performance of cable 
median barrier systems. Unfortunately, a comprehensive cross-sectional analysis of cable median 
barrier crashes and vehicle profiles has not been available. It was frequently cited in publications 
and re-iterated in conversations with DOT representatives that cable median barriers are less 
capable of safely containing larger, taller vehicles such as trucks, as well as to low-profile, 
narrow-front-end vehicles such as roadster or sport car vehicles. Furthermore, many experts 
believed some vehicles were uniquely susceptible to penetration or rollover compared to other 
vehicles, due to inertial, suspension, and front profile differences [e.g. 10, 20, 27]. As a result, it 
was uncertain whether the roadside safety community was conducting crash tests with 
representative practical worst-case vehicles, or if more critical vehicles should be used. 
Based on vehicle makes, models, and years involved in cable median barrier crashes, a 
database was constructed relating vehicle dimensions and properties to crash results. Data from 
states not providing vehicle year, make, and model were excluded from the analysis. 
Two different reference databases of vehicle dimensions were consulted to identify 
critical features of vehicles involved in roadside safety crashes. The first reference was the 
National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) crash testing vehicle data 
spreadsheet, which tabulated vehicle dimensions and weights of vehicles used in various crash 
testing programs including the New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) [30]. The second resource 
consulted included dimensions of various vehicles tabulated by make, model, and year. The data 
were assembled by expert crash reconstructionists into the program Expert AutoStats, produced 
by 4N6XPRT Systems. 
Vehicle dimensions and inertial properties of both databases were compared. In general, 
less information was available from the NHTSA dataset, since data tabulation in the NHTSA set 
supported frontal crash testing programs. Discrepancies between the databases were typically 
minimal, with the exception of weights. The differences are believed to be the result of the 
inclusion of dummies in NCAP testing. 
7.2 Vehicle Types 
Vehicle types were classified using a simple heuristic combination of Highway Loss Data 
Institute (HLDI) classifications of passenger cars, and segregation of utility vehicles into van, 
SUV, and light truck profiles. HLDI classifications segregated passenger cars by wheelbase and 
overall length. Small cars were defined to be cars with total lengths less than 180 in. (4,572 mm) 
and wheelbases less than 105 in. (2,667 mm). Mid-size cars were defined as vehicles with 
wheelbases between 105 and 110 in. (2,667 and 2,794 mm) and overall lengths between 180 and 
195 in. (4,572 and 4,953 mm), and large cars were taken to be the remainder of the passenger 
cars. Tractor-trailer, large truck, and commercial or mass transit vehicles were categorized as 
“Large Vehicles,” but due to the relatively low frequency of impacts at only 1.9% of all crashes, 
a detailed analysis of tractor-trailer and large vehicle crashes was not conducted.  
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The impact distribution by vehicle type is shown in Figure 15. Each distribution was 
plotted as a percentage with the type of crash noted. Small cars were involved in the highest 
number of crashes and penetrations, but were involved in fewer rollovers than SUVs. Likewise, 
mid-size cars were involved in the second highest number of crashes and penetrations, but were 
involved in fewer rollovers than small cars, SUVs, and pickups, in terms of total crashes. 
 
Figure 15. Vehicle Types Involved in Cable Barrier Crashes 
By comparison, rates of vehicle penetration and rollover on a per-crash basis are shown 
in Figure 16. Large cars were involved in the highest frequency of penetration crashes, followed 
by vans, mid-size cars, and small cars. Surprisingly, pickups had the lowest rates of penetration 
of any vehicle type. Although some pickup models were identified which had a higher 
susceptibility to penetration crashes, as discussed later, generally pickups were not prone to 
penetrating through cable median barriers. Rollovers were infrequent with all passenger car 
types, but were common for larger vehicles, averaging more than 10% of all pickup, SUV, and 
van crashes combined.  
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Figure 16. Frequency of Barrier Failure by Vehicle Type 
Serious injury and fatal crashes were distributed between all vehicle classes, as shown in 
Figures 17 and 18. Large car and SUV crashes were more severe in general than small car, mid-
size car, or pickups. Vans had the highest rate of severe crashes. A high number of severe 
crashes occurred involving vans. Tractor-trailer crashes involved a high number of cross-median 
crashes and rollovers which contributed to the increased average crash severity. 
SUVs and large cars were involved in a disproportionately high number of severe 
crashes. The high rate of severe crashes with these vehicle classes correlated with the high 
rollover and penetration rates. Likewise, despite a high rate of rollovers, pickup trucks were 
involved in a significantly lower number of penetration crashes than other vehicle types, which 
contributed to a comparable rate of severe crashes as small and mid-size cars. 
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Figure 17. Risk of A+K Crash by Vehicle Type 
 
Figure 18. Frequency of Severe Injury by Crash Result and Vehicle Type 
An analysis of severe crashes based on barrier containment rates indicated that the 
majority of severe crashes were associated with barrier containment failures, as shown in Figure 
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19. The highest frequencies of severe crashes based on containment failures occurred with large 
cars, SUVs, and pickups. Not surprisingly, vans had the lowest rate of severe injuries related to 
barrier containment failures, since the penetration and rollover rates for vans were not extremely 
high while the severe crash rate was conversely very high. Also, mid-size cars were involved in 
more crashes in which the vehicle became entrapped in the cables and cables crushed the hood, 
roof, or windshield, or penetrated into the occupant compartment of convertibles. As a result, 
more non-containment failure related crashes were severe involving mid-size cars than other 
vehicle types. 
 
Figure 19. Percentage of Severe Crashes Related to Containment Failures 
7.3 Vehicle Factor Analysis 
In order to evaluate the statistical relationships between vehicle parameters and CMB 
containment failures, chi-squared tests were performed to evaluate the similarity between vehicle 
parameters and the global distribution related to that parameter. The statistical weighting scale 
used to evaluate statistical significance is shown in Table 25. 
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Table 25. Scales Used to Evaluate Statistical Significance of Chi-Squared Tests 
 
7.3.1 Summary of Important Findings 
A summary of critical results pertaining to penetration and rollover crashes is shown in 
Table 26. It was obvious that the distribution of vehicles involved in rollover events varied 
considerably from the composite distribution. The composite distribution was defined as the 
database of all crashes.  
Containment failure causes were not known for many of the penetration and rollover 
crashes in which vehicle year, make, and model were known. As a result, penetration and 
rollover rates could not be segregated for every vehicle. If crashes without containment failure 
causes were excluded, the dataset was too small to make critical analysis of the features which 
contributed to penetration or rollover. Thus, all containment failures were included and analyzed 
in this dataset. In addition, containment failure data from Missouri and North Carolina, which 
oversampled severe and penetration crashes, respectively, were included. Overall penetration, 
rollover, and severe crash rates were used to scale the resultant frequencies of penetration and 
rollover to the calculated national average. 
Lower Limit
p-value
Upper Limit
p-value
Interpretation
0 0.15 Statistically Independent
0.15 0.25 Likely Independent
0.25 0.4 Possibly Independent
0.4 0.6 No Conclusion
0.6 0.75 Possibly Similar
0.75 0.85 Likely Similar
0.85 1 Statistically Similar
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Table 26. Chi-Squared Tests for Independence of Tested Vehicle Factors 
 
Penetration Rollover
Weight 0.7972 0.0000 Likely Similar Statistically Independent
Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars 0.0758 0.2870 Statistically Independent Possibly Independent
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans 0.1415 0.1914 Statistically Independent Likely Independent
Wheelbase 0.4496 0.0005 No Conclusion Statistically Independent
Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars 0.0582 0.6882 Statistically Independent Possibly Similar
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans 0.2674 0.8409 Possibly Independent Likely Similar
Track Width 0.5099 0.0187 No Conclusion Statistically Independent
Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars 0.0320 0.6503 Statistically Independent Possibly Similar
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans 0.3922 0.3348 Possibly Independent Possibly Independent
Bumper Height 0.5732 0.0000 No Conclusion Statistically Independent
Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars 0.8591 0.4536 Statistically Similar No Conclusion
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans 0.5924 0.2010 No Conclusion Likely Independent
Center of Headlight Height 0.2634 0.0000 Possibly Independent Statistically Independent
Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars 0.5394 0.7157 No Conclusion Possibly Similar
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans 0.5454 0.4408 No Conclusion No Conclusion
Front Hood Height 0.6267 0.0000 Possibly Similar Statistically Independent
Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars 0.0320 0.6503 Statistically Independent Possibly Similar
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans 0.3922 0.3348 Possibly Independent Possibly Independent
Rear Bumper Height 0.0615 0.0853 Statistically Independent Statistically Independent
Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars 0.2890 0.8065 Possibly Independent Likely Similar
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans 0.3338 0.3627 Possibly Independent Possibly Independent
Top of Trunk Height 0.4531 0.0000 No Conclusion Statistically Independent
Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars 0.5263 0.6545 No Conclusion Possibly Similar
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans 0.7745 0.9159 Likely Similar Statistically Similar
CG Height 0.1691 0.0000 Likely Independent Statistically Independent
Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars 0.2053 0.1585 Likely Independent Likely Independent
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans 0.2089 0.5335 Likely Independent No Conclusion
CG from Front Axle 0.6634 0.0000 Possibly Similar Statistically Independent
Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars 0.9015 0.1211 Statistically Similar Statistically Independent
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans 0.4500 0.9136 No Conclusion Statistically Similar
Turning Circle Diameter 0.1363 0.0340 Statistically Independent Statistically Independent
Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars 0.1950 0.8586 Likely Independent Statistically Similar
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans 0.7420 0.8660 Possibly Similar Statistically Similar
Max Turning Angle 0.3267 0.4031 Possibly Independent No Conclusion
Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars 0.3354 0.7174 Possibly Independent Possibly Similar
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans 0.7855 0.5520 Likely Similar No Conclusion
Roll Moment-of-Inertia 0.9626 0.0000 Statistically Similar Statistically Independent
Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars 0.0497 0.1406 Statistically Independent Statistically Independent
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans 0.4665 0.2802 No Conclusion Possibly Independent
Yaw Moment-of-Inertia 0.4904 0.0008 No Conclusion Statistically Independent
Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars 0.6047 0.1987 Possibly Similar Likely Independent
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans 0.1170 0.9384 Statistically Independent Statistically Similar
Comparison of Subset to Global SetRollover Subset 
p-value
Penetration Subset 
p-value
Distributions Evaluated for
Independence using
Chi-Squared Tests
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As shown in Figure 16, SUVs were involved in rollovers in approximately 13% of all 
crashes. Likewise, rollovers occurred in 9.4% and 9.3% of all pickup and van crashes, 
respectively. With such a significant frequency of rollovers occurring with larger vehicles, the 
combined distribution of vehicle dimensions, weights, and inertial properties varied at an 
overwhelmingly statistically significant level from the distribution of all crashes, which was 
much more balanced in terms of vehicle representation. 
By contrast the penetration subset was largely inconclusive with respect to the composite 
dataset. While penetration crash frequency was the highest with large cars, penetrations varied 
between 9% and 11% of all crashes for four of the vehicle body types. Thus, penetration crashes 
did not vary widely from the global composite distribution. The large similarity between the 
penetration rates suggests that other factors than the vehicle type, including impact conditions, 
median barrier placement, and median slopes have a stronger correlation with penetration 
propensity than the vehicle type. Certain features on impacting vehicles, such as sharp front nose 
profiles, rear bumper heights, turning circle diameters, and CG heights, serve to accentuate the 
risk of penetration. 
Vehicle dimensions tabulated from both the NHTSA database and 4N6XPRT Expert 
AutoStats program were plotted and compared. Some discrepancies were observed in the 
distributions of vehicle wheelbase, weight, and CG heights using both methods, but most of the 
variations were within 5% difference. The only statistically significant difference occurred with 
large vehicle wheelbases and weights. For example, the Chi-squared error, calculated using the 
formula 
 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 =
(𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑢𝑚 𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑠−𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑢𝑚 𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑠)2
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑢𝑚 𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑠
 
was 52.5 for wheelbases between 115 and 120 in. (2,921 and 3,048 mm), heavily oversampling 
larger vehicles in the NHTSA database. As a result, overall p-values of the distributions were 
less than 0.001. 
7.3.2 Vehicle Curb Properties 
Weight distributions varied widely between the NHTSA and AutoStats databases, and are 
shown in Figure 20. The discrepancies in weights were likely the result of added weight which 
could be attributable of dummies, ballast, and instrumentation used in NCAP testing. 
Additionally, the Expert AutoStats program tabulated the vehicle curb weights, whereas the 
NHTSA database tabulated gross weight prior to testing. The resultant difference in weights was 
approximately 500 lb (227 kg) for the composite distributions.  
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Figure 20. Distribution of Vehicle Weight in Severe CMB Impacts by Crash Result 
Differences in the database were also related to the information constraints available in 
the NHTSA database. When certain years or models of vehicle were not available, the database 
was cross-referenced using knowledge of the structural frames used in each model year. For 
example, the Ford Taurus and the Mercury Sable were geometrically similar and built on the 
same frames through 2006. When one vehicle type was involved in a crash and information on 
that year or model could not be found, a search was made for an analogous vehicle platform and 
shape from the same year. Also, vehicles from the same production generation years were 
examined and occasionally data from older or newer vehicles of the same model were used. As a 
result, dimensions and properties obtained from the NHTSA database were extrapolated to the 
available vehicles, and were therefore an approximation. This approximation was excellent for 
small, mid-size, and full-size cars and SUVs, but was poor for pickups and vans.  
Comparisons of the curb weights and exterior dimensions of vehicles in the Expert 
AutoStats programs matched manufacturer-provided data in discrete tests. In light of the 
differences between the databases, unrealistically high weights, the need for approximations to 
associate dimensions in the NHSTA database, and the greater volume of data available using the 
Autostats database, the Expert AutoStats data results were concluded to be more accurate and 
thus are exclusively shown from this point forward. 
The distribution of vehicle weights plotted by crash result and vehicle body type is shown 
in Figure 21. The global vehicle weights were poor estimates for the independent effects 
observed in the databases. In particular, the global rollover distribution suggests that heavier 
vehicles, as a whole, are more likely to be involved in rollover crashes than lighter vehicles. 
However, a comparison by vehicle types indicate the opposite effect is likely true – lighter cars 
are more commonly involved in rollovers than heavier cars, and there does not appear to be a 
causal relationship between SUV, pickup, and van rollovers and vehicle weights. Passenger car 
rollover relationships were not statistically significant because there were few passenger car 
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rollovers, but it is believed that the relationship would be significant with additional data. By 
contrast, heavier passenger cars were statistically significantly more likely to be involved in 
penetrations than lighter vehicles. Heavier SUV, van, and pickup vehicles also were involved in 
more penetrations than lighter vehicles. Individual plots of the relationships between vehicle 
weights and penetration and rollover propensities are shown in Figures 22 and 23. 
 
Figure 21. Distribution of Vehicle Weights by Crash Result and Vehicle Type 
 
Figure 22. Crash Result by Vehicle Weight, Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars 
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Figure 23. Crash Result by Vehicle Weight, SUVs, Pickups, and Vans 
Cable barrier failure propensity based on wheelbase is shown in Figure 24. The 
distribution of vehicles was plotted with the frequency of penetration or rollover in each 
category. Rollovers were more frequent with increasing wheelbase. Recall that small car classes 
according to HLDI classifications had wheelbases less than 105 in. (2,667 mm) and total lengths 
less than 185 in. (4,699 mm), and mid-size cars had wheelbases between 105 and 110 in. (2,667 
and 2,794 mm) and overall lengths between 180 and 195 in. (4,572 and 4,953 mm). Because 
mid-size cars had such a low rate of rollovers, the rollover curve reached a minimum in the mid-
size car wheelbase range of 4.7% of crashes.  
Approximately 57% of all crashes into cable median barrier involved vehicles with 
wheelbases ranging between 100 and 110 in. (8 ft-4 in. and 9 ft-2 in., or 2,540 and 2,794 mm). 
Of all vehicles with wheelbases exceeding 130 in. (3,302 mm), 106 vehicles were pickup trucks, 
6 were SUVs, and 16 were vans. The high contribution of pickups in this large wheelbase 
category likely contributed to the increase in rollover frequency. 
The wheelbase distribution was further segregated by vehicle type. Small car, mid-size 
car, and full-size car classes were segregated into one group, and SUVs, vans, and pickups were 
segregated into a second group. Plots of the two groupings are shown in Figures 25 and 26. 
Rollover rates were relatively flat when segregated by vehicle type, which indicated that 
wheelbase alone was not a causative factor in rollover crashes. Vehicle type was a controlling 
factor. Alternatively, mid-length SUVs, pickups, and vans had high penetration rates, whereas 
mid-length cars had the lowest penetration rates. 
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Figure 24. Crash Result Based on Wheelbase 
 
Figure 25. Crash Result Based on Wheelbase, Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars 
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Figure 26. Crash Result Based on Wheelbase, SUVs, Pickups, and Vans 
The distribution of wheelbase lengths is shown in Figure 27. The distribution was 
stepped, because wheelbase numbers were tabulated by whole inches in the AutoStats program. 
An attempt was made to smooth the distributions by capturing the median percentile for each 
wheelbase increment. The smoothed plot of the distribution is shown in Figure 28. 
 
Figure 27. Distribution of Vehicle Wheelbase in Cable Median Barrier Crashes 
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
<
 1
0
5
 in
.
1
0
5
-1
1
0
 in
.
1
1
0
-1
1
5
 in
.
1
1
5
-1
2
0
 in
.
>
 1
2
0
 in
.
P
er
ce
n
t 
C
M
B
 F
a
il
u
re
P
ec
en
t 
o
f 
A
ll
 C
ra
sh
es
Wheelbase (SUVs, Pickups, and Vans)
All Crashes
Penetrations
Rollovers
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
90 100 110 120 130 140 150
P
er
ce
n
t 
G
re
a
te
r 
T
h
a
n
Wheelbase (in.)
All Crashes
Penetrations
Rollovers
June 20, 2013  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13 
63 
 
Figure 28. Smoothed Distribution of Vehicle Wheelbase in Cable Median Barrier Crashes 
The distribution of wheelbase by crash result for all vehicles suggested that large 
wheelbase vehicles were involved in more rollovers than small-wheelbase vehicles. This was 
confirmed in Figure 24. There were no obvious differences between the penetration and 
composite distributions. 
Distributions based on vehicle segregation into passenger car vs. SUV, van, and pickup 
classes are shown in Figure 29. Unlike in the composite distributions, this sub-divided 
distribution indicated a typically slightly larger wheelbase involved in passenger car and SUV, 
pickup, or van penetrations. Alternatively, the rollover distribution was virtually 
indistinguishable from the composite distributions for both vehicle classes. 
 
Figure 29. Smoothed Distribution of Vehicle Wheelbase by Vehicle Type and Crash Result 
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Track widths were also plotted to identify potential relationships, as shown in Figure 30. 
Generally, rollovers were more prevalent with larger track widths. This was expected, because 
SUVs, pickups, and vans, which are involved in more rollovers than cars, also typically have 
larger track widths.  
 
Figure 30. Crash Result Based on Track Width 
Track widths were segregated by vehicle type as shown in Figures 31 and 32. The 
distributions were compared by crash outcome. Segregation by vehicle type indicated a strong 
relationship between track width and penetration rates for passenger cars, whereas statistically 
significant differences in penetration rate were not observed for SUVs, pickups, and vans. 
Penetrations were infrequent with small track with utility vehicles, but remained relatively 
constant for vehicles with track widths greater than 60 in. (1,524 mm). Rollover rates were not 
strongly related to track width in either vehicle grouping. Further analysis of track width with 
respect to CG height is discussed in Section 7.3.4. 
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Figure 31. Crash Result Based on Track Width, Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars  
 
Figure 32. Crash Result Based on Track Width, SUVs, Pickups, and Vans 
A smoothed distribution of crash result by track width is shown in Figure 33. The 
penetration distribution was dominated by larger-track width passenger cars. The 85th percentile 
track width in all car crashes was 63.3 in. (1,608 mm), whereas the 85th percentile track width for 
cars involved in penetration crashes was 63.8 in. (1,621 mm). By contrast, rollovers frequently 
occurred with greater frequency at smaller track widths, which would contradict the conclusions 
made by solely evaluating the results shown in Figure 30. 
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Figure 33. Smoothed Distribution of Track Width by Vehicle Type and Crash Result 
7.3.3 Vehicle Profile Dimensions 
Crash results based on front bumper height were plotted and are shown in Figure 34. 
There was an unmistakable increasing trend toward higher rollover rates with increasing bumper 
height. Surprisingly, this correlation appeared nearly linear with bumper height. A similar 
relationship could not be determined for penetration crashes. The overall distribution of vehicles 
involved in the crashes had no discernible trend in penetration rates. 
 
Figure 34. Crash Result Based on Top of Front Bumper Height 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70
%
 G
re
a
te
r 
T
h
a
n
Track Width (in.)
All Cars
Cars - Penetrations
Cars - Rollovers
All Utility Vehicles
Utility Vehicles - Penetrations
Utility Vehicles - Rollovers
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
<
 2
0
 in
.
2
0
-2
2
 in
.
2
2
-2
4
 in
.
2
4
-2
6
 in
.
2
6
-2
8
 in
.
2
8
-3
0
 in
.
>
 3
0
 in
.
P
er
ce
n
t 
C
M
B
 F
a
il
u
re
P
ec
en
t 
o
f 
A
ll
 C
ra
sh
es
Front Bumper Height
% of All Crashes
% Penetrations
% Rollovers
June 20, 2013  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13 
67 
As with wheelbase and track widths, the crash results were segregated by vehicle type 
and plotted separately. The plots are shown in Figures 35 and 36. Although rollover rates were 
very strongly related to front bumper heights when all vehicles were compared together, 
comparisons by classes revealed mixed results. Passenger cars had no strong correlation between 
rollover rates and front bumper heights. A strong correlation was observed between SUV, 
pickup, and van rollover rates and front bumper heights. 
The penetration distributions were not independent from the composite distributions of 
each vehicle type when compared by bumper height; in fact, the passenger car penetration 
distribution was statistically similar to the distribution of all passenger car crashes. This result 
was surprising, since it is widely known that lower bumper heights can contribute to higher 
penetration rates for low-profile cars. This likely indicates that median terrain and impact 
conditions have a far stronger effect on penetration than top-of-bumper height. 
 
Figure 35. Crash Results by Front Bumper Height, Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars 
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
<
 2
0
 in
.
2
0
-2
1
 in
.
2
1
-2
2
 in
.
2
2
-2
3
 in
.
>
 2
3
 in
.
P
er
ce
n
t 
C
M
B
 F
a
il
u
re
P
ec
en
t 
o
f 
A
ll
 C
ra
sh
es
Front Bumper Height (Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars)
All Crashes
Penetrations
Rollovers
June 20, 2013  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13 
68 
 
Figure 36. Crash Result by Front Bumper Height, SUVs, Pickups, and Vans 
A smoothed distribution of bumper heights by vehicle class and crash result is shown in 
Figure 37. The distributions of bumper heights indicated significant differences between car and 
utility vehicle bumper heights. Differences in bumper heights between car penetrations and 
rollovers compared to the composite were negligible. The distribution of passenger car bumper 
heights strongly supports the presumption that the differences in suspension characteristics, such 
as stiffness and travel, were more significant than differences in bumper heights for these cars, 
since 85% of all passenger car bumper heights were between 19 and 23 in. (483 and 584 mm). 
This also further supported the conclusion that impact conditions may be more important than 
bumper heights for passenger car impacts in relationship to penetration frequency.  
In addition to the top of the front bumper, crash results were analyzed by center-of-
headlight heights, as shown in Figure 38. As before, a strong relationship between the center-of-
headlight height and rollover frequency was observed. Higher center-of-headlight heights were 
associated with higher rates of rollover. However, this was expected because higher rollover 
rates were associated with pickups, vans, and SUVs, all of which had higher average center-of-
headlight heights than passenger cars. 
 
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
<
 2
3
 in
.
2
3
-2
5
 in
.
2
5
-2
7
 in
.
2
7
-2
9
 in
.
>
 2
9
 in
.
P
er
ce
n
t 
C
M
B
 F
a
il
u
re
P
ec
en
t 
o
f 
A
ll
 C
ra
sh
es
Front Bumper Height (SUVs, Pickups, and Vans)
All Crashes
Penetrations
Rollovers
June 20, 2013  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13 
69 
 
Figure 37. Smoothed Distribution of Bumper Height by Crash Result and Vehicle Type 
 
Figure 38. Crash Result by Center-of-Headlight Height 
When compared by vehicle types, rates of penetration and rollover due to variations in 
center-of-headlight height were less significant, as shown in Figures 39 and 40. However, a 
generally decreasing trend in penetration rates for increasing center-of-headlight heights was 
observed for passenger cars, as shown in Figure 39. This was intuitive; very low front bumper 
height vehicles were involved in more penetration crashes than other passenger cars due to an 
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increased propensity to underride. No significant correlations were observed with respect to 
SUVs, pickups, and vans. 
 
Figure 39. Crash Result by Center-of-Headlight Height, Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars 
 
Figure 40. Crash Result by Center-of-Headlight Height, SUVs, Pickups, and Vans 
The distributions of center-of-headlight heights were plotted and are shown in Figure 41. 
The deviation of the rollover dataset of SUVs, pickups, and vans was clearly visible. The 
correlation between larger center-of-headlight height and rollover frequency was clearly visible 
for SUVs, pickups, and vans.  
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Figure 41. Smoothed Distribution of Center-of-Headlight Heights by Crash Result and Vehicle 
Type 
The front-of-hood height was also plotted, and is shown in Figure 42. As with the bumper 
and center-of-headlight heights, the rollover distribution was statistically significantly different 
from the composite dataset. The increase in rollover rates occurred at front hood heights 
exceeding 33 in. (838 mm). This is significant since the top cable heights on most TL-3 high-
tension and low-tension cable median barrier systems is 35 in. (889 mm) or less. The penetration 
rates did not appear to be strongly influenced by front-of-hood height.  
 
Figure 42. Crash Result by Leading Edge of Hood Height 
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When compared by vehicle types, results were mixed. Comparisons of crash results by 
vehicle type and hood heights are shown in Figures 43 and 44.The passenger car distribution of 
front hood heights involved in penetrations was statistically independent of the composite. 
Likewise, the distribution of front hood heights for SUVs, pickups, and rollovers approached 
statistical independence. However, the relationships were opposite. In general, cars had lower 
rollover rates with increasing hood heights, except for hood heights in excess of 31 in. (787 mm). 
By contrast, SUVs, pickups, and vans were involved in more rollovers with increasing hood 
height, with the exception of vehicles with hood heights greater than 44 in. (1,118 mm).  
In both classes, the median front hood heights had the lowest rates of penetration. Higher 
rates were observed at both lower and higher hood heights. Also, the highest front hood heights 
for both cars and utility vehicles had the highest rates of rollover. 
The smoothed distribution of front hood heights of all vehicles is shown in Figure 45. 
The difference between the composite and rollover datasets is clearly visible, particularly with 
hood heights between 30 and 40 in. (762 and 1,016 mm). A surprising trend was observed that 
very few rollover crashes involved vehicles with front hood heights between 30 and 35 in. (762 
and 889 mm). Over 65% of all cable median barrier crashes occurred involving vehicles with 
front hood heights less than 32 in. (813 mm), whereas 55% of all rollovers involved vehicles 
with front hood heights greater than 35 in. (889 mm). The distribution of front hood height by 
crash result and vehicle group were virtually indistinguishable for both vehicle groups, and was 
not shown. 
 
Figure 43. Crash Result by Front Hood Height, Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars 
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Figure 44. Crash Result by Front Hood Height, SUVs, Pickups, and Vans 
 
Figure 45. Distribution of Front Hood Heights in CMB Crashes 
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The top of bumper to front of hood height separation distances were plotted against crash 
result, but results were not statistically significant when plotted by vehicle grouping. Although 
statistical significance was observed with respect to the rollover database when all vehicle types 
were plotted together, the differences were strongly related to the types of vehicle involved in 
rollover crashes, and were not caused by the bumper-to-hood separation distance. Furthermore, 
statistical tests evaluating bumper-to-hood separation distances of passenger cars indicated a 
very strong statistical similarity between bumper-to-hood separation distances in rollovers and 
all crashes; stated differently, the two distributions were virtually indistinguishable. If there is a 
relationship between bumper-to-hood separation distance and penetration rates for passenger cars 
or utility vehicles, it was not obvious in the available database of 3,804 crashes with known 
vehicle types and crash outcomes, as shown in Figure 46. 
 
Figure 46. Smoothed Distribution of Separation  Between Leading Edge of Hood and Top of 
Bumper by Crash Result and Vehicle Type 
Rear bumper heights were compared to the composite and plotted, as shown in Figure 47. 
The penetration frequencies peaked between 24 and 28 in. (610 and 711 mm), and was reduced 
at both lower and higher rear bumper heights. Rollovers reached a minimum between 22 and 24 
in. (559 and 610 mm) rear bumper height. Both distributions were statistically independent of the 
composite distribution. 
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Figure 47. Crash Results by Rear Bumper Height  
Rear bumper heights were plotted by crash result and vehicle class, and are shown in 
Figures 48 and 49. Although results were not statistically independent for either rollover or 
penetration crashes for either dataset, the penetration dataset for passenger cars approached 
statistical independence from the composite distribution. The penetration rates varied 
significantly between bumper heights of 25 and 27 in. (635 and 686 mm). However, penetration 
rates for rear-leading impacts, which were not distinguished in this data analysis, were higher for 
both lower and higher bumper heights. Although evidence of this claim is currently limited to 
anecdotal observations, further evidence is being explored.  
Top-of-trunk heights were related to both penetration and rollover rates. The top-of-trunk 
height plots for all vehicles are shown in Figure 50. Penetration rates generally declined with 
increasing rear trunk heights. This was intuitive:  higher rear trunk heights were associated with 
greater vertical capture area and higher energetic requirements to underride the barrier, 
particularly in rear-leading impacts. As the trunk or hatch height increased, underride 
penetrations were virtually eliminated, which decreased the overall penetration rate. However, a 
competing effect due to increased CG and bumper heights tended to increase the rate of override 
for higher trunk or hatch heights as well, though this effect was less pronounced. 
In addition, rollover rates increased with increasing trunk or hatch height, but this was 
expected based on vehicle dimensions of the typical vehicles involved in rollover crashes. Trunk 
or hatch heights were determined to not be causatively linked to rollover frequency. 
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Figure 48. Crash Result by Rear Bumper Height, Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars 
 
Figure 49. Crash Result by Rear Bumper Height, SUVs, Vans, and Pickups 
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Figure 50. Crash Result by Top of Trunk/Rear Hatch Height 
A smoothed distribution of trunk and hatch heights based on crash results and vehicle 
groups is shown in Figure 51. The distributions were each virtually identical to the composite for 
each respective vehicle group. 
 
Figure 51. Smoothed Distribution of Top of Trunk/Rear Hatch Heights 
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7.3.4 Center-of-Gravity Location 
The position of the CG was a critical factor in the selection of crash testing vehicles for 
standardized testing according to NCHRP Report No. 350 and MASH [31, 24]. A comparison of 
CG heights by crash results was plotted and is shown in Figure 52. The rollover rate was 
intuitively related to CG height. Higher CG heights were generally associated with higher 
rollover rates. One unexpected relationship was that penetrations generally decreased with 
increasing CG height, through 28 in. (711 mm), then increased thereafter for passenger cars and 
utility vehicles. 
 
Figure 52. Crash Result by CG Heights 
CG height distributions based on crash result and vehicle type indicated strong 
correlations between penetration and rollover rates based on vehicle CG. Plots of CG heights for 
passenger cars and SUVs, pickups, and vans are shown in Figures 53 and 54. 
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Figure 53. Crash Result by CG Height, Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars 
 
Figure 54. Crash Result by CG Height, SUVs, Pickups, and Vans 
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CG heights were not strongly correlated with rollover rates for SUVs, pickups, and vans. 
This result suggested that these types of vehicles were susceptible to rollover independent of the 
CG heights. However, penetration rates were strongly correlated with CG heights, as penetration 
rates increased with increasing CG height. 
Passenger cars had a mixed rate of penetrations with CG height, with a maximum 
between 22.25 and 22.5 in. (565 and 572 mm). The minimum occurred between 21.75 and 22.25 
in. (552 and 565 mm). Rollover rates demonstrated a much more linear relationship, generally 
declining with increasing CG height through 23 in. (584 mm). Results of all these factors were 
on the bounds of statistical significance, but the small differences between the passenger car CG 
height distribution would be erased if a vehicle entered a sloped median and struck the cable 
median barrier at any height other than nominal level. Thus, although CG height had an effect, 
particularly on stability, overall CG height did not have a causative relationship in cable median 
barrier containment performance within the indicated vehicle groupings. 
Surprisingly, no passenger cars and only two SUVs in the entire database of 3,806 
vehicles had recorded CG heights between 22.5 in. (572 mm) and 22.75 in. (578 mm). Between 
22.25 in. (565 mm) and 22.5 in. (572 mm) a total of 282 vehicle crashes were recorded, and 
between 22.75 in. (578 mm) and 23.0 in. (584 mm), a total of 201 crashes were recorded. There 
were no obvious explanations for the apparent gap in vehicles with CG heights between 22.5 and 
22.75 in. (572 and 578 mm). 
The smoothed distribution of CG heights in cable barrier crashes is shown in Figure 55. 
Over 60% of all crashes occurred with CG heights less than 23 in. (584 mm), but approximately 
9% of crashes and penetrations occurred with CG heights between 23 and 26 in. (584 and 660 
mm). The 85th percentile CG heights for the composite, penetration, and rollover data sets were 
21.6, 20.7, and 25.8 in. (548, 525, and 654 mm), respectively. 
 
Figure 55. Smoothed Distribution of CG Heights in Cable Barrier Crashes 
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A comparison of the longitudinal CG location relative to the front axle was plotted and is 
shown in Figure 56. Penetration rates were relatively independent of the longitudinal distance 
between the CG and the front axle, but rollover rates tended to increase as the CG distance from 
the front axle increased. Historical tests with cable median barriers has indicated a higher 
proportion of large yaw displacements using rear engine mount cars with CGs located far from 
the front axle [32, 33]. The yaw displacement following redirection may contribute to vehicle 
instability. 
The distribution of longitudinal CG locations is shown in Figure 57. The distribution of 
longitudinal CG location suggested that both penetration and rollover crashes tended to occur 
more frequently with vehicles with CGs located further from the front axle, but closely 
mimicked the distribution of all crashes for longitudinal distances less than 40 in. (1,016 mm). 
The 85th percentile longitudinal CG locations for the composite, penetration, and rollover 
databases were 51.7 in., 52.5 in., and 54.5 in. (1,313 mm, 1,333 mm, and 1,384 mm), 
respectively. 
 
Figure 56. Longitudinal CG Distance from Front Axle by Crash Result 
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Figure 57. Distribution of Longitudinal CG Location Relative to Front Axle 
The static stability factor (SSF) [34], which is calculated using the formula 
 𝑆𝑆𝐹 =
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑊𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ
2(𝐶𝐺 𝐻𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡)
  (1) 
was used to segregate crash outcomes. Results are plotted in Figure 58. The SSF is a statistical 
measure of the likelihood of rollover, based on the slope angle that would cause a static vehicle 
to tip over. SSF star ratings and the probability function ranges of estimated rollover rates is 
shown in Table 27. 
Table 27. NHTSA SSF Star Ratings and Probability Function Values [34] 
 
Although end effects were present at the 1- and 5-star ratings since less than 100 crashes 
involved either 1-star or 5-star rated vehicles, generally rollovers decreased with higher SSF 
ranking. These results are not surprising, but reinforce what is known about rollover stability 
with relation to CG position and track width. 
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Figure 58. Crash Result Based on Track Width and CG Height (SSF) 
Whereas a very strong relationship between rollover and SSF was observed with respect 
to all vehicles, when the data was segregated into subsets by vehicle types, variations were not as 
distinctive. However, it is worth noting that very few SUVs, pickups, or vans were rated with 
four-star SSF rating, whereas very few passenger cars had a three-star SSF rating or less. 
Distributions were statistically independent at the 5% confidence level but functionally 
distributions were not unique. Penetrations and rollovers were both more common with lower 
SSF values for SUVs, pickups, and vans, but were more common at higher SSF values for much 
of the passenger car distribution.  
 
Figure 59. Distribution of Crash Result by SSF and Vehicle Type 
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7.3.5 Vehicle Cornering and Inertia 
Crash results by minimum turning circle diameters were also plotted and evaluated. The 
plot is shown in Figure 51. The minimum turning circle is a measure of the maximum steering 
angle and reaction of the wheels and suspension to driver steering input. As a result, it was 
expected that smaller turning circles, corresponding to higher cornering rates and larger 
maximum steering angles, would be associated with more rollovers and penetrations due to a 
more rapid increase in CG trajectory angle. 
In general, larger turning circles corresponded to higher rates of rollover. This was 
because SUVs, pickups, and vans had larger turning circle diameters than cars, on average. 
When distributions were plotted by vehicle type and crash results, the penetration and rollover 
rates were not clearly related to turning circle diameter, as shown in Figure 61. A large portion of 
car penetrations occurred with turning circle diameters between 38 and 45 in. (96 and 1,143 
mm). This class of passenger car corresponded to sports-type cars, such as the Chevrolet 
Camaro, Dodge Charger, Pontiac Firebird/Trans Am, and Dodge Viper, in addition to imported 
sports cars. 
 
Figure 60. Crash Result by Turning Circle Diameter 
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Figure 61. Smoothed Distribution of Turning Circle Diameter by Crash Result and Vehicle Type 
The distribution of roll moments of inertia of vehicles involved in cable median barrier 
crashes is shown in Figure 62. For both passenger car and utility vehicles, penetrations occurred 
at larger roll moments of inertia than the composite distribution. However, rollover rates were 
mixed. For utility vehicles, higher roll moments corresponded to higher rollover rates for roll 
moments of inertia less than 600 lb-ft-s2 (248 kg-m2), but for larger roll moments of inertia the 
rollover distribution matched the composite. Alternatively, for the passenger car rollover 
distribution, rollovers generally occurred with lower roll moments of inertia. The passenger car 
distribution matched the intuitive expectation that lower roll moments of inertia were associated 
with higher rates of rollover. Penetrations were more common at higher roll moments of inertia 
for both vehicle types. 
 
Figure 62. Distribution of Roll Moments of Inertia by Crash Result and Vehicle Type 
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Roll moments of inertia were non-dimensionalized by dividing by the mass and CG 
height squared. Results are plotted in Figure 63. By non-dimensionalizing the rollover 
distribution of SUVs, pickups, and vans, the rollover distribution was altered from approaching 
statistical independence to bordering statistical similarity, with a p-value of 0.83. None of the 
other distributions had statistically significant differences to the composite. 
 
Figure 63. Distribution of Non-Dimensionalized Roll Moments of Inertia by Crash Result and 
Vehicle Type 
Likewise, the distribution of the yaw moments of inertia of vehicles involved in cable 
barrier crashes is shown in Figure 64. As with roll moments of inertia, higher yaw moments of 
inertia were associated with higher rates of penetration. Higher yaw moments of inertia were 
correlated with higher rollover frequency for SUVs, pickups, and vans through 2,500 lb-ft-s2 
(1,033 kg-m2), but converged to the composite distribution at higher yaw moments of inertia, 
similarly to the roll moments-of-inertia distribution. Additionally, lower yaw moments of inertia 
were associated with higher rollover rates for passenger cars. 
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Figure 64. Distribution of Yaw Moments of Inertia by Crash Result and Vehicle Type 
7.3.6 Conclusions 
The vehicle dimension and performance analysis suggested that there is no “silver bullet” 
vehicle profile or set of dimensions which can functionally explain all of the penetration or 
rollover occurrences. Vehicles such as SUVs are involved in a disproportionately large number 
of rollover crashes resulting from vehicle instability. However, the high rate of rollovers was not 
indicative of a high rate of penetrations. Furthermore, pickup trucks had the lowest overall rate of 
penetrations, which may be related to years of cable median barrier full-scale testing with pickup 
trucks. Vehicles not commonly used in cable median barrier testing, including large cars, SUVs, 
and vans were involved in more penetrations than pickup trucks. Furthermore, vans were also 
involved in more rollovers and severe crashes than pickup trucks in general.  
It may be necessary to adjust the vehicles used in crash testing to be more reflective of 
the actual fleet involved in penetration or rollover crashes. The historical perspective on vehicle 
selection can be improved using these results, because vehicle types and selection can be catered 
directly to those vehicles which were involved in containment failures or severe crashes. 
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7.4 Vehicle Make and Model Analysis 
A summary of the vehicles most commonly involved in penetration and rollover crashes with 
cable median barriers is shown in Tables 28 and 29. Recall that both penetration and rollover 
rates for all vehicle types were scaled down to reflect calculated national overall penetration and 
rollover rates. Vehicles included in Tables 28 and 29 were in a minimum of 10% penetration or 
rollover crashes, respectively, and were typically involved in at least 15 crashes. Vehicles with 
the highest rates of penetration were the 1996-2007 Ford Taurus, which spanned two generations 
of the Taurus model, as well as the Subaru Impreza, Ford F250 and F350, and Chrysler PT 
Cruiser. 
Vehicles involved in penetrations were largely either high-CG, stiff-body panel vehicles 
or large cars with narrow, sharp front profiles. Likewise, rollovers were most frequent with high-
CG SUVs, pickups, and vans. However, in addition to notably high crash rates it is also 
constructive to consider vehicles which were involved in relatively few rollover or penetration 
crashes. A tabulated list of vehicles with relatively low risk of penetration or rollover are shown 
in Tables 30 and 31. 
There has been a trend in recent years away from sharply-contoured front end profiles. 
Many of the vehicles involved in high penetration crash frequencies are no longer in production. 
This is an unfortunate consequence of having datasets which extend more than 10 years from the 
present. However, Subaru Imprezas and Chrysler PT Cruisers, for example, are relatively 
common, have models readily available, and had penetration rates above 20%.  
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Table 28. Vehicles Involved in Penetration Crashes at High Frequencies 
 
Vehicle Crashes Penetrations Rollovers
Scaled 
Penetration 
Rate
Scaled 
Rollover 
Rate
Honda Civic 130 18 5 12% 3%
Honda Accord 118 15 4 11% 3%
Ford Explorer 81 11 20 12% 21%
Ford Taurus (1996-2007) 48 10 6 18% 10%
Saturn SL/SL1/SL2 41 5 3 11% 6%
Nissan Sentra 40 8 2 17% 4%
Chevrolet Blazer 37 7 9 16% 20%
Pontiac Grand Am 37 5 2 12% 5%
Ford Escort 33 5 2 13% 5%
Volkswagen Jetta 33 5 0 13% 0%
Pontiac Grand Prix 33 4 1 11% 3%
Chevrolet Trailblazer 28 4 3 12% 9%
Toyota 4 Runner 25 5 6 17% 20%
Ford F250 24 6 5 22% 17%
Acura Integra 24 6 0 22% 0%
Chevrolet Impala 23 5 1 19% 4%
Chrysler Sebring 23 4 0 15% 0%
Dodge Durango 21 4 2 17% 8%
Jeep Liberty 21 3 3 12% 12%
Dodge Intrepid 19 4 3 18% 13%
Toyota Tundra 19 3 3 14% 13%
Chevrolet Cobalt 19 3 1 14% 4%
Chevrolet Lumina 18 4 0 19% 0%
Ford F350 17 4 2 20% 10%
Chevrolet Astro 16 3 2 16% 10%
Chevrolet Camaro 15 3 1 17% 6%
Chevrolet S10 15 3 0 17% 0%
Ford Crown Victoria 14 4 0 25% 0%
Buick Regal 14 3 1 19% 6%
Chrysler PT Cruiser 12 4 3 29% 21%
Oldsmobile Alero 12 3 0 22% 0%
Subaru Impreza 11 6 0 47% 0%
Ford Escape 11 3 0 24% 0%
Toyota Celica 10 3 2 26% 17%
Chrysler Concorde 7 3 2 37% 24%
Lincoln Town Car 7 3 0 37% 0%
Mercury Tracer 6 3 0 43% 0%
Mitsubishi Mirage 6 2 1 29% 14%
Chrysler Cirrus 6 2 0 29% 0%
Toyota Matrix 6 2 0 29% 0%
Ford Aerostar 5 2 0 35% 0%
Mercury Grand Marquis 4 2 0 43% 0%
Oldsmobile 88 4 2 0 43% 0%
Volkswagen Golf 4 2 0 43% 0%
PENETRATIONS
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Table 29. Vehicles Involved in Rollover Crashes at High Frequencies 
 
Table 30. Vehicles Involved in Penetration Crashes at Low Frequencies 
 
Vehicle Crashes Penetrations Rollovers
Scaled 
Penetration 
Rate
Scaled 
Rollover 
Rate
Ford Explorer 81 11 20 12% 21%
Ford Ranger 72 4 13 5% 15%
Chevrolet Blazer 37 14 8 16% 20%
Chevrolet C1500/2500/3500 32 7 9 5% 21%
Jeep Cherokee 30 2 8 9% 11%
Dodge Ram 1500 27 3 4 10% 19%
Toyota 4 Runner 25 3 6 17% 20%
Ford F250 24 5 6 22% 17%
Jeep Liberty 21 6 5 12% 12%
Dodge Intrepid 19 3 3 18% 13%
Toyota Tundra 19 4 3 14% 13%
Chrysler PT Cruiser 12 3 3 29% 21%
Isuzu Rodeo 11 4 3 16% 31%
Dodge Grand Caravan 11 2 4 16% 23%
Ford Econoline 11 2 3 8% 23%
Chrysler Concorde 7 1 3 37% 24%
Mazda Tribute 6 3 2 0% 28%
Mazda 323 5 0 2 17% 34%
ROLLOVERS
Vehicle Crashes Penetrations Rollovers
Scaled 
Penetration 
Rate
Scaled 
Rollover 
Rate
Ford Ranger 72 4 13 5% 15%
Ford Focus 61 4 5 6% 7%
Chevrolet Malibu 32 2 1 5% 3%
Dodge Dakota 33 1 0 3% 0%
Toyota Tacoma 24 0 1 0% 3%
Dodge Caravan 23 0 2 0% 7%
Hyundai Accent 22 1 0 4% 0%
Mitsubishi Eclipse 21 1 2 4% 8%
Dodge Stratus 21 1 1 4% 4%
Jeep Grand Cherokee 20 1 2 4% 8%
Honda CRV 19 0 2 0% 9%
Ford Expedition 19 1 2 5% 9%
Nissan Pathfinder 18 0 2 0% 9%
Geo Metro/Prizm 17 1 1 5% 5%
Chevrolet Suburban 16 1 1 5% 5%
Pontiac Sunfire 16 1 0 5% 0%
Nissan Maxima 15 0 0 0% 0%
Chevrolet K2500 15 1 2 6% 11%
Jeep Wrangler 14 0 2 0% 12%
Mazda Protégé 14 1 1 6% 6%
Ford Contour 13 0 0 0% 0%
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Table 31. Vehicles Involved in Rollover Crashes at Low Frequencies 
 
Current- and previously-used small cars were not well-represented in terms of penetration 
crash frequency. The combined number of crashes involving Geo Metro/Geo Prizm, 
Volkswagon Golf, Suzuki Swift, and Hyundai Accent was 47 crashes, but only 4 penetrations 
and 1 rollover were recorded on these small cars. These cars were frequently used in NCHRP 
Report 350 crash testing. This is not surprising, since full-scale crash testing with these small 
cars under NCHRP Report No. 350 and MASH has only showed critical behavior when tested in 
a V-ditch [35]. Few crashes were tabulated with vehicles frequently used in MASH testing.  
Vehicles demonstrating more frequent barrier failures should be considered in future 
crash testing efforts. Testing with vehicles which are susceptible to penetrations or rollovers 
should be conducted in order to maximize the resultant safety of all impacting vehicles. Results 
shown suggest that crash testing with new MASH trucks may not be sufficient to capture the 
extent of the penetration and rollover crash types observed in this study. Further analysis of the 
causes of penetration crashes is explored in Chapter 8. 
 
Vehicle Crashes Penetrations Rollovers
Scaled 
Penetration 
Rate
Scaled 
Rollover 
Rate
Ford Mustang 52 6 0 10% 0%
Chevrolet Malibu 32 2 1 5% 3%
Chevrolet Silverado 34 4 1 10% 2%
Pontiac Grand Prix 33 4 1 11% 3%
Dodge Dakota 33 1 0 3% 0%
Volkswagen Jetta 33 5 0 13% 0%
Chevrolet Malibu (2004-2008) 34 3 0 8% 0%
Toyota Camry (2001-Present) 26 2 1 7% 3%
Toyota Tacoma 24 0 1 0% 3%
Acura Integra 24 6 0 22% 0%
Chevrolet Impala 23 5 1 19% 4%
Buick Lesabre 23 2 0 8% 0%
Chrysler Sebring 23 4 0 15% 0%
Hyundai Accent 22 1 0 4% 0%
Dodge Stratus 21 1 1 4% 4%
Hyundai Elantra 21 2 1 8% 4%
Subaru Legacy 21 2 0 8% 0%
Chevrolet Cobalt 19 3 1 14% 4%
Mercury Sable 19 2 0 9% 0%
Chevrolet Tahoe 18 2 1 10% 5%
Mitsubishi Galant 18 2 1 10% 5%
Chevrolet Lumina 18 4 0 19% 0%
Pontiac Sunfire 16 1 0 5% 0%
Chevrolet Camaro 15 3 1 17% 6%
Buick Century 15 2 0 12% 0%
Chevrolet S10 15 3 0 17% 0%
Mazda 3 15 2 0 12% 0%
Nissan Maxima 15 0 0 0% 0%
ROLLOVERS
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8 CAUSES OF CABLE MEDIAN BARRIER PENETRATIONS 
Cable median barrier penetrations were heavily dependent on which type of system was 
struck. Penetration mechanisms were heavily dependent on the mechanics of barrier deformation 
and cable release. In order to describe the mechanisms of penetration, system details for the 
Nucor NU-CABLE TL-3 3-Cable System, C-Shaped post and S-Shaped post Trinity Cable 
Safety System (CASS) TL-3 Systems, Brifen Wire Rope Safety Fence (WRSF) TL-3 4-Cable 
System, and the TL-3, low-tension, 3-cable median barrier system are described below. 
8.1 System Design Details 
8.1.1 Nucor NU-CABLE TL-3 3-Cable System 
Nucor system details are shown in Figures 65 through 68. The cable-to-post attachment 
used by Nucor was very strong compared to all other barrier systems, and is shown in Figures 68 
and 68. This cable-to-post attachment is also used in the Trinity CASS barrier near end 
anchorages and terminations. The details which follow were reflective of the systems available 
for analysis in the existing database; an alternative construction with the Nucor system utilizes 
cable hangars on the top of the post instead of the strong cable attachment shown in this report. 
The clips were fastened to the post by inserting the bent upper leg into the appropriate 
hole on the flanged U-channel, and then were locked in place with a nut threaded onto the 
bottom clip threads. Holes in the flanges were spaced approximately 1 in. (25 mm) on center 
vertically through the centerline of the flange. Many posts were 4 lb/ft (6 kg/m) flanged U-
channel with Rib-Bak construction, though some installations utilized the 5 lb/ft (7 kg/m) posts. 
The median barrier configuration for this post utilized two short clips, shown in Figure 68, for 
the top and bottom cables, and one long clip, shown in Figure 67, to support the middle cable. 
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Figure 65. Nucor Cable Barrier Design Details [36] 
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Figure 66. Nucor Cable Barrier Design Details [36] 
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Figure 67. Nucor Cable Barrier Long Clip Design Details [37] 
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Figure 68. Nucor Cable Barrier Short Clip Design Details [37] 
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Since the attachment had a 60 ksi (414 MPa) minimum ultimate strength requirement, the 
resulting minimum tensile load required to cause rupture of the shank was 4.6 kip (20.5 kN) 
through a single leg. The clip appeared to be designed to dissipate energy through the bending 
deformation of the upper leg of the clip. During vertical pullout loading conditions, the curved 
clip construction contributed to friction wedge locking of the bent leg in the bottom hole. Due to 
vertical forces, the couple at the bottom of the clip tended to aggravate the locking tendency as 
the bottom leg interacted with the web. A schematic of the vertical release problems identified is 
shown in Figure 69. The friction lock resisted the lower leg bending and releasing from the post, 
frequently resulting in large applied tensile loads carried by both legs of the clip until the clip 
fractured, the post was pulled vertically out of the ground or post socket, or the post fractured. 
The vertical loading resulted in post pullout in most crashes. 
 
Figure 69. Vertical Pullout Moment Couple on Nucor Cable-To-Post Attachment 
Although the clip would perform adequately in horizontal pullout with posts that are 
sufficiently stiff, the flange-channel U-post does not have the rigidity necessary to resist bending 
and buckling or fracture to permit the top cable to release. During horizontal pullout loading, the 
post deflected with the cable, and the horizontal load applied experienced a rotation to a mixed 
horizontal and vertical loading. As the loading transitioned to vertical pullout, the posts were 
pulled upward and out of the ground or fractured in many crashes. Relatively few crashes were 
observed in which the cable-to-post attachments released as intended. 
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8.1.2 Trinity Cable Safety System (CASS) 3-Cable Barrier 
Like the Nucor TL-3 3-cable barrier on flange-channel posts, the Trinity CASS 3-cable 
barrier installed on C-shaped posts had a large installed base in the United States. CASS 
installations were present in such states as Iowa, Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah, and Washington, as 
well as many others. Details of the C-channel and S-post versions of the TL-3 CASS system are 
shown in Figures 70 through 73. 
Most of the Trinity CASS system installed in the participating states utilized the TL-3 C-
shape post sections. Installations of both the TL-4 and TL-3 structural S-type post section barrier 
designs were identified. However, relatively few crashes with the TL-4 design were available for 
analysis. 
The direction of the channel in the C-shaped posts was alternated, per construction 
design. As a result, the radius of gyration to the weak axis was different when the posts were 
struck on the channel or continuous sides. Alternatively, the S-shape posts were comprised of 
S4x7.7 (S102x11.5) shape sections, with two 11/16-in. (17-mm) holes in each flange. Researchers 
estimated that weakening holes decreased the strong-axis section modulus from 3.03 in.3 to 2.54 
in.3 (49,652 mm3 to 41,623 mm3), and decreased the weak-axis section modulus from 0.562 in.3 
to 0.368 in.3 (9,210 mm3 to 6,030 mm3). By comparison, a standard S3x5.7 post has a strong-axis 
bending modulus of 1.67 in.3 (27,366 mm3), and a weak-axis bending modulus of 0.383 in.3 
(6,276 mm3). 
All of the cables in the Trinity CASS systems were located in a slot in the top of the post. 
Cable spacers and retainers were used to prevent the cables from slipping out of the posts in 
nuisance impacts. A sleeve tie was also used to retain the lower cable with a higher vertical 
release load and to stiffen the flanges where the web was cut. Driven and socketed options were 
available. The S-post TL-3 system had cables mounted at 29½, 253/16, and 20⅞ in. (749, 640, and 
530 mm) and are shown in Figure 72. Cables in the TL-3 C-shape post system were 1/16 in. (2 
mm) lower than in the S-post system. The TL-4 system had cables mounted at 38⅛, 29½, and 
20⅞ in. (968, 749, and 530 mm). 
A common cause of penetration in the CASS database occurred when the vehicle struck a 
post before striking the cable barrier system. The posts then transmitted the impact load to the 
posts through the internal slot. Because the vehicle had little, if any, interaction with the cables 
prior to striking the post, lateral loads applied to the cables tended to engage the cables more 
deeply in the slot, preventing the cables from disengaging from the post to capture the vehicle. 
The slot engagement contributed to many override containment failures of vehicles, including 
passenger cars which are typically not prone to override. This type of cable entrapment can occur 
whenever cables are located within a post slot.  
Because this mechanism of penetration was determined to occur frequently, this form of 
cable entrapment was referred to as a “ramp formation” override penetration. The Trinity CASS 
system may be intrinsically susceptible to cable entrapment and ramp formation override 
penetrations unless barrier modifications to prevent cable entrapment can be made. A schematic 
of the cable entrapment mechanism is shown in Figure 74. 
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Figure 70. Trinity CASS C-Shape Post System Details [38] 
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Figure 71. Trinity CASS C-Shaped Post System Details [38] 
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Figure 72. Trinity CASS TL-3 S-Post System Details [39] 
  
1
0
2
 
Ju
n
e 2
0
, 2
0
1
3
  
M
w
R
S
F
 R
ep
o
rt N
o
. T
R
P
-0
3
-3
1
9
-1
3
  
 
Figure 73. Trinity CASS TL-3 S-Post System Details [39] 
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Figure 74. Entrapment Forces Acting on Cables in Center Post Slot
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8.1.3 Brifen TL-3 Wire Rope Safety Fence (WRSF) 
The TL-3 Brifen WRSF is typically comprises proprietary Z-posts with rollers supporting 
the cables vertically, as shown in Figures 75 through 77. Virtually all Brifen systems utilize 
ground sockets for easy post replacement, though a post with soil plate option was also available. 
Four cables are used in the system, with one cable woven around the posts and mounted at 19 ½ 
in. (495 mm), two cables cross-woven and mounted at 26 in. (660 mm), and an additional cable 
in a slot cut in the top of the post, mounted at 28 ⅜ in. (720 mm).  
Typically, plastic retainer caps were used to retain the top cable in the Brifen WRSF. 
Other cables were constrained by the interaction with adjacent posts. For each of the middle and 
lower cables, vertical rise was only resisted by friction, whereas the lower roller supported the 
cable from being pushed down by the impacting vehicle. Because of the cable weave, the Brifen 
cables often sagged after a moderate-speed crash into the system in which more than two posts 
were disengaged from the cables. The weave significantly reduced average dynamic deflections 
and provided a smooth ridedown deceleration, but the system was susceptible to underride 
penetrations. Rollovers were sometimes associated with wheel entrapment by the lower woven 
cable. Underride penetrations were frequently caused by vehicles prying the bottom cable 
upward. This was because the bottom cable had low resistance to vertical uplift. These factors 
will be discussed in greater depth in Chapters 9 and 11. 
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Figure 75. Typical TL-3 Brifen WRSF Design Details [40] 
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Figure 76. Typical TL-3 Brifen WRSF Design Details [40] 
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Figure 77. Typical TL-3 Brifen WRSF Surface-Mounted Post Design Details [40] 
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8.1.4 Low-Tension, 3-Cable Median Barrier 
Several low-tension, 3-cable median barrier designs have been tested and were originally 
approved by FHWA according to TL-3 crash conditions in NCHRP Report 350. One low-
tension, non-proprietary 3-cable median barrier was developed through testing and evaluation by 
several state DOTs, including New York and Washington [e.g. 41-42]. Several other states have 
installed many miles of low-tension cable median barrier, and in North Carolina and Missouri, 
the combined length of barrier exceeded 1,400 miles (2,253 km). It was estimated that the low-
tension, non-proprietary 3-cable median barrier currently accounts for more than 40% of the 
cable median barrier mileage installed in the United States, though the exact percentage is 
unknown. 
The low-tension, 3-cable median barriers installed in Missouri, Washington, and North 
Carolina were very similar. Examples of the North Carolina’s low-tension, 3-cable median 
barrier standard plans implemented in 2002 are shown in Figures 78 through 83. In each of the 
low-tension, non-proprietary designs, tension spring compensators were used to retain tension in 
the cables during very warm weather and to prevent excessive tension increases during very cold 
weather. The cables were tensioned to between 900 and 950 lb (4.0 to 4.2 kN) at approximately 
70º F (21º C), and frequently used wedge splitter cable splice connections, as shown in Figure 
81. End anchors for these designs frequently used the end terminal developed by New York, 
which was approved under the guidelines presented in NCHRP Report 350 [43]. North Carolina 
later modified the standard cable median barrier plans in 2006 to address penetration concerns 
after conducting some performance improvement studies [44]. 
8.2 Overview of Crash Data 
Based on the statistical analysis presented, the crash data were analyzed individually and 
crashes were categorized by system type. The types of containment failures in each cable median 
barrier crash were determined using scene diagrams, narratives, vehicle damage indications, and 
photographs when available. When the cause of the penetration crash could not be identified, the 
case was identified as Unknown. 
A total of 213 crashes with determinable causes of penetration were identified. Seven 
primary causes of vehicular penetrations were identified and tabulated, and are shown in Table 
32. One of the categories, “Large Vehicle”, included all medium to heavy truck crashes, 
including single-unit trucks, buses, tractor-trailers, construction vehicles, and other vehicles 
which are not typically used in a cable barrier full-scale crash testing program for TL-3 impact 
conditions. However, because this type of failure was linked primarily to vehicle type, 
penetrations involving large vehicles were easily linked and virtually no large vehicle crashes 
were included in the “Unknown” category. As a result, these types of crashes were 
disproportionately identifiable relative to the other crash types. 
The failure causes shown in Table 32 were not intended to demonstrate relative 
frequencies of penetration crash types between systems. Many of the penetration crashes did not 
have determinable causes. The purpose was to demonstrate the types of failures which were 
discernible per each system type to observe general trends in the data. Unfortunately, systems 
such as Gibraltar and Brifen had very few discernible causes of penetrations due to the lack of 
available scene diagrams and data about penetrations.  
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Figure 78. Low-Tension 3-Cable Median Barrier Standard Plans, North Carolina DOT, 2002 
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Figure 79. Low-Tension 3-Cable Median Barrier Standard Plans, North Carolina DOT, 2002 
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Figure 80. Low-Tension 3-Cable Median Barrier Standard Plans, North Carolina DOT, 2002 
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Figure 81. Low-Tension 3-Cable Median Barrier Standard Plans, North Carolina DOT, 2002 
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Figure 82. Low-Tension 3-Cable Median Barrier Standard Plans, North Carolina DOT, 2002 
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Figure 83. Low-Tension 3-Cable Median Barrier Standard Plans, North Carolina DOT, 2002 
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Table 32. Causes of Penetrations 
 
Furthermore, many states had a significant number of miles of one particular barrier type 
installed. This contributed to some additional uncertainty due to roadside design practices 
utilized in each state. For example, median widths in Ohio routinely exceeded 50 ft (15.2 m), and 
barriers on relatively shallow slopes were typically installed either at or near the center of the 
ditch or near the shoulder slope break point. As a result, very few crashes would result in a 
“bounce-over” type of failure, since “bounce-over” crashes involve vehicles rebounding 
vertically after bouncing on changes in the median slope.  
Similar constraints affected the Brifen system overall. The only crashes applicable in this 
study involved barriers located in wide medians or adjacent to shallow slopes, effectively 
eliminating any opportunity for a “bounce-over” impact to occur. Although no “bounce-over” 
impacts were observed on the Brifen, Gibraltar, or Safence systems, there is currently no 
proprietary or non-proprietary design which is not susceptible to “bounce-over” failures. 
Most of the impacts in the database occurred with 3-cable barrier variations of each 
system type, with standard hardware and cable spacing. A total of 18 crashes occurred in the 
state of Ohio with a 4-cable Nucor barrier, which was the only TL-4 system involved in crashes 
which had available scene diagrams and supporting photographic evidence to determine the 
causes of failure. Two penetrations and two rollovers occurred in two crashes on this system. In 
one crash, barrier penetration contributed to a rollover. In a separate crash, the rollover caused 
the vehicle to override the barrier. 
Nucor CASS Brifen Gibraltar Generic Total
Diving
Front end of vehicle protrudes beneath cables and lifts 
cables up and over the hood.  This condition is most 
common with passenger cars.
10 2 1 1 22 36
Prying
Vehicle protrudes between or below cables and pries the 
cables away from the system due to the slope of the vehicle 
body, resulting in either underride or through-cable 
penetration.
20 26 5 1 30 82
Override
Wheels of vehicle pass over the top of the cables, forcing 
them below the undercarriage. This category includes 
launching but excludes rebound off of slopes which causes 
override.
27 26 1 - 8 62
Bounce-Over
Specific to rebounding off of slopes; vehicle strikes ditch 
and rebounds up and over the barrier due to suspension 
compression and unloading.
- 2 - 1 1 4
System Failure
Penetration caused by a breakdown of system components, 
design, or installation, either releasing tension in the cables 
or eliminating post contributions.
- - - - 2 2
Large Vehicle
Tractor-trailers, buses, large trucks, camper vehicles, and 
construction vehicles. No cable barrier is currently designed 
for these types of impacts; however, these impacts are 
frequently severe.
5 7 - 1 8 21
62 63 7 4 71 207
Number of Penetrations RecordedPenetration 
Contributor
Description
Total
June 20, 2013  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13 
116 
Although the causes of barrier containment failures were mutually exclusive, contributing 
factors to the failures were not. Contributing factors included:  system-dependent factors, 
installation-dependent factors, and vehicle-dependent factors. Of these domains, the system-
dependent and installation-dependent failures will be discussed in detail in Chapter 9. A brief 
summary of typical conditions associated with each type of penetration factor is provided below. 
8.3 Types of Penetrations 
8.3.1 Diving Penetrations 
Diving-type penetrations were defined as crashes in which the median geometry caused 
suspension compression, causing the leading edge of the vehicle bumper to dive below the 
bottom cable and lift all of the cables above the bumper and onto the hood. Diving penetrations 
were characterized by mechanical levers:  once the impacting corner of the vehicle protruded 
under the cables, prying action through the longitudinal axis of the vehicle lifted the cables up in 
the same manner as a small force on a rod at a sufficient distance can lift or displace a boulder.  
Diving failures were not restricted to particular vehicle classes. Examples of vehicle 
makes involved in diving crashes included a Saturn Aura, Mitsubishi Galant, Ford Fusion, and 
Ford Mustang. These vehicles did not conform to any identifiable front-end patterns except that 
the height of the leading edge of the hood was not “large,” or was below approximately 27 in. 
(686 mm) in each case when the vehicle was at rest. Other underride penetration types were 
heavily dependent on the geometry of the impacting vehicle. 
8.3.2 Prying Underride Failures 
In prying-type underride penetrations, cables were pried up above the hood, thus allowing 
the vehicle to pass under the cables. The prying differentiation was used to separate crashes 
which did not heavily depend on median terrain; any underride containment failure occurring on 
a flat shoulder adjacent to the travel lane was therefore a prying-type penetration. Prying 
underride penetrations had a strong correlation with the orientation angle and vehicle shape.  
Prying penetrations were analogous to mechanical wedges, which can split logs when 
struck with enough force. Analogously, for low-angle prying events, the prying action is similar 
to a “seesaw,” in which a small child located far from the fulcrum can lift an adult. Similarly, the 
motion of the rear of the vehicle can cause prying on the front corner to lift the cables, or vice-
versa. Both diving and prying penetrations shared similar failure mechanisms. However, median 
geometries and vehicle types varied widely between the two containment failure datasets, 
prompting researchers to treat each type independently. 
Non-tracking skid crashes, in which the entire side of the vehicle was engaged with the 
cable barrier, frequently resulted in adequate vehicle capture and low risk of rollover. 
Conversely, engagement along the front or rear planar surfaces of the vehicle frequently resulted 
in penetrations.  
During high-orientation angle impact conditions, the vehicle engaged the barrier in a 
condition which may promote cable separation, lifting, or compression. The increased risk to 
impacting vehicles was due to a combination of the following factors:  (1) higher front-end and 
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rear-end stiffness prevented the cables from creating “furrows” or grooved contact patches on the 
vehicle, which tended to retain the cables throughout impact; (2) the “approximate equivalent” 
vehicle profile which came into direct contact with the barrier system changed; and (3) vertical 
motions of the front or back of the vehicle were exaggerated relative to cable motion at 
orientation angles approaching 90 or -90 degrees. 
8.3.3 Bounce-Over Penetrations 
A bounce-over penetration was a specialized crash event in which the impacting vehicle 
rebounded off of a median slope and passed over the top of the barrier system. This type of crash 
is more common with smaller passenger vehicles since large vehicles more frequently “dig in” to 
the medians and either roll over or are captured by the barrier. 
Bounce-over crashes occur most commonly on medians steeper than 8:1; most bounce-
over crashes occurred on medians between 6:1 and 4:1. Medians which are in this steepness 
range are often used to facilitate large rain runoff from the road; as a result, many medians have 
moist or wet soil through much of the year, even in dry climates. The softer median terrain does 
not facilitate bounce-over for larger vehicles since a large amount of soil is typically displaced 
after a heavy vehicle engages the slope. Soil displacement dissipates much of the energy which 
contributes to “bouncing.” Smaller vehicles, which frequently have much lower pitch and yaw 
inertias and overall masses, bounce due to median impact without displacing much soil. This is 
why frequently only small to mid-size cars were engaged in bounce-over impacts in this crash 
database. 
8.3.4 Override Penetrations 
Override penetrations corresponded to a vehicle passing over the top of all of the cables 
before passing to the non-impact side of the cable median barrier. Note that “bounce-over” 
crashes, in which the impacting vehicle rebounded off of the median slope and passed over the 
barrier, were segregated from override penetrations due to median slope contributions. 
Override crashes occurred due a combination of factors including vehicle profile shape, 
vehicle orientation angle at impact, cable entrapment at a post, ramp formation, or excessive 
cable sag. Of these possibilities, cable entrapment, ramp formation, and vehicle orientation at 
impact were the most common causes. Virtually every large ½-ton or ¾-ton pickup truck class 
has a rear end bumper height which is approximately 3 to 5 in. (76 to 127 mm) higher than in the 
front. Since many cable median barrier systems have a top cable mounting height less than 35 in. 
(889 mm), many rear-leading pickup and large SUV crashes resulted in penetration that likely 
would have been adequately captured if cable barrier systems were taller or if the vehicle had 
struck with the front end. MASH crash testing with the 2270P vehicle could demonstrate this 
type of behavior. 
8.3.5 Low CG Trajectory Angle Penetrations 
A broad class of penetrations that spanned multiple penetration mechanisms consisted of 
low-CG trajectory angle crashes which resulted in penetration. Low-angle impacts leading to 
barrier penetration occurred on every barrier make. According to the results of NCHRP Report 
No. 665 [22], approximately 55% of all run-off-road crashes occurred with CG trajectory angles 
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less than or equal to 15 degrees. Due to the difficulty in determining when a penetration crash 
occurred, it is likely that the number of low-angle penetrations is underrepresented in the 
penetration crash database. 
Low-CG trajectory angle penetration crashes frequently occurred concomitantly with 
contributions cable entrapment on posts, front-end profiles and bumper heights which increased 
susceptibility to penetration, and low energy associated with the lateral component of velocity 
(IS value energy) available for stable crush to occur. Barrier-specific interactions also 
contributed to penetration propensity. Both override and prying underride penetrations occurred 
at low CG trajectory angles.  
The risk of severe crash result associated with this containment failure was dependent on 
multiple factors. If the low-CG trajectory angle crash resulted in penetration when the barrier 
was installed on the traffic-side shoulder or approach slope, the vehicle entered the median. 
Then, the vehicle could enter the opposing lanes, come to rest in the median, or redirect toward 
the initial travel lanes. Crashes in which the vehicle came to rest were not severe in general, 
whereas moderately low-angle cross-median trajectories were frequently severe but relatively 
uncommon. When the barrier was installed near the center of the V-ditch, vehicles involved in 
low-angle penetration crashes nearly always came to rest in the median.  
Roof crush was a major contributor to severe low-CG trajectory angle penetration 
crashes. Vehicles which became entrapped beneath the cables were frequently at a higher crash 
severity risk than vehicles which either completely penetrated beneath the system or were 
redirected. Low-CG trajectory angle penetrations did not occur on systems located on the back 
side of median slopes, but did occur when the barrier was installed on the opposite-side shoulder.  
8.4 Approximate Equivalent Vehicle Profile 
Penetration crashes into high-tension cable median barriers shared many common 
characeristics. Narrow-profile vehicles or vehicles with smooth front ends alter the expected 
interaction between the vehicle’s front end and the cable barrier during high-orientation angle 
crashes. As the orientation angle approached either 90 or 270 degrees to the barrier system, 
differences arose as the vehicle engaged the cable barrier system with the entire front or back 
surface instead of a concentrated impact at a corner. Impacts occurring along vehicle corners 
could be analyzed as a wireframe object with corresponding mass as well as roll, pitch, and yaw 
moments of inertia impacting the cable barrier. Front- or rear-leading impacts instead engaged 
the cable barrier with an entire surface, which engaged the barrier with a contour corresponding 
to a cross-section of the vehicle at a given time. This concept is illustrated in Figure 84. 
The observation of the differences between impact orientations gave rise to the concept 
of an approximate equivalent vehicle concept, which consisted of a block striking a string in a 
two-dimensional plane. If the block strikes the strings with an orientation angle other than 0, 90, 
180, or 270 degrees, contact will be made along a leading edge, and the tensioned string will 
remain engaged with leading edge until the block redirects and contact is made with the trailing 
edge. Prying underride penetrations occurred when the leading edge contact caused cable 
separation or lifting. If the vehicle orientation at impact was 0, 90, 180, or 270 degrees, an entire 
surface contacted the cable. Rounded or smooth vehicle front-end surfaces caused separation or 
lift when impact occurred near the midspan. This susceptibility was amplified when crashes 
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involved vehicles with aerodynamic, sharply-contoured front ends. Large vehicles were also 
sometimes able to push the cables down and override the barrier if bending waves propagating 
through the cables caused the cables to disengage from the front bumper.  
 
Figure 84. Approximate Equivalent Vehicle Profile Concept 
The major difference associated with the performance in high orientation angle crashes 
near 90 or 270 degrees was that contact was distributed. With non-localized contact along the 
entire front or rear of the vehicle, contact pressure was distributed and local contact forces were 
low. Cable barrier systems are tension systems which have a lateral force-deflection curve only 
dependent on the total force acting over a given span. Thus, for the same lateral deflection of the 
cable, the reduced contact force resulting from distributed pressure did not surpass the elastic 
limit of the front-end components on the vehicle. Elastic deformations were negligible in 
comparison with cable barrier deflections. Thus, vehicle reacted similarly to a rigid body, and 
lifted cables above the bumper and hood, separated the cables and allow the vehicle to penetrate 
through, under, or over the cables, depending on the shape of the vehicle’s front end. 
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8.5 Cable Tension and Dynamic Deflection 
As discussed in Chapter 5, there was an increased risk to occupants of errant vehicles in 
any high-tension cable median barrier crash that appeared to be associated with the higher 
tension in the cables. Although higher cable tensions do tend to reduce dynamic deflections, the 
effect was not as pronounced as many engineers have assumed previously. Dynamic deflections 
in tests conducted on cable barrier systems, including roadside systems, were plotted by against 
impact severity. Impact severities were derived from crash test results submitted to FHWA for 
eligibility status for use on the NHS, as well as testing agency reports. Results were included 
through 2010 and are shown in Figure 85. 
 
Figure 85. Dynamic Deflection Comparison, Low- and High-Tension Cable Barriers 
As shown in Figure 85, at IS-values below 40 kip-ft (54 kJ), high-tension barriers exhibit 
up to a 33% reduction in dynamic deflection compared to low-tension cable barriers. However, 
the difference in dynamic deflection between low- and high-tension cable barrier systems was 
approximately 15% with an IS value of 102 kip-ft (138 kJ). This IS value is typical of the 
standard impact condition for TL-3 impacts using a 2000P test vehicle according to NCHRP 
Report 350. Reported rates of dynamic deflections were always higher than the 15% average 
determined from full-scale crash testing. It should be noted that the high-IS value crashes with 
high-tension cable median barriers very closely corresponded to, and occasionally intersected, 
the approximate deflection curve from low-tension crashes; the primary “benefit” of high-tension 
dynamic deflection reduction occurs at low IS-value crashes. This low-IS value benefit is likely 
the result of decreased post spacing and total cable system lengths less than 300 ft (91 m) in 
many of the high-tension cable median barrier systems. However, the low-tension systems 
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exhibited much lower average crash severity than high-tension systems, which may be correlated 
with the lower cable tension. 
Reasons that higher cable tensions do not produce a substantially lower dynamic 
deflection at high IS values include the following:  (1) most high-tension cable barrier systems 
used weak, proprietary posts which were not as strong in strong-axis bending as S3x5.7 
(S76x8.5) posts used in low-tension cable barrier systems; (2) higher tension on the cables 
produced a lateral redirective force with an approximate correlation to the sine of the angle 
formed between the deflected cable and adjacent supports, meaning weaker adjacent posts 
cannot sustain as much load as stronger posts used in low-tension 3-cable median barrier systems 
could and the cable deflection angle between adjacent posts was frequently less than in low-
tension systems; and (3) higher-tension systems frequently redirected vehicles with fewer 
numbers of cables since the higher restorative forces in the cables tended to allow vehicles to 
override lower cables or slip under higher cables. While there was a tangible benefit to using 
higher-tension systems, the associated detriments must also be weighed in accordance with that 
decision. 
8.6 Energetic Capture Concept 
The increased risk of penetration due to high orientation angle had roots in classical 
physics and mechanics. The cable capture phenomenon was strongly related to energetic 
constraints during redirection. When vehicles engaged cable barrier systems with standard crash 
testing conditions, with both CG trajectory and orientation angles of 25 degrees, the front 
bumper corner absorbed the initial impact through headlight fracture and crushing of the front 
fender panels. As the fenders were crushed by the cables, local energetic minima were generated 
which tended to cause the cables to interlock with the vehicle. Cables which were engaged in 
those energetically-favorable crush locations would have to undergo additional stretch to climb 
out of the energetic minima around the crush. This same concept is utilized to maintain cables or 
wire ropes in sheaves and pulleys, which have flanges which require the cables to stretch in order 
to release. By the natural tendency to minimize potential energy, including strain energy, cables 
which engaged vehicle sheet metal and interlocked most commonly remained engaged until the 
vehicle was captured or redirected. 
When vehicles impacted cable barrier systems with orientation angles approaching 90 or 
270 degrees with respect to the barrier system, energetic constraints were altered. Localized 
crushing was typically reduced, preventing the energetic minima from being generated. As a 
result, the cables did not have a stable engagement with the vehicle and were only constrained by 
frictional interaction with the components, rather than a sheave-like groove.  Unless intermittent 
locations of energetic minima were created (i.e., the grill cracking, headlights fracturing, hood 
lifting or prying, or the windshield or crown of the hood catching the cable), the cables 
frequently slipped up and over the vehicle. The large stiffness of the most vehicle front and back 
planes often prevented localized contact stresses from exceeding the elastic limit of the 
impacting components and prevent the initial capture engagement in some crashes.  
Higher cable tensions further decreased cable response times and increased sensitivity to 
transverse wave motions. High-tension cables closely follow classical wave propagation 
equations for tensioned strings since the bending contributions become negligible compared to 
low-tension cables. As a result, wave speeds were functionally dependent on cable tension. 
June 20, 2013  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13 
122 
Bending waves caused cables to disengage from the impacting vehicle in some crashes. Higher 
CG trajectory angle crashes were also susceptible to these types of prying underride or cable-slip 
override phenomena. 
8.7 Overall Discussion and Recommendations 
As stated previously, low-tension, 3-cable median barriers had the lowest average rate of 
severe crashes and severe outcomes of all of the barrier types. Researchers postulated that this 
result was actually the culmination of multiple effects.  
First, low-tension cable median barriers are frequently historical systems. Most low-
tension cable median barrier currently installed in the United States were installed before high-
tension cable median barrier systems became prevalent. Working knowledge of the barrier and 
the difficulties associated with mowing and ditch erosion around posts were also expressed in 
research reports and DOT experience as the prominence of high-tension cable median barriers 
increased. As a result, many state DOTs began to place high-tension cable median barrier 
adjacent to the travel lanes on the shoulders in the hope that the problems experienced by 
roadside maintenance crews could be mitigated. Additionally, barrier placement on shoulders 
frequently improved ease of repair by maintenance crews since the workers were able to park 
vehicles in the median and repair the system at a safe distance from adjacent traffic. 
However, crash severity is strongly correlated with the associated IS value at impact. 
Although systems in median centers experienced a higher frequency of crashes with high CG 
trajectory angles, the speeds of the crashes were almost always lower than when barrier systems 
were located on the shoulders adjacent to the roadways. This fact was particularly evident when 
comparing crash results of states with widely-varying median configurations. In Utah, median 
barriers were commonly installed at 1 ft (0.3 m) or not less than 8 ft (2.4 m) from the center of 
the V-ditch but as far from the travel lanes as possible, per Utah installation standards. Utah’s 
large separation distance between the cable barrier and the travel way contributed to the lowest 
rates of A+K crashes compared to other aggregate severities of high-tension cable barrier 
installations in other states. However, frequent wet or snowy weather in the Interstate 15 corridor 
also contributed to lower-speed and lower-angle crashes, which also reduced crash severities. 
Conversely, in both Wisconsin and Washington, similar systems were frequently installed on 
barrier shoulders since medians were steeper and narrower to accommodate increased drainage 
and narrower right-of-ways. In both of these states, the crash severity on the same barrier type 
was considerably higher than in Utah. These effects had never been previously documented, and 
all three states were acting in compliance with the state-of-the-art in cable barrier installation 
practices and recommendations made by transportation safety agencies. Furthermore, many 
miles of the system with the same shape of posts, same types of connections, and similar speed 
roadways adjacent to the system minimized individual discrepancies which could occur. 
An analysis of the median data in Ohio indicated that, although penetration propensity 
increased to more than 17% when barriers were located within 4 ft (1.2 m) of the center of the V-
ditch, crash severities were lowest when barriers were placed near the center of the ditch verses 
on traffic-side shoulder, opposite-side shoulder, approach slope, or back slope. In fact, 
penetration propensity was nearly twice as large when barriers were installed near the center of 
the ditch compared to anywhere else in the median. One exception was the traffic-side shoulder, 
which had a penetration rate nearly equal to the penetration rate of the barriers installed near the 
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center of the median. Yet the percentage of serious injury and fatality crashes for barriers in 
median centers was less than half as large as when the barrier was installed anywhere else in the 
ditch.  
In addition, nearly all severe crashes near the center of the median were caused by 
penetrations, occasionally resulting in cross-median crashes or rollovers. If penetration crashes 
can be prevented when cable median barriers are placed in ditch centers, the potential to reduce 
severe crash risk is very high. The results of the Ohio evaluation are shown in Table 33.  
A chi-squared test was conducted on the severe crash, penetration, and rollover data, and 
the results were significant at the 10% confidence level; given the size of the data set at 857 
crashes, the result should be interpreted as very significant since the data set is small with respect 
to A+K crashes. 
Table 33. Ohio Cable Median Barrier Location Severity and Crash Result 
 
Penetration and rollover crashes increased risk to occupants of errant vehicles compared 
to low-tension systems. However, penetration and rollover crashes typically constituted less than 
55% of all severe cable median barrier crashes. Based on this finding, if penetration and rollover 
crash risks could be completely mitigated, many other severe crashes would still occur.  
Ultimately, cable median barrier penetrations were caused by varied factors and were 
heavily dependent on barrier design. Therefore, changes in barrier design can lead to immediate 
reductions in the risk of penetration, as well as the rates of severe injury or fatality crashes. 
Based on the results of this study and the types of containment failures identified, improved 
barrier designs may be drafted, tested, and implemented. This could lead to the reduction of 
hundreds or thousands of severe injuries and fatalities. 
Barrier Location Crashes Penetrations Rollovers A+K Injuries
Shoulders (Either Side) 20 20.0% 5.0% 15.0%
Traffic-Side Slope 485 8.5% 4.3% 4.5%
Within 4 ft of Ditch Bottom 123 13.8% 2.4% 0.8%
Opposite-Side Slope 229 8.3% 4.4% 3.5%
All Traffic-Side Crashes 494 8.7% 4.5% 4.9%
All Opposite-Side Crashes 240 8.8% 4.2% 3.8%
All Crashes Not in Ditch Center 734 8.7% 4.4% 4.5%
All Crashes 857 9.5% 4.1% 4.0%
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9 PENETRATION CRASH ANALYSIS 
9.1 Nucor TL-3 System on Flange Channel Posts 
The Nucor NU-CABLE system was installed in many of the surveyed states, although the 
greatest quantity was in the state of Ohio. The most predominant causes of penetrations on the 
Nucor system were override events and prying crashes in which the vehicle pried cables upward 
and lifted them over the hood and bumper. Several crashes in which the strong cable-to-post 
attachments contributed to penetration containment failure occurred at CG trajectory angles 
much lower than are designated for full-scale crash testing in NCHRP Report 350 or MASH. 
9.1.1 Override Penetrations 
A total of 22 override penetrations were identified on the database of Nucor penetration 
crashes. Of these override crashes, 16 were linked to the strong cable-to-post attachment, 4 were 
due to vehicle launching over the barrier due to installation on a slope, and 2 penetrations were 
due specifically to the weak post-to-ground interaction. Photographs of the crashes were used to 
document failure types when available. 
An example of a crash in which the strong cable-to-post attachments contributed to 
vehicular penetration through the barrier is shown in Figures 86 and 87. In this crash, an 
impacting pickup truck lost control due to slick roadway conditions and departed the roadway 
into the median. The CG trajectory angle was approximately 24 degrees, and the orientation 
angle of the vehicle at impact was approximately 110 deg. The vehicle impacted the cables and 
began to redirect. The first few impacted posts were pulled out of the ground as the pickup was 
redirecting, and the strength of the cable-to-post attachments retained the posts on the cables. 
Due to the high orientation angle at impact, the cables did not locally crush the fender at the front 
of the vehicle. Fender crush promotes good cable-vehicle interaction and was commonly 
associated with vehicular capture or redirection. Posts downstream from impact bent backward 
as the pickup truck progressed into the system. Because the cables remained attached to the posts 
as the posts fractured and bent at the ground line, cable heights were lowered relative to the 
vehicle. Eventually, the vehicle overrode the cables and struck the round wood posts on the back 
side of a W-beam guardrail system. Due to the high orientation angle of the truck, the posts acted 
as a tripping mechanism and the pickup rolled five quarter-turns. 
Although the weak post strength and high vehicle orientation contributed to the 
penetration, the primary cause of the failure was due to the cable-to-post attachments which 
failed to release the cables. By preventing cable release, the posts were pulled out of the ground 
or fractured, which deposited the posts on the ground and lowered the cable heights in front of 
the bumper. This type of override penetration was therefore referred to as a “ramp formation” 
failure. If the cables had been released from the posts, cables would have remained engaged with 
the front of the vehicle.  
The incident slope at the POI was 10.4:1, which was generally considered “flat” median 
terrain. Construction of the system was within recommended tolerance, and the vehicle bore a 
strong resemblance to the Dodge Ram pickup trucks used in many full-scale crash tests 
evaluating roadside hardware to MASH criteria. Other additional crashes occurred in which the
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Figure 86. Penetration Crash Caused by Strong Cable-to-Post Attachment 
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Figure 87. Crash Result Due to Strong Cable-to-Post Connection 
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strong cable-to-post attachments caused override, but photographic evidence from those crashes 
was sparse. 
A second example of the strong cable-to-post connection consisted of a combination of 
several component failures which culminated in the override penetration. Vehicle no. 1 
hydroplaned on the roadway and struck an adjacent vehicle. The second vehicle swerved to 
avoid Vehicle no. 1 but was unsuccessful. After colliding with Vehicle no. 1, Vehicle no. 2 
skidded into the median and struck a cable barrier, coming to rest on the opposite side of the 
system. Impact CG trajectory and orientation angles of Vehicle no. 2 were in the range of 10 to 
15 degrees and 20 to 30 degrees, respectively. Unfortunately, a lack of vehicle trajectory 
photographs prevented more accurate photogrammetric techniques from being used to calculate 
the encroachment angles. Final vehicle orientation was approximately 205 degrees, relative to 
the vehicle’s original travel direction. Crash photographs are shown in Figures 88 and 89. 
The penetration event occurred due to a combination of the following three factors:  (1) 
the posts were manufactured from high-strength, low-ductility steel, resulting in post fracture 
rather than bending at the ground line; (2) the cable-to-post attachments remained firmly 
attached to the cables, resulting in the accumulation of fractured posts in front of the vehicle; and 
(3) the top cable engaged the vehicle above the top of the bumper, but the large vertical 
resistance to cable disengagement from the post tore the bumper cover off of the vehicle. Based 
on the photographic evidence, it would appear that the bumper cover removal occurred early in 
the crash event, because no posts accumulated in front of the vehicle before the bumper cover 
was removed. Further, it is likely that the top cable engaged an opening between the bumper 
cover and the fender due to bumper cover deformation shortly after impact, snagging the bumper 
cover and retaining it in front of the vehicle for the remainder of the impact event.  
The bumper cover disengagement from the vehicle is related to vehicle stiffness in the 
capture zone (CZ). The CZ refers to the front area of the vehicle between the upper bumper 
surface and the lower edge of the hood which is the predominant location intended for cable 
engagement with an impacting vehicle. The capture zone is generally composed of blunt surfaces 
concealing the radiator, the engine, and cavities in the body made for headlights and the wheel 
well. The CZ concept has frequently been invoked when discussing cable barrier placement in 
V-ditches and explaining both failures and successes of certain cable barrier systems. 
Bumper cover disengagement resulting in vehicular penetration is a relatively rare event. 
However, the accumulation of fractured posts may be indicative of a systemic problem, because 
the post fractures during both redirection and penetration events, and post accumulation, were 
both widely observed. 
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Figure 88. Override Penetration Crash Caused by Strong Cable-to-Post Attachment 
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Figure 89. Override Penetration Crash Vehicle Final Position and Removed Bumper Cover 
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9.1.2 Prying Underride Penetrations 
Through-cable penetrations were never identified for crashes involving the TL-3 Nucor 
NU-CABLE, flanged U-channel post cable median barrier system. All prying penetrations were 
caused by vehicle underride. Every Nucor prying underride penetration occurred with one of the 
following impact conditions: (1) a high orientation angle (typically a large oversteering angle) 
contributed to underride penetration because the bumper slid beneath the bottom cable; (2) small 
CG trajectory and orientation angles, combined with a downward slope in advance of the barrier, 
contributed to poor initial engagement of the impacting bumper corner; or (3) after redirection, 
the vehicle re-engaged the barrier at a low CG and orientation angle which then pried cables up 
before penetrating through the barrier. Vehicles involved in prying failures were either narrow-
profile, sharp-nosed vehicles, such as the early 2000s-model Ford Taurus, or vehicles which had 
stiff, rounded back ends such as the Pontiac Grand Am and Grand Prix models.  
Several examples of prying failures are discussed here in greater detail. In one prying-
type crash, a 1999 Ford Taurus struck the Nucor 3-cable median barrier with CG trajectory and 
orientation angles of less than 10 degrees when the barrier was located at the edge of the 
shoulder. The vehicle remained in contact with the barrier for approximately 60 ft (18.3 m) 
before prying the cables above the hood and coming to rest in the median. No photographs were 
available for this crash. 
In a second prying case, a 1994 Chevrolet Camaro impacted the Nucor system with a 
sideslip angle of approximately 90 degrees. Photos of the impact are shown in Figures 90 and 91. 
In this crash, the vehicle oversteered into the median to avoid contact with another vehicle on the 
road, and struck a TL-3 3-cable Nucor barrier system with 20 ft (6.1 m) post spacing. The CG 
trajectory angle at impact was approximately 32 degrees, and the heading angle was 
approximately 118 degrees. The vehicle yawed and redirected away from the opposing travel 
lanes, coming to rest  with an orientation angle of approximately 245 degrees. The vehicle 
engaged one post along the right side, and pushed the post downstream. The post did not 
disengage from the cables as the vehicle underrode the system. 
The vehicle did not adequately engage the cables due to the geometry of the vehicle and 
the impact orientation angle. Unlike many other vehicles, the Camaro had stiff body paneling 
and a sloped front hood above the headlight, which changed the capture zone on the front of the 
vehicle to the area below the bumper level. In this crash, the adequate capture zone varied 
between a front-leading impact and a corner-leading impact. The front end of the vehicle would 
promote the tendency of the bottom cable to slide up over the leading edge of the bumper and 
above the hood. Conversely, orientation angles between 10 and 50 degrees, or 130 and 170 
degrees, would likely promote cable engagement because the headlight cavities at the right-front 
and left-front corners of the vehicle extended upward to the leading edge of the hood. The 
variation in the capture zone based on orientation angle increases the difficulty of a “panacea” 
solution to cable mounting heights.  
As the cables slid up from the top of the bumper over the hood, front windshield, roof, 
and rear windshield, the cables pried the hood upward and crushed both the front and rear 
windshields. The vehicle’s hood may have struck the front windshield, causing both left- and 
right-side windows to subsequently fracture. Other penetration and redirection crashes did not 
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always result in windshield or window fracture; this result was strongly related to the high cable 
tensions of the Nucor system.  
Partial penetration crashes were crashes in which the final position of the vehicle with 
respect to the barrier suggested penetration was imminent. Partial penetration crashes consisted 
of crashes in which the vehicle overrode the cables and came to rest with at least one wheel on 
the back side of the system and at least one wheel on the impact side of the system, or crashes in 
which the vehicle came to rest with cables resting on the roof with no cables on the impacting 
side of the system capable of redirecting the vehicle. If at least one cable remained engaged with 
the impacting side of the vehicle, the crash was not considered a partial penetration. 
One such potential penetration crash occurred with a 2003 Pontiac Grand Am, which 
struck a cable barrier with a low but unknown CG trajectory angle and an orientation angle 
greater than 100 degrees. Photographs of the crash are shown in Figure 92. Vehicle engagement 
was initially acceptable as the lower cables crushed the right-front fender panel inward and 
fractured the headlight housing. However, due to the slope of the leading right-front corner of the 
vehicle and the strength of the cable-to-post attachments, the upper cable was forced up the 
vehicle’s A-pillar, lifting the lower cables and tearing the hood supports. The hood was removed 
from the vehicle and came to rest at an unknown location in the median. The force applied to the 
vehicle to remove the hood initiated a clockwise yaw by arresting the front of the vehicle. The 
second and third posts downstream from impact were struck by the rear of the vehicle and lifted 
out of the ground due to the prying action of the cables above the vehicle, but remained attached 
to the cables due to the strong cable-to-post attachments. The posts became wedged in the rear 
windshield, shattering the rear glass and crushing the roof inward. 
Although the vehicle was brought to a stop in the median, the strong cable-to-post 
attachment could have seriously injured or killed an occupant in the back seat of the vehicle in 
this crash because of the retention of the post. Fortunately, no occupants were present in high-
risk seat locations, and this crash resulted in only property damage. 
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Figure 90. Prying Penetration Crash on Nucor NU-CABLE Barrier 
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Figure 91. Prying Penetration Failure on Nucor NU-CABLE Barrier 
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Figure 92. Potential Penetration Crash on Nucor NU-CABLE Barrier 
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9.1.3 Diving Underride Penetrations 
A total of 11 diving penetration crashes were identified in the Nucor penetration crash 
database. Of the 11 documentable diving penetration crashes on the Nucor barrier, 8 crashes 
occurred in medians with approach slopes steeper than 7:1 and when the barrier was installed 
close to the ditch center. In each crash, the CG trajectory angle was sufficient to cause 
suspension compression on the impacting corner, and the vehicle orientation angle was between 
10 and 80 degrees to the barrier. No rear-leading or over-correcting diving crashes were 
documented, leading researchers to conclude that failures due to vehicular diving were sensitive 
to the impacting orientation angle. 
One such diving crash that resulted in a penetration involved a 2009 Ford Fusion. 
Photographs of the crash are shown in Figure 93. A collision occurred with a second vehicle in 
adjacent travel lanes, causing the Fusion to veer off of the roadway into the median. The vehicle 
entered the median with an oversteering vehicle orientation, but the vehicle’s front suspension 
compressed as it interacted with the 5.2:1 approach slope, and the vehicle dove beneath the lower 
cables. Suspension rebound lifted the cables up, crushing and folding the hood and crushing the 
windshield. Many posts upstream and downstream from impact were pulled out of the ground 
due to the underride collision, rendering the system inoperable for subsequent impacts. 
A second example of a diving collision involved a 2003 Ford Taurus. Photographs from 
the impact are shown in Figure 94. The vehicle had lost control on the icy roadway and entered 
the median with an orientation angle greater than 60 degrees and a moderately-high CG 
trajectory angle of approximately 21 degrees. After impact, the cables slid up the bumper and 
grill and onto the hood without crushing or becoming “seated” in the vehicle’s body. Cables 
adjacent to impact lifted posts out of the ground, and the posts pierced the windshield before the 
vehicle came to a stop. Both the windshield and roof were crushed downward by the cables. 
It was determined that in addition to the smooth contour of the front end of the vehicle, 
suspension compression also contributed to this penetration crash. With the large orientation 
angle and moderately large CG trajectory angle, suspension compression and subsequent 
rebound had the effect of “bouncing” the cables upward and onto the hood and windshield. 
Significant occupant compartment deformation occurred, and the vehicle demonstrated a clear 
propensity for penetration since no cables were in optimum position to capture the vehicle after 
the vehicle came to rest; thus this crash was classified as a potential penetration and included 
with other penetrations in the analysis. 
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Figure 93. Diving Underride Penetration Crash on Nucor NU-CABLE Barrier 
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Figure 94. Diving Potential Underride Penetration Crash on Nucor NU-CABLE Barrier 
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9.1.4 Nucor NU-CABLE Penetrations Discussion 
The Nucor NU-CABLE barrier had the largest volume of photographs available. It also 
had the highest average severity for all of the high-tension barrier types. The penetration severity 
increase factor (PSIF) of the barrier was low relative to other barrier types, as shown in Table 23. 
Based on the overall A+K rate near 4%, this indicates that non-penetration crashes tend to be 
more severe on average than occurred with other systems. 
Strong cable-to-post attachments were disadvantageous in two ways:  (1) the strong 
attachments tended to promote system override by forcing the cables to deflect downward with 
the posts on impact and (2) to the inherently weak post-soil interaction and analogous low 
embedment of the post in socketed foundations increased susceptibility to post pullout from the 
ground or sockets. Although both conditions increased risk to impacting occupants by enabling 
penetration crash conditions to occur, the weak post-soil or post-socket interaction increased 
occupant risk more than override conditions because displaced posts which remain attached to 
the cables became spearing risks to small cars. 
9.2 Trinity CASS Cable Barrier 
Most of the Trinity CASS crashes in the available crash database occurred with the 
Trinity CASS system with C-section posts. As a result, analysis efforts were focused on this 
system. However, penetration frequencies for all systems were virtually identical, and the same 
mechanisms contributed to vehicle penetration for each of the designs. Despite a large 
uncertainty associated with a relatively small dataset, the highest penetration crash frequency 
occurred with the TL-4 CASS system.  
9.2.1 Ramp Formation Override Penetrations 
Override penetrations were the most common type of penetration failure of the CASS 
system. Of the 26 penetration override events with distinguishable causes on the CASS barriers, 
23 of the penetration crashes were caused by the vehicle striking a post before contacting the 
cables. All of the CASS system variations utilize a center slot which seats the cables in the post, 
which is designed to release the cables when the post bends over. When impacts occurred at a 
post location and the post failed to release the cables from the slot, a ramp was formed permitting 
the vehicle to climb up and override the barrier system. Furthermore, evidence of this type of 
impact can be provided simply by examining the vehicles involved in override penetrations. 
Small and mid-size cars comprised 31% of all override penetration failures on the CASS system. 
By contrast, excluding “bounce-over” impact conditions in which the impacting vehicle 
rebounded off of the median slope and penetrated over the top of the barrier, small to mid-size 
cars were typically involved in less than 15% of override penetrations on any other cable barrier 
system. 
Because impacts at post locations contributed to cable entrapment within the slot in the 
web, this type of failure was referred to as a “ramp formation” failure. Oversteering impacts 
involving vehicles with large orientation angles at impact were the most common impact 
condition associated with ramp formation failures. Overcorrecting and fully tracking crashes 
only constituted 3 ramp formation override crashes. Unfortunately, crashes with photographic 
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evidence of the ramp formation failure could not be shown to prevent violation of non-disclosure 
agreements. 
An additional override crash involved a vehicle towing a trailer. Most of the crashes 
involving a vehicle towing a trailer resulted in unfavorable cable barrier performance, by causing 
trailer “tip-over.” trailer penetration, vehicle rollover, or vehicle penetration. Frequently, these 
crashes were caused by oversteering gradients in the median. Trailers with high CG locations, 
higher bumper heights, flatter, stiffer body panels, and high rigidity, failed to engage cable 
barriers and increased penetration propensity. However, crashes involving passenger vehicles 
towing trailers were also infrequent. Thus, these crashes were not considered to be “failures” of 
the barrier, nor the fault of the DOT, construction or maintenance crews, or barrier designers. 
9.2.2 Prying Underride Penetrations 
Twenty-six prying underride crashes were identified in the CASS penetration crash 
database. Of the 26 identified vehicular prying penetrations, high orientation angle crashes 
accounted for 17 penetrations and low CG trajectory angle, low orientation angle crashes 
accounted for 9 penetrations.  
One high-orientation angle, prying underride crash with a CASS cable barrier involved a 
2002 Dodge Stratus. This crash was particularly notable because, of the 21 cable median barrier 
crashes involving similar Stratus vehicles, only one crash resulted in a penetration. The scene 
diagram from the penetration crash involving the 2002 Dodge Stratus is shown in Figure 95. 
Photographs of a 2002 Dodge Stratus, which was similar to the vehicle involved in the impact, 
are shown in Figure 96.  
The vehicle departed the roadway due to slick road conditions, impacting the system with 
a CG trajectory angle less than 10 degrees, but with an orientation angle exceeding 60 degrees. 
Because of the large orientation angle, the cables did not become “seated” in either the grill 
cutout, headlights or quarter panels. The vehicle slipped beneath the lower cables and entered the 
median, coming to rest between parallel installations of cable guardrails. 
 
Figure 95. Scene Diagram of High-Orientation Angle Crash  
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Figure 96. 2002 Dodge Stratus Similar to Vehicle Involved in High-Orientation Angle 
Penetration Crash [45] 
The Dodge Stratus was not typically involved in penetration crashes due to some unique 
features. The front of the vehicle was both broad and blunt, and the sides of the vehicle were 
relatively flat. There were multiple locations on the vehicle which promoted interlock with the 
vehicle, such as cutouts around headlights, a recessed grill area, and a concave trunk area which 
resisted cable slippage. Typical sill heights of the windows exceed 35 in. (890 mm), whereas the 
ground clearance averages approximately 16 in. (406 mm). Total vehicle height averages were 
approximately 55 in. (1,397 mm). This height provided a large surface over which vehicle 
capture was possible, which also required cables to rise substantially to pass over the top of the 
vehicle. Thus, this vehicle was uniquely positioned to resist cable median barrier penetrations. 
Other high-orientation angle penetration crashes involving vehicles which were not 
traditionally susceptible to penetration were also observed in the database. These crashes 
supported the conclusion that high orientation angles increased propensity for penetration by 
altering the initial contact engagement sequence. 
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Other low-angle crashes also contributed to unexpected cable median barrier penetration 
crashes. The CASS system was susceptible to low-angle penetration crashes because continued 
engagement of the cable barrier system resulted in multiple posts deflecting downstream and 
releasing from the cables, allowing for even minor prying forces on the cables to lift cables out 
of center post slots after a sufficient number of posts were deformed. The low angle of 
engagement also typically corresponded to lower levels of cable damage on the vehicle, which 
reduced cable interlock. The cables were not entrapped on the vehicle body and were free to 
oscillate or shift along the body panels, and particularly, to rise above the hood and roof. 
This problem was aggravated when crashes involved narrow-profile vehicles or vehicles 
with smooth front ends. When a vehicle’s bumper protruded beneath the cables, the vehicle was 
able to pry upper cables out of the slot and away from the post. Higher cable tensions resisted 
this uplift prying force, but also resulted in more hood, roof, and windshield crush than cables 
with lower tensions. 
9.2.3 Diving Underride Penetrations 
Only two diving underride penetrations were observed in the CASS database. Both 
occurred on the Trinity CASS system with C-channel posts and occurred in V-ditches with 
slopes between 4:1 and 6:1. Not all crashes in which the vehicles interacted with slopes to 
compress the suspension prior to impact resulted in penetrations or partial penetrations. Diving 
crashes typically resulted in higher severity on CASS systems than other cable median barrier 
systems due to the potential for roof crush by the bottom or middle cables. If the bottom cable 
remained adequately engaged with the vehicle but did not adequately disengage from the posts, 
the cables occasionally caused occupant compartment crush. 
The cable release load of the bottom cable in the CASS system was not available in 
published research studies. However, a brief mechanical analysis indicated that the weight of the 
cable, the cable tension, and friction with the retainer clip likely could develop a net vertical 
release load per post of approximately 900 lb (4.0 kN). However, due to the vertical resistance of 
the upper two cables, the vertical release of the lower cable could rise by a factor of as much as 
2.5, to approximately 2200 lb (9.8 kN). For posts deflecting during impact, the vertical release 
load can be even larger. During a diving or prying underride crash, the propensity for the lower 
cable to crush the hood or windshield could be very large if the low vertical release load of the 
bottom cable was increased.  
Scene diagrams were not available for several non-rollover, non-cross-median, severe 
CASS crashes with passenger cars. It was believed that partial or complete underride was likely 
responsible for the severe outcomes. However, this estimate could not be proven with the 
currently available dataset. Care should be taken to determine the cause of any serious crash 
involving the Trinity CASS barrier to ensure that the lower cables did not crush the occupant 
compartments of impacting vehicles. 
9.2.4 Trinity CASS Penetrations Discussion 
In general, placement of the cables in the post slot resulted in less desirable cable 
interaction with the vehicle. Although many crashes resulted in adequate containment with 
relatively low damage to impacting vehicles, and dynamic deflections were relatively low in 
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most crashes because good cable engagement occurred, many crashes resulted in undesirable 
outcomes. By placing the cables within the center slot and constraining them, the cables are 
subject to the reaction of the posts and may not release properly, which increases penetration risk 
due to override and increased occupant risk due to underride. Barrier design improvements must 
be made to prevent these types of high-risk containment failures from occurring.  
9.3 Brifen Wire Rope Safety Fence (WRSF) 
The total number of Brifen cable barrier crashes exceeded 1,500, and cross-median crash 
rates of the Brifen system in Oklahoma were comparable with other systems used in the state. 
However, documentable cable barrier crashes, in which scene diagrams, photographs, and 
narratives were available, numbered approximately 120. Of this set, only 7 documentable cable 
barrier crashes resulted in penetrations. Thus, the penetrations were examined in great detail, but 
the relative frequency of each type of penetration event could not be determined.  
9.3.1 Prying Underride Penetrations 
Of the 7 penetration crashes available for further analysis, 5 were prying underride 
crashes in which the impacting vehicle struck and penetrated below the Brifen WRSF barrier. 
Slope contributions were not considered with this data set. The surprisingly high rate of prying 
penetrations, given the small data set, further illustrates the risk associated with low vertical 
release loads for the bottom cable. Vehicles diving under the barrier, or those which engaged the 
barrier such that the cables slipped over the bumper and were pried upward, experienced 
significantly increased risk of penetration, since the bottom cable could not resist vertical uplift 
prying forces. 
An example of a Brifen crash which resulted in a prying penetration is shown in Figure 
97. With sufficient details to complete a full crash reconstruction, it was determined that the 
2000 Toyota Avalon impacted the barrier at approximately 50.7 mph (81.6 km/h) with a 16 
degree CG trajectory angle and a 152 degree orientation angle, with respect to the barrier. The 
vehicle contacted the wire rope with the right-front corner leading.  
Immediately after impact, the force of the redirection caused the vehicle to yaw with the 
right-rear corner turning into the barrier. These forces were eccentric to the vehicle’s CG and 
induced a counter-clockwise yaw, but the force required to initiate yaw were relatively low. As a 
result, the forces never exceeded the breaking strength of the front headlight glass casing and the 
cables did not crease into and engage the vehicle. As the vehicle’s back end rotated into the 
barrier, the cables slipped over the front bumper and hood corner due to the prying force and the 
vehicle penetrated under the barrier. The sunroof was shattered due to contact with the cables. 
The vehicle struck and bent four posts. One impact occurred at the front bumper, two 
occurred with the right-side body panels, and one occurred at the right-rear wheel, as shown in 
Figure 97. The vehicle occupants were not injured in this crash. The approach slope in front of 
the barrier was 9:1, and soil foundation tubes supporting the posts were in excellent condition.
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Figure 97. Prying Underride Failure on Brifen WRSF 
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Other prying penetration crashes were typical of this crash event. Vehicles impacted the 
barrier with large orientation angles, frequently with the right-side of the vehicle leading, and 
slipped under the wire ropes. These types of failures were predominantly due to the 
configuration of this barrier type. The lower cables on the TL-3 Brifen barrier were located at a 
height of 19½ in. (495 mm), but no vertical constraints were used to retain the bottom cable. 
Vertical release of the cables is largely resisted by gravity and friction with the post, but 
consequently the dynamic release loads tend to be very low. 
9.3.2 Other Penetration Types 
One override penetration and one diving penetration were recorded. The diving 
penetration crash occurred in an approved 6:1 V-ditch, in which the Brifen barrier was installed 
on the traffic-side approach slope. The vehicle exited the roadway at a relatively low angle, 
projected over the slope break point, then contacted the slope and began to rebound. During 
rebound, the vehicle partially redirected and yawed into and beneath the barrier. 
The override penetration observed in the database was somewhat anomalous. In this 
crash, a heavy snowfall occurred prior to and during the crash. Control of the vehicle was lost, 
and the vehicle entered the median and struck the Brifen WRSF. However, the snow depth was 
so high that the barrier deflection was restricted, and the snow in front of the barrier contributed 
to ramping over the barrier. Such a penetration event is not expected in most impact conditions. 
Moreover, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to prevent such a penetration from occurring 
on other barrier systems; due to the snow and low travel speeds, this crash has low likelihood of 
cross-median crash result. 
9.3.3 Brifen WRSF Penetration Discussion 
The Brifen penetration database was limited, but some clear tendencies were observed. 
First, due to the low vertical resistance of the bottom cable, the Brifen TL-3 WRSF was 
susceptible to underride from prying and diving failure types. Prying failures were the most 
common type of failure and the most common type of impact condition in general, especially 
when barriers were located at or near the shoulder. Thus, special care should be taken to increase 
the vertical release resistance of the lower cable. One such improvement could consist of the 
addition of a cable retainer at the bottom of the post which has a sufficient vertical release load to 
resist or prevent prying-type penetration crashes from occurring. However, the optimum lower-
cable release load threshold has not been determined. 
9.4 Low-Tension Non-Proprietary 3-Cable Median Barrier 
Approximately 128 severe cable median barrier crashes in Missouri between 2007 and 
2009, 795 crashes in Washington between 1999 and 2008, and 22 penetration crashes in North 
Carolina between 2001 and 2004 were examined in detail to determine causes of penetration or 
rollover occurrence on low-tension, 3-cable median barrier systems. Results of the analysis are 
provided below. 
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9.4.1 Override Penetration Crashes 
Override penetration crashes on the low-tension, 3-cable median barrier were much less 
frequent than override penetration crashes on high-tension cable median barriers. Out of 71 cable 
median barrier crashes with determinable failure causation, only 8 crashes involved passenger 
vehicles overriding the barrier. 
Out of the 8 override crashes, 5 involved vehicles striking the cable median barrier at 
large CG trajectory angles approaching 90 degrees. Although the override occurrence was 
usually associated with only larger passenger vehicles such as pickups, SUVs, and vans, a 
Hyundai Tiburon (Tuscani) was also involved in an override crash. The vehicle swerved off of 
the road to the right, overcorrected, and redirected into the median at approximately 86 degrees 
before it vaulted off of the slope break point of the 4:1 median approach slope and overrode the 
barrier, which was installed on the traffic-side approach slope. Such a crash is highly unusual 
and likely exceeded the IS value required for testing at TL-3 impact conditions. No longitudinal 
barrier system has yet demonstrated the capability of safely redirecting a vehicle with similar 
impact conditions. Four other high-angle override crashes involved a large van and three pickup 
trucks. A sample scene diagram of a pickup high-angle override crash is shown in Figure 98. 
 
Figure 98. High-Angle Override Penetration Crash Example 
The 3 other override penetration crashes consisted of very low CG trajectory angle, low 
orientation angle crashes. In two crashes, the impacting vehicles were pickup trucks, and in one 
crash, the vehicle was a large passenger car. The barriers were installed on relatively steep 
approach slopes, with unmeasured slopes likely between 4:1 and 6:1 based on visual estimation. 
The vehicles impacted the cable median barrier, sequentially bending the S3x5.7 (S76x8.5) 
support posts downstream, then overrode the cables. The override was likely due to the following 
two factors:  (1) the low tension in the cables was insufficient to prevent sagging when multiple 
support posts were removed from the system, and (2) the large vehicles with stiff exterior body 
panels were less conducive to energetically-favorable cable engagement. This engagement was 
frequently caused by crushing the vehicle exterior and retaining the cables against the sides of 
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the vehicle. As the vehicle bent the support posts, it was likely that the vehicles bounced or rode 
up the post after speeds were sufficiently reduced. Any vertical rebound of the vehicles increased 
the vehicles’ CG heights and potentially drove cables downward beneath the wheels. 
9.4.2 Diving Underride Crashes 
A far more common type of penetration crash mechanism on the low-tension cable 
median barrier was a diving underride crash. Many studies have been performed to improve the 
performance of low-tension cable median barrier performance in V-ditches [e.g. 27, 28, 44]. 
Underride failures with contribution from V-ditches steeper than 6:1 have often been cited as the 
most common failure of low-tension cable median barriers, and mitigation of diving penetrations 
has received the most widespread attention. 
Of the 71 low-tension, 3-cable median barrier penetration crashes with determinable 
causes, 23 were due to diving penetrations. The low-tension, 3-cable median barrier utilized a 
5/16-in. (8-mm) J-bolt. A study conducted at the Midwest Roadside Safety Facility (MwRSF) on 
the strength of the J-bolts, commonly referred to as hook bolts, determined that the peak 
horizontal pullout load of the 5/16-in. (8-mm) J-bolt was approximately 719 lb (3.20 kN), and the 
peak vertical pullout load was approximately 636 lb (2.83 kN) [46].  
Most diving underride crashes occurred when the bottom cable was on the opposite side 
of the post relative to the impacting vehicle travel direction. Although not recorded, several 
estimates of frequency were made regarding back-side penetrations, and suggest that at least 
60% of all underride penetrations occurred at locations where the lower cable was on the 
opposite side of the post relative to the impacting vehicle.  
The North Carolina penetration database supported this finding even though it was not a 
true “random sampling” of penetration crashes. However, causes of the penetrations and the 
associated crash circumstances in North Carolina were unknown to the researchers at the time of 
the crash investigations. It was observed that 15 of the 22 North Carolina penetration crashes, or 
approximately 68%, were crashes in which the bottom cable was located on the opposite side of 
the post from impact. Of these, it was determined that 8 of the back-side crashes resulted in the 
vehicles diving under the cables.  
Although median slope rates did have an effect on diving penetration rates, median slopes 
alone did not completely describe the risk of diving underride penetrations. Many of the sloped 
medians were shallower than 6:1. One diving penetration occurred on a median slope of 
approximately 10:1. In that crash, the vehicle was traveling at a high rate of speed and plowed 
into the back-side slope of the the median approximately 4 ft (1.2 m) in front of the barrier, then 
dove under the cables. Photographs from the crash site are shown in Figure 99. 
In general, slopes steeper than 8:1 were most susceptible to cable median barrier diving 
penetrations. Diving penetrations occurred less frequently if the impacting vehicle made contact 
with the barrier on the approach slope. The critical location to cause diving penetrations was 
approximately 3 to 6 ft (0.9 to 1.8 m) from the center of the V-ditch, based on analyses of ruts 
made in the soil in the crashes in North Carolina. This determination was supported by literature 
[28].  
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Figure 99. Diving Underride Penetration Crash in North Carolina 
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Although photographs were not available for crashes in the state of Missouri, median 
profiles were estimated based on site-specific analysis and limited photogrammetric 
reconstruction. In each Missouri diving underride crash, the median slope was steeper than or 
equal to 6:1, and the back-side slopes were also steeper than or equal to 6:1. In every diving 
underride crash in the database, back-side slopes were as steep as or steeper than the approach 
slopes into the median. This suggested that the approach slope steepness has a significant effect 
on the propensity to compress the suspension. However, the back side slopes had the strongest 
correlation with diving propensity when cable barriers were located near the center of the ditch. 
Steep back-side slopes caused more frequent penetrations than steep front-side slopes, and no 
diving crashes were observed when the cable median barrier was installed on a shallower slope. 
However, this type of installation may be subject to penetration, rollover, or other types of 
failures. 
Despite the effect of suspension compression on the propensity for vehicle penetration 
through the barrier, the weak lower cable-to-post attachments strongly increased penetration 
propensity. The attachments disengaged from the posts at low loads and allowed the cables to 
slip above or below the vehicle. It was believed that in every recorded diving cable median 
barrier crash in this database, the diving tendency would be significantly reduced or eliminated if 
the bottom cable-to-post attachment strength was increased. This could have reduced diving 
penetrations by as much as 50%. Increasing the release load of the bottom cable would likely 
increase contact forces between the impacting vehicle and bottom cable, which could result in 
better engagement and formation of the familiar cable crease observed on vehicles involved in 
successful redirections. Additional examples of diving underride crashes are shown in Figures 
100 and 101. 
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Figure 100. Additional Example of Diving Penetration Crash 
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Figure 101. Additional Example of Diving Penetration Crash 
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9.4.3 Prying Underride/Through-Cable Penetrations 
Unlike most high-tension cable median barrier systems, low-tension, 3-cable median 
barriers were the most susceptible to through-cable barrier penetration. This type of penetration 
was restricted to prying type, although median slope and vehicle geometry also contributed to the 
penetration in some crashes. Median profiles of prying crashes varied dramatically from the 
diving penetration crashes, since by definition suspension compression and rebound was not the 
predominant cause of penetration in these types of crashes. Out of the 22 penetration crashes in 
North Carolina, all penetrations occurring on the median approach slopes were prying 
penetrations, and 5 of the 15 crashes where the cable median barrier was installed on the back 
slope were prying penetration crashes. Additionally in Missouri, only 1 of the 18 prying crashes 
occurred on the median back slope, while 2 prying penetration crashes occurred when the barrier 
was impacted on the opposite-side shoulder. Conversely, 13 prying penetrations occurred on 
either the approach slope or ditch center, and an additional prying crash occurred when the 
barrier was installed on the adjacent shoulder of the divided roadway. 
Frequently, at least two prying risk factors were present in prying penetration crashes. 
Prying penetrations occurred when cables were lifted or separated and failed to engage the 
vehicle. As with the high-tension cable median barrier systems, prying penetrations were 
sensitive to impacting vehicle orientation angles. CG trajectory and orientation angles of vehicles 
in all crashes were plotted, with prying penetration crashes highlighted for comparison, as shown 
in Figure 102. No clear distinction could be made between the two crash distribution data sets. 
As with most penetration crash conditions, oversteering into the barrier was approximately 5 
times more common than overcorrecting, although conclusions were limited due to the small 
data set.  
Prying penetration crashes typically occurred via a combination of the following factors:  
(1) cables located on the back side of the post released from many posts because lateral forces 
exceeded cable-to-post attachment strengths; (2) large orientation angles promoted bumper 
protrusion between or below the cables contributing to underride or through-cable penetration; 
and (3) low contact forces prevented beneficial body panel crushing or headlight fracture, 
causing poor cable-vehicle engagement. Back-side cable release most commonly occurred when 
other cables failed to adequately engage the vehicle, so the entire redirection load was applied by 
one back side cable. Examples of penetration crashes in which the impacted back-side cable was 
removed from more than 10 posts downstream from impact are shown in Figures 103 and 104. 
One unique penetration crash involved a Mitsubishi Montero equipped with a brush 
guard mounted on the front bumper. Crash photographs are shown in Figures 105 and 106. The 
vehicle struck the cable barrier system, and the angled surface of the brush guard forced two of 
the cables below the front bumper and one above the hood. The cable that was lifted onto the 
vehicle caused minor windshield damage and scratching on the vehicle’s A-pillar. However, 
most of the vehicle damage was due to an unrelated rollover which occurred on the roadside of 
the opposite travel lanes long after the barrier penetration. 
Such an event was anomalous because very few impacting vehicles were equipped with 
these guards. However, the effect of the brush guard in this crash was a microcosmic 
representation of the effect of weak cable-to-post attachments on strong posts. Even large 
vehicles, which were typically excellent candidates for redirection on cable median barriers, 
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were at increased risk of prying penetration crashes at high orientation angles. This further 
supports the conclusion that orientation angles can alter the energetically preferential interaction 
of vehicles with cable median barriers. If a sufficient contact groove was not made before the 
impacted cables began to slip on the vehicle, the likelihood of redirection was very low. 
 
Figure 102. Comparison of Prying Penetration CG Trajectory and Orientation Angles 
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Figure 103. Back Side (Middle) Cable Release from Many Downstream Posts Resulting in 
Penetration 
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Figure 104. Back Side (Middle) Cable Release from 11 Downstream Posts Resulting in 
Penetration 
June 20, 2013  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13 
155 
 
 
Figure 105. Prying Penetration Failure with SUV Caused by Brush Guard 
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Figure 106. Brush Guard Prying Penetration with Cable Contact Striations on A-Pillar 
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9.4.1 System Failures 
Two cases of system failures were noted in the low-tension cable median barrier 
penetration database. In both crashes, the vehicle adequately engaged the tensioned cables and at 
least one cable formed a contact groove, fracturing the impacting corner headlight casing and 
collapsing the grill and fender around the cable. However, in both crashes, the low-tension cable 
splice failed, allowing the tensioned cable to rebound away from the vehicle. In one crash, the 
back-side bottom cable engaged the grill and headlight. As the cable deflected with the vehicle, 
the splice disengaged releasing the cable at a splice location. Similarly, in the other crash, the 
back-side middle cable engaged the bumper and grill of the impacting vehicle, crushing the 
fender and grill. As the cable deflected with the vehicle into opposing travel lanes, high tension 
was developed in the cable and exceeded the splice limits. In both crashes, weak cable-to-post 
attachments contributed to splice failure. Photographs of the first crash are shown in Figures 107 
and 108. 
Since this crash result was only recorded on low-tension cable median barrier systems, 
better splices may be necessary for future low-tension cable barrier systems. A study of cable 
median barrier hardware identified several other splices which could be used or adapted for low-
tension cable barrier use [47]. 
9.4.2 Other Penetration Causes 
Other penetration causes were identified that led to penetrations on low-tension cable 
median barrier systems, including impacts with large vehicles (i.e., tractor trailers-or single-unit 
trucks), and bouncing override penetrations due to median slopes. However, as with the high-
tension cable median barrier counterparts, bouncing override penetrations were impact condition 
dependent, and no cable barrier system manufactured had been tested and approved to redirect 
large vehicles (i.e., tractor-trailers). 
Causes for bounce-over of low-tension systems were virtually identical to other systems. 
Out of a recorded 70 cable median barrier penetrations on low-tension cable median barriers, 
only 2 resulted in a bounce-over. These two penetrations occurred when the barriers were 
installed near shoulders in relatively narrow ditches where vertical vehicle rebound was highest. 
Bounce-over penetrations may also be reduced by easy release of the top cable. The low-
frequency of bounce-over penetrations is likely related to the low top cable release load. 
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Figure 107. Splice Failure Penetration 
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Figure 108. Splice Failure Penetration 
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9.4.3 Discussion 
Low-tension, 3-cable median barriers were the most susceptible barrier type to prying 
and diving underride penetrations, and the least susceptible to override penetration based on 
crash results obtained in this research effort. Strong cable-to-post attachments are essential for 
bottom and middle cables in low-tension cable median barrier systems. By increasing the vertical 
resistance of the lower cable, diving penetrations could be reduced. However, care must be taken 
to prevent excessive stiffening of the cable against downward vertical motion on the post, or the 
lower cable will become a trip point for rollovers.  
The advantage of the weak top cable-to-post connection is that with a low vertical release 
load, vehicles with low roof heights which passed beneath the cables did not experience 
occupant compartment crush due to the top cable, and overrides were very infrequent when the 
cables quickly released from the post but remained engaged with the vehicle. This stratification 
of cable-to-post attachment strengths has not been optimized by any cable median barrier system 
in use to date and could be necessary to further improve cable median barrier design. 
There is no evidence yet that many (if any) penetration crashes were caused due to cables 
which drooped in one location due to a previous crash. This may be due to excellent DOT 
response of rapid barrier repair at crash sites, which prevented these conditions from occurring. 
However, crashes in which two or more vehicles struck the cable median barrier only resulted in 
penetration if one of the vehicles was either a tractor-trailer or was towing a trailer, based on the 
available database. In both of these crash types, the vehicles which struck the barrier were not 
within the designed performance limits of the barriers. Further, crashes in which multiple 
vehicles struck the cable median barrier constituted only approximately 3% of all crashes in the 
database. If such a correlation existed and penetration propensity was higher when vehicles 
struck near previous crash locations, insufficient data were present in the database to indicate this 
increase. Nonetheless, states with low-tension cable median barrier systems often mandate 
barrier maintenance and repair within 48 hours of the crash notification. Even when repairs 
happen up to two weeks after a crash, the repair timeframe appears to be adequate to prevent 
penetration events caused by previous cable barrier crashes from occurring. Shorter repair 
windows may be required during winter months when icy road conditions increase crash 
frequency. 
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10 PENETRATION CRASH SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS 
10.1 Introduction 
Cable median barrier penetration propensity is affected by many independent factors. 
These factors include vehicle geometry, crush stiffness, and suspension properties, system 
stiffness, post strength, cable tension, cable-to-post attachments, cable heights, median slopes, 
cable barrier offset from roadway, CG trajectory angle, and CG orientation angle at impact. 
Identifying what combination of these factors, or additional unlisted factors, contributed to a 
penetration crash can be daunting. 
A series of simulations were created to identify the causes of cable median barrier 
penetrations in three separate crashes with photographic evidence. Factors which culminated in 
the penetration of the vehicle over, under, or through the cable barrier system were identified. It 
was determined that in each of the simulated crashes, system placement was in compliance with 
federal recommendations, system construction was acceptable, and impact conditions deviated 
from the typical impact conditions which accentuated penetration risk. 
All median measurements were made with respect to the point of departure. Angles were 
always referenced from a tangent line to the road drawn at the location where the vehicle CG 
departed the lane edgeline, and were positive when the vehicle rotated counterclockwise as 
viewed from above. As a result, any median crash had a positive CG trajectory angle by 
definition. Orientation angles varied from -180 to 180 degrees, with positive angles occurring 
when the centerline of the vehicle was oriented toward the median and negative when the vehicle 
centerline oriented at the CG was oriented away from the median. 
10.2 Simulation 1:  TL-3 Nucor Cable Barrier System 
The first simulation considered an impact of a 2009 Mitsubishi Galant into a TL-3 Nucor 
NU-CABLE cable barrier system. The median was comprised of five discrete segments, relative 
to vehicle initial direction of travel:  a 12.5-ft (3.8-m) wide flat, asphalt-paved shoulder; a 15.5-ft 
(4.7-m) wide 6:1 approach slope, a 3.0-ft (0.9-m) wide flat grassy ditch bottom, a 19.0-ft (5.8-m) 
wide 7:1 back slope, and a 13.5-ft (4.1-m) flat opposite-side shoulder. The system was installed 
13.5 ft (4.1 m) from the approach slope break point. Since the system was installed on a 6:1 
approach slope, the system location was acceptable according to FHWA approval letters b96, 
b96a, b167, b183, b184, b184a, and b193.  
The impacting vehicle lost control, swerving off of the road into the median. The vehicle 
departed the road with a CG trajectory angle of 32 degrees and an orientation angle of 62 degrees 
relative to the roadway. Based on a rudimentary crash reconstruction, the speed of the vehicle at 
the point of departure from the lane was determined to be approximately 58.1 mph (25.6 m/s), 
based on skid marks on the road and shoulder, tire marks in grass, post deformations, and vehicle 
damage energy estimates. Photographs of the crash site are shown in Figures 109 and 110. 
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Figure 109. Crash Scene Photographs, Simulation No. 1 
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Figure 110. Post-Crash Vehicle Photographs, Simulation No. 1 
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10.2.1 Component Models 
The posts in the system were 4 lb/ft Rib-Bak ® posts manufactured from ASTM A499 
steel with a yield stress of approximately 80 ksi (552 MPa) and a tensile strength of 
approximately 100 ksi (689 MPa). Post models were comprised of four separate parts:  base 
flanges measuring 0.272 in. (6.9 mm) thick, a 0.143-in. (3.6-mm ) thick, dual-leg web, 0.227-in. 
(5.8-mm) thick ribs, and a 0.196-in. (5.0-mm) thick short flange. 
All post parts were modeled using type 2, Belytschko-Tsay shell elements in LS-DYNA 
v. 971 R5.1 [48]. To simulate the soil stiffness, rigid tubes closely matching the dimensions of 
the post were created. The tops of the soil tubes were located 1 in. (25 mm) below the ground to 
allow for small deflections at the top of the ground, but posts in the real-world crashes tended to 
fracture at the ground line or pull out of the soil or soil foundation tubes. The soil tube-to-post 
clearance was approximately 0.12 in. (3 mm).  
The ground slopes were modeled with rigid walls intersecting at sharp angles. This was 
an approximation, since slope rounding was present at every slope transition. Although slope 
rounding does minimize the sharp transition and reduces the abrupt reactions with the 
suspension, the radius and position of the slope rounding was not known and could not be 
measured from photographs or satellite photography. 
During the crash event, two posts were completely fractured and retained by the high-
tension cables. To simulate post contact with the ground, each post web and flange section was 
partitioned into upper and lower parts. The lower parts were used in contact definitions with the 
rigid soil tube, and the upper part was included in the part set that could contact the ground. 
Cables were attached to the posts with curved cable clips. The clips had diameters of 
0.2725 in. ± 0.0010 in. (6.92 mm ± 0.025 mm). The clips were attached to the post with a lower 
curved leg and an upper threaded shank with a nut. The clips were made of steel with 60 ksi (414 
MPa) tensile strength. An approximate tensile load to cause rupture of one leg would therefore 
be 3.5 kips (15.6 kN). 
The clips were modeled using a process described in reference [50]. Solid element 
models of a rod of equivalent diameter to the cable clips were created and simulated in tension, 
bending, and torsion using material properties consistent with available material properties found 
from Nucor clip specifications. The resulting tension-strain, bending moment-curvature, and 
torque-rate of twist curves were inserted into beam element models of the clips using the 
*MAT_MOMENT_CURVATURE_BEAM material model with a type 2 Belytschko-Schwer 
beam element section. The nut on the end of the cable clip was modeled using solids and made 
rigid. A rigid nut approximation was reasonable because nuts typically experience minimal 
damage during impact, and the solid elements dominated the timestep.  
Because contact between beam elements and shell element edges can result in node 
snagging, beam elements with null material properties (i.e., zero-stress) were used in a ring 
around each hole in the smaller flange. The holes in the post were oversized by 0.020 in. (0.5 
mm), and the diameter of the null beam elements was 0.020 in. (0.5 mm). The cables were 
modeled with beam elements according to the process described in reference [29]. The cables 
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were tensioned over 400 ms prior to impact using discrete beam elements, which were switched 
from deformable to rigid just before impact. 
The cables in the system comprised of models recommended in literature [29]. Cables 
were tensioned to 5.0 kips (22.2 kN) over 350 ms prior to impact using discrete beams and the 
*MAT_CABLE_DISCRETE_BEAM model with a ramp loading curve to apply a controlled 
ramp load. The cable tensioner at the boundary of the cable was switched from deformable to 
rigid approximately 50 ms before impact. Contacts between the cables and the posts and vehicle 
were of the automatic node-to-surface type, and contact between cables and beam element cable-
to-post attachments utilized an automatic general contact type, which more accurately treated 
beam-to-beam contact. 
10.2.2 Vehicle Model 
A Dodge Neon model created and maintained by the National Crash Analysis Center 
(NCAC) at George Washington University (GWU) was selected for similarity with the 
Mitsubishi Galant. Unfortunately, some major differences between the Mitsubishi Galant and 
Dodge Neon vehicle model were observed. 
The suspension properties of the Dodge Neon model were not capable of reproducing the 
load-deflection reaction of highly-impulsive load applied by the opposite-side slope after the 
vehicle overrode the barrier. As a result, the simulation was terminated after the vehicle 
contacted the back slope. 
Second, the front bumper of the Mitsubishi Galant was composed of a smooth-faced 
aluminum bumper cover with a crushable plastic cartridge for energy dissipation. The Dodge 
Neon model incorporated a thin plastic bumper cover and polystyrene bumper for energy 
dissipation. To improve cable-to-bumper interaction, the front bumper of the Neon was 
smoothed with a layer of shell elements over the front of the opening of the bumper and included 
in the contact definitions. Additionally, the Neon bumper cover was large, measuring 13.4 in. 
(340 mm) tall, whereas the Galant bumper cover was only approximately 9 in. (229 mm) tall, 
and the Galant bumper cover was attached with screw-on tabs. 
Finally, the weight, height, length, wheelbase, track width, and roll and yaw moments of 
inertia of the vehicles were markedly different. Using data from the Expert AutoStats program, 
the wheelbase of the Neon was 20 in. (508 mm) less than the Galant, the weight was nearly 900 
lb (408 kg) less, and the track width of the Neon was 4 in. (102 mm) less than the Galant. 
Nonetheless, the simulation was still able to approximate the override event sequence. 
10.2.3 Results of the Simulation 
Sequential photographs of simulation no. 1 are shown in Figures 111 through 114. The 
vehicle projected over the top of the slope break point and struck the cable median barrier while 
airborne. The top cable of the Nucor system contacted the vehicle’s bumper and was forced 
below the bumper. The high tension in the cable pulled the bumper cover downward and pulled 
against the attachments supporting the bumper cover. As the cable deflected, lateral force from 
the cables caused the second cable to rebound, followed by the first. The vehicle then contacted 
the back slope and rebounded upward, and the steering linkage was torqued, causing the vehicle 
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to redirect downstream. The rear tires contacted the cables and fractured posts and continued to 
deform the cables downward. 
Most events in the simulation matched physical evidence from the crash. The vehicle 
projected over the slope and overrode the cable; however, in the crash, the downward pull of the 
cables deformed the bumper cover attachments, and ultimately tore the bumper cover off of the 
vehicle. It is likely that, due to a combination of slope rounding and the differences in vehicle 
profiles, that the top of the bumper cover actually slipped beneath the top cable facilitating 
bumper cover removal. These crash results were anomalous. Without more accurate vehicle, tire, 
bumper cover connection, and slope rounding models, such an event could not be replicated. 
Nonetheless, the override tendency was clearly obvious based on the sequential photographs. 
Two root causes of this penetration were identified. First, the high CG trajectory angle of 
the vehicle into the barrier resulted in higher CG height at impact than was suggested by 
Mongiardini et al. for sedan or small car vehicles [20]. As a result, the vehicle struck the barrier 
at a much higher energy level and CG height relative to similar vehicles in nominal TL-3 impact 
conditions. 
Although the placement of the cable median barrier anywhere on a 6:1 slope is permitted 
by FHWA and most state DOTs, agencies such as NCAC have recommended that low-tension 
cable median barriers not be placed between 1 ft (0.3 m) and 8 ft (2.4 m) from the center of the 
V-ditch [28]. Some state DOTs have mandated this practice for all cable median barriers. 
However, some high-tension systems have been tested and approved for use anywhere in 6:1 V-
ditches, based on the expectation that a vehicle departing the road with a CG trajectory angle of 
25 degrees and a speed of 62.1 mph (100 km/h) will not override most cable median barrier 
systems based on nominal bumper trajectories. Following several cable median barrier placement 
studies, FHWA issued a memo revising acceptable barrier placement locations. Detailed studies 
analyzing vehicle trajectories in V-ditches have recently generated concern that MASH vehicles 
can display sensitivities not witnessed in testing conducted according to NCHRP Report 350 
[20]. 
Unfortunately, high-angle departures from the road generate very difficult scenarios for 
capturing errant vehicles. This problem will be present for all sloped medians to some degree; for 
6:1 V-ditches, significant deviations of the CG height relative to the ground are observable at 28 
degrees, and for 4:1 slopes, significant differences between CG heights can be observed even at 
20 degrees. In a limiting case, the angle of departure which generates a “free fall” condition will 
result in bouncing as well as potential for override. An optimum solution to prevent these types 
of override or underride crashes in V-ditches with slopes of 6:1 or steeper is to use taller, more 
robust cable median barrier systems, such as TL-4 cable median barriers. States should consider 
adopting TL-4 cable median barriers as a standard to prevent these overrides and underrides. 
The second cause of this penetration was that the cable-to-post attachments for the Nucor 
system were too strong, as detailed in Chapters 8 and 9. The high cable-to-post attachments 
prevented the top cable from releasing from the posts, and dragged the top cables downward 
beneath the vehicle. This was particularly evident from the post-crash photographs, which 
showed two fractured posts displaced downstream of impact, still attached to the cables. The 
cable-to-post attachment strengths should be stratified to prevent the top cable-to-post 
attachments from becoming overly strong and dragging the cables downward. There are 
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additional benefits to low top cable attachment strengths, including low risk of vehicle occupant 
compartment crush during underrides, higher rates of cable entrapment preventing rebound into 
adjacent travel lanes, and better reaction on sloped medians. An ongoing study has attempted to 
identify the critical performance metrics for top and mid-post cable-to-post attachment heights 
[49]. 
 
 
 
Figure 111. Overhead Sequentials, Simulation 1 
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Figure 111 (cont). Overhead Sequentials, Simulation 1 
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Figure 112. Downstream Sequentials, Simulation 1 
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Figure 112 (cont). Downstream Sequentials, Simulation 1 
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Figure 113. Downstream Behind Sequentials, Simulation No. 1 
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Figure 113 (cont). Downstream Behind Sequentials, Simulation No. 1 
June 20, 2013  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13 
173 
 
 
 
Figure 113 (cont). Downstream Behind Sequentials, Simulation No. 1 
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Figure 114. Sequentials of Critical Impact Sequence, Simulation No. 1 
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Figure 114 (cont). Sequentials of Critical Impact Sequence, Simulation No. 1 
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10.3 Simulation 2:  TL-3 Brifen Cable Barrier 
The second simulated cable median barrier penetration crash considered a Brifen 4-rope, 
TL-3 cable median barrier. The median profile at the point of departure consisted of five 
segments:  an 8-ft (2.4-m) wide flat shoulder, a 22.7-ft (6.92-m) wide, 9:1 approach slope, a 4.6-
ft (1.40-m) wide flat ditch center, a 22.4-ft (6.83-m) 8:1 back slope, and a 10.6-ft (3.23-m) wide 
opposite-side shoulder. The cable median barrier was installed at the center of the 9:1 approach 
slope. 
The Brifen system, as previously detailed, involved 0.24-in. (6-mm) thick S-posts. roller 
cable supports locked on the sides of the posts, woven cables between posts, and posts placed in 
sleeves. The cable heights were at 19.7, 26.0, and 28.3 in. (500, 660, and 720 mm), with two 
cables woven on opposite sides of the post at 26.0 in. (660 mm). 
The vehicle, a 2000 Toyota Avalon, struck the cable median barrier with CG trajectory 
and orientation angles of 16 and 152 degrees. Photographs of the crash scene are shown in 
Figures 115 through 117. This vehicle never departed the ground during impact, and the low CG 
trajectory angle and relatively flat approach slope enabled a straightforward crash reconstruction. 
Based on frictional values and post deformation energies, researchers estimated that the impact 
speed was approximately 50.7 mph (81.6 km/h). 
10.3.1 Component Models 
The vehicle model used in simulation no. 1 was also used in Simulation No. 2, but 
oriented at a 152-degree orientation angle and a 15.9-degree CG trajectory angle. Also, the front 
bumper cover slat was removed, since that portion of the bumper did not contact the cable 
barrier. The ground slopes were also created using rigid walls, similar to those used in 
Simulation No. 1. 
The posts were modeled with type 2 Belytshcko-Tsay shell elements, with an element 
length of approximately 0.39 in. (10 mm). The posts were modeled as two parts:  one part below 
ground was used in contact definitions with the foundation tube, and one part above ground used 
in the contacts with the rigid walls representing the ground. 
The cable supports, which were effectively rollers pinned to the sides of the posts, were 
modeled using a thin, rigid, shell element casing. Shell elements were used in lieu of solid 
elements since the cables, modeled with beam elements, are better suited for contact with shell 
elements than solid elements. This effect was described in reference [50]. Rigid cable supports 
on each post utilized tied to nodes on the posts to model the clip engagement. 
The cable on the top of the post was placed in a U-shaped slot. However, as mentioned, 
shell element edge contact with the beam elements can result in node snagging and instability. 
Thus, the U-channel slot was expanded by 0.039 in. (1.0 mm) and beam elements with a 0.039 
in. (1.0 mm) diameter were lined around the U-channel slot, and assigned null material 
properties. 
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Figure 115. Crash Scene Photographs, Simulation No. 2 
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Figure 116. Crash Scene Photographs, Simulation No. 2 
June 20, 2013  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13 
179 
 
 
Figure 117. Post-Crash Vehicle Photographs, Simulation No. 2 
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The cables in the system comprised models recommended in literature [29]. Cables were 
tensioned to approximately 5.0 kips (22.2 kN) over 500 ms prior to impact using discrete beams 
and the *MAT_CABLE_DISCRETE_BEAM model with a ramp loading curve to apply a 
controlled ramp load. The cable tensioner at the boundary of the cable was switched from 
deformable to rigid approximately 50 ms before impact. Contacts between the cables and the 
posts, cable-to-post attachments, and vehicle were of the automatic node-to-surface type, and 
contact between cables utilized an automatic general contact type, which more accurately treated 
beam-to-beam contact. 
Initial simulation results indicated vehicle capture instead of penetration. The vehicle 
struck the cable median barrier and the cables deformed the right-front fender inward toward the 
headlight housing. The low vehicle mass and yaw moment of inertia caused the vehicle to rotate 
around the right-front corner, enabling the back of the vehicle to strike the system. Sequential 
photographs of the vehicle redirection event are shown in Figures 118 and 119. 
It was determined that the failure type in this penetration crash was an underride, likely 
caused by the lower cable sliding up and over the headlight and hood before the vehicle was 
redirected. The basic model of the Neon did not incorporate headlight glass into the model. The 
simulated fender terminated adjacent to a gap which corresponded to the headlight casing 
location in an actual vehicle. 
A headlight assembly was modeled by creating a tangent surface to the hood and fender 
that filled the hole above the bumper. The headlight was assigned glass material properties and 
given a thickness of 3.5 mm. Because few material models of glass have shown acceptable 
modeling performance to date, and because the glass in the physical crash did not fracture, the 
glass material was prescribed to be elastic. The mesh was smoothed and attachment points were 
created between the fender and the hood, although the modeled headlight casing was not 
attached to the bumper cover. 
10.3.2  Simulation Results 
The updated simulation results are shown in Figures 120 through 122. The Neon 
projected over the 9:1 slope and into the cable median barrier. The vehicle struck the barrier with 
the right-front corner. The front headlight struck the bottom cable first, lifting the cable over the 
top of the right-front headlight, and over the right-front corner of the hood. The remaining three 
cables struck the right-front fender and hood and were also lifted above the hood. As the vehicle 
progressed into the system, it struck four posts, and all four cables were forced above the hood 
and roof. The struck posts dented the fender, door panel, and rear bumper, and struck the right-
rear tire, just as occurred during the crash sequence. 
Unfortunately, the differences between the Dodge Neon and the Toyota Avalon also 
contributed to differences between the simulation and penetration crash. The curb weight of the 
Avalon was 700 lb (318 kg) greater than the curb weight of the Neon model, the wheelbase was 
2 in. (51 mm) larger, and the top bumper height of the Avalon was higher than in the Neon 
model, but the center-of-headlight height was nominally the same. This led to a sharper front-end 
profile of the Avalon than was present in the Neon model. However, results were still indicative 
of the physical crash. 
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Figure 118. Downstream Sequentials, No Modeled Headlight Cover, Simulation No. 2 
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Figure 119. Upstream Behind Sequentials, No Modeled Headlight Cover, Simulation No. 2 
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Figure 120. Overhead Sequentials, Stiff Modeled Headlight Cover, Simulation No. 2 
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Figure 121. Behind-Barrier Sequentials, Stiff Modeled Headlight Cover, Simulation No. 2 
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Figure 122. Downstream Behind Sequentials, Stiff Modeled Headlight Cover, Simulation No. 2 
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Two major contributors to this penetration crash result were identified. First, the low 
strength of the bottom cable-to-post attachment permitted the cable to rise up, over the headlight 
and hood without damaging the vehicle. By simply supporting the bottom cable with no vertical 
resistance load to lifting, the vehicle was able to pry the bottom cable up, and no other cable was 
in an optimum position to prevent penetration. This problem could be rectified by adding vertical 
resistance to the bottom cable on the post. Such a mechanism could be as simple as another snap-
on roller attachment placed above the bottom cable to retain it on the post. 
When a vehicle struck a cable median barrier system such that the headlight made 
tangential contact with the cables, a higher propensity for penetration always occurred. Side 
panels, including fenders, are nearly always more stiff than the vehicle front ends. This is 
because there is frequently crush room in front of the vehicle to safely bring a vehicle to a stop. 
Other non-structural components at the front end of the vehicle, including a crushable bumper, 
glass headlights which can fracture, and plastic components such as frontal grills or air dams 
tend to promote good cable engagement with the vehicle by deforming or fracturing and 
generating cable interlock locations. When the vehicle struck the barrier with an orientation 
angle between 90 and 180 degrees; however, the impact location was highly eccentric from the 
vehicle’s CG, which contributed to induced yawing and facilitated disengagement of the cables 
from the vehicle front-end. Impact forces were not sufficient to cause fender crush or headlight 
fracture because yaw-inducing loads were below the deformation or fracture limits of the front-
end components. It is likely that these factors were largely responsible for the large penetration 
rate for very high orientation angles. 
10.4 Simulation No. 3:  Generic Low-Tension Cable Median Barrier 
The final crash simulated involved a low-tension, 3-cable median barrier constructed 
similarly to the system drawings shown in Figures 78 through 83. Posts used in the system were 
6 ft-3 in. (1,600-mm) long, S3x5.7 posts with holes drilled in the flanges to accommodate 5/16-
in. (8-mm) diameter J-bolts which supported the cables. Nominal cable mounting heights were at 
21, 27, and 33 in. (533, 686, and 838 mm). 
The median profile at the crash site consisted of four discrete slopes:  a 4-ft (1.2-m) wide 
concrete shoulder, a 19-ft 10-in. (6.0-m) wide, 11.4:1 approach slope, a 19-ft 10-in. (6.0-m) 
wide, 11.4:1 back slope, and a 4-ft (1.2-m) wide concrete shoulder adjacent to the opposite-side 
travel lanes. The system was installed 5 ft (1.5 m) up the backslope from the median center. 
Post-crash photographs are shown in Figures 123 through 125. Based on scene diagram 
and trajectory information, it appeared that the driver either became incapacitated or fell asleep. 
The vehicle, a 2000 Mercury Grand Marquis, drifted off of the roadway with a CG trajectory and 
orientation angle of 7 degrees. There were no visible signs of braking or steering throughout the 
departure event. The vehicle passed through the bottom of the ditch, which increased the CG 
trajectory angle to 11 degrees prior to impact because of the slope contribution. The vehicle 
remained engaged with the bottom cable for a sufficient amount of time to remove the bottom 
cable from more than 15 posts downstream of impact. The vehicle had a small steering angle to 
the left, which resulted in the vehicle overriding the bottom cable, redirecting up the back slope 
and colliding head-on with a different vehicle in the opposite travel lanes.  
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Figure 123. Crash Scene Photographs, Simulation No. 3 
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Figure 124. Crash Scene Photographs, Simulation No. 3 
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Figure 125. Crash Scene Photographs, Simulation No. 3 
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10.4.1 Component Models 
Similar to the Brifen and Nucor simulations, post models in Simulation No. 3 consisted 
of shell element flange and web parts. Since the flanges of S3x5.7 posts were sloped, the 
thickness of the flanges was tailored to approximate the bending section of the real flange using a 
flat, constant-thickness flange approximation. The thickness of the shell flange was set to 0.26 in. 
(6.6 mm), and was positioned such that the distance between the outer contact surfaces of the 
front and rear flanges of the post were 3 in. (76 mm) apart, equal to the depth of a real post. 
Because there was some surface soil displacement, the soil tubes were terminated 
approximately 2.5 in. (64 mm) below the surface of the ground. This permitted the posts to 
“rotate” through the upper effective 2 in. (51 mm) of soil. Some differences between the 
deformed post energy of the crash and model were expected because of differences between 
modeled and actual soil properties. The marginal contribution of soil, contributing to less than 
1% of the overall energy dissipated, suggests that the modeling approximation was acceptable. 
The 5/16-in. (8-mm) diameter J-bolt cable-to-post attachments were modeled using beam 
elements, similarly to the cable-to-post attachments used in the Nucor cable barrier system. 
Tension-strain, moment bending-curvature, and torque-rate of twist curves were determined 
based on the behavior of equivalent solid element rod models subjected to bending, torsion, and 
tension. The resulting curves were inserted into a *MAT_MOMENT_CURVATURE_BEAM 
material model, and the bolts were connected directly to the mesh of the post since none of the 
bolts fractured in this simulation. A comparison between the beam element models of the J-bolts 
and the documented tests on J-bolts indicated a difference of less than 5% of the nominal vertical 
and horizontal pullout strengths of the models and real bolts [46]. 
As with the other simulations, the cables in the system comprised models recommended 
in literature [29]. Cables were tensioned to 950 lb (4.2 kN) over 400 ms prior to impact using 
discrete beams and the *MAT_CABLE_DISCRETE_BEAM model with a controlled ramp 
loading curve. The cable tensioner at the boundary of the cable was switched from deformable to 
rigid approximately 50 ms before impact. Contacts between the cables and the posts and vehicle 
were of the automatic node-to-surface type, and contact between cables and beam element J-
bolts utilized an automatic general contact type, which more accurately treated beam-to-beam 
contact. 
A Ford Taurus model developed by NCAC was initially included in the model as a close 
match to the Mercury Grand Marquis. However, simulations frequently resulted in instabilities 
and early terminations, which originated with the vehicle model. Because improving the Taurus 
model was outside of the scope of this effort, the Neon model used in simulation nos. 1 and 2 
was substituted for the Taurus. The front-end geometries of the Taurus and Neon were similar, 
but major structural differences were identified. The Taurus weighed more than 1,350 lb (612 
kg) more than the Neon, was 40 in. (1,016 mm) longer with a 10-in. (254-mm) longer wheelbase, 
and had a 4-in. (102-mm) wider track width. To accommodate the increase in mass, several 
discrete masses were added to the system, and densities of frame elements were also increased to 
match the weight of the modeled vehicle to the vehicle in the crash.  
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10.4.2 Simulation Results 
Sequential photographs of simulation no. 3 are shown in Figures 126 through 129. The 
vehicle followed a similar trajectory as the vehicle involved in the penetration crash. Upon 
impact, the middle and upper cable were pried upward and over the hood, as the bottom cable 
engaged the vehicle at the headlight location. The bottom cable crushed into the front fender less 
than 1 in. (25 mm) as it was displaced laterally by the vehicle, was stripped off of 10 posts 
downstream from impact, slipped down the vehicle bumper and fender, and was eventually run 
over by the tires. 
The Neon model did not incorporate explicit steering control or modeling capacity, and 
had a considerably different front-end profile. Despite these shortcomings, critical features of the 
simulation and crash test were similar. The middle and upper cables slipped over the hood and 
roof in both events, and the bottom cable engaged the vehicle at the left-front fender corner. The 
bottom cable was removed from enough posts downstream of impact to allow the cable to droop 
when the vehicle trajectory became parallel with the system. The vehicle overrode the bottom 
cable, resulting in penetration, and became free-wheeling. 
This simulation illustrated two major problems with the low-tension cable median barrier 
system. First, the bottom cable-to-post attachment is too weak to prevent these types of impacts 
from penetrating through the barrier system. In the simulation, this was further accentuated by 
the low but increasing CG trajectory angle, causing the middle and upper cables to make first 
contact with the left-side fender instead of the front of the vehicle. This generated a high-
stiffness resistance to deflection, which generated the same fender stiffness problems observed in 
simulation no. 2. 
Secondly, the bottom cable height was too high to prevent underrides from occurring in 
even flat medians. The bottom cable height of 22 in. (559 mm) was higher than the hood height 
of 1% of vehicles involved in cable median barrier crashes. A 3-in. (76-mm) deflection of the 
front end of the vehicle, which can occur due to suspension compression near the center of the 
V-ditch and can even occur due to bouncing on the approach slope, would then increase 
susceptibility to more than 5% of all vehicles involved in cable median barrier crashes. If the 
high rate of penetrations which occur when the bottom cable struck the vehicle above the center 
height of the headlight is taken into account, the risk increase for flat and sloped terrain in front 
of the barrier increases to 1.5% and 21% of crashes, respectively. 
Excessive deflection of the back-side cable and bottom cable underride together 
accounted for over 70% of all low-tension cable median barrier penetrations based on data 
collected in this study, though the precise rate is unknown. To alleviate these problems, the 
bottom and middle cable-to-post attachments must be strengthened, and attachments with greater 
energy absorption on cable release from the posts are strongly recommended. An increase in the 
diameter of the J-bolt shanks, from 5/16-in. (8-mm) to 3/8-in. (10-mm), would result in an 
approximately 75% increase in pullout strength from the post. Such a modification would likely 
reduce backside-cable release-related penetration frequency by 50% or more, based on the 
results of this simulation and the distribution of vehicle masses involved in cable median barrier 
crashes shown in Figure 20. 
June 20, 2013  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13 
192 
In addition, a fourth cable may be necessary for low-tension cable median barriers, 
located between 15 and 18 in. (381 and 457 mm) from the ground. This additional cable could be 
added to existing low-tension cable median barrier systems with one of two methods:  an 
additional hole could be drilled in the flange for an additional cable-to-post attachment, or a 
hanging bracket could be attached to the bottom cable location to support the lowest cable. In 
order to retain a 1,000-lb (4.4 kN) release force, the bracket could be strengthened with a cable 
tie near the cable location. Both methods would require simulation for concept development and 
full-scale crash testing to verify the crashworthiness of the design.  
Fatalities are estimated to occur at a minimum of once per 40 miles (64 km) of barrier per 
every 3 years with the current system construction. A non-fatal to fatal crash ratio of 199:1 is 
expected in a given mile stretch, based on low-tension cable median barrier A+K rates of 
approximately 0.5% K crashes. Maintenance cost increases of $100 per crash were expected, due 
to the increased repair time and additional cable hardware. Additional costs per 40-mile (64-km) 
stretch of road would then increase $20,000 per fatal crash in a 3-year period. By using this 
method, ADTs, crash rates, and ROR departure frequencies are not necessary to complete this 
analysis. Thus, a maximum cost estimate for one fatal crash would reasonably be $270,000 per 
40 miles (64 km) of barrier per three years.  
Considering that 50% of fatalities are caused by underride or low cable-to-post 
attachment strength and expecting a 50% reduction in such penetrations due to these simple 
modifications, a resultant reduction of 35% of fatalities is expected over this same stretch of 
barrier. Using the FHWA fatal crash costs of $4,008,900 per fatal crash, a 35% reduction in fatal 
crashes over this expanse of road over a 3-year period would result in a cost savings of 
$1,403,115. The benefit-to-cost ratio of this modification to low-tension cable median barriers 
would then be 5.2:1.  
Since the cost per unit of roadway defined in this benefit-to-cost analysis is much higher 
than is expected for state DOTs per fatality, and actual penetration rates for the barrier could 
decrease by more than 70% based on the penetration analysis, the actual B/C ratio based solely 
on fatality reduction should exceed 5.2. However, it should be emphasized that the current 
bottom and middle cable-to-post attachments must be strengthened at the same time as an 
additional cable should be added to the system. No top cable-to-post attachment changes are 
currently recommended. 
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Figure 126. Overhead Sequentials, Simulation No. 3 
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Figure 126 (cont). Overhead Sequentials, Simulation No. 3 
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Figure 127. Downstream Sequentials, Simulation No. 3 
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Figure 127 (cont). Downstream Sequentials, Simulation No. 3 
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Figure 128. Downstream Behind Sequentials, Simulation No. 3 
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Figure 128 (cont). Downstream Behind Sequentials, Simulation No. 3 
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Figure 129. Critical Events Occurring in Both Simulation and Real-World Crash 
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10.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
Difficulties associated with simulating real-world cable median barrier crashes arise from 
significant differences in vehicle front-end geometries, stiffnesses, material properties, weights, 
and vehicle shapes and inertial properties. The purpose of the simulations was not to replicate the 
actual crash results, but to replicate the mechanisms responsible for the penetration crash events. 
Because of this, variations between the simulation results and the crash results were tolerated. 
In the first two penetration crashes, problems with the cable barrier system and general 
problems affecting all cable median barrier systems were both identified. High-angle crashes on 
slopes alter the intended interaction of the vehicle with the barrier system. If the CG velocity 
vector significantly exceeds the nominal value of 25 degrees used in full-scale crash testing, 
previous studies evaluating the testing and design limits of barriers in 6:1 slopes are no longer 
valid [e.g., 20]. In simulation no. 1, the high strength of the cable-to-post attachments also 
prevented the cables from cleanly releasing from the posts. Thus, the cables were overridden and 
the vehicle vaulted over the system. 
Likewise, high orientation angle crashes can alter the outcome of a crash, as shown in 
Simulation 2. Instead of contributing to beneficial headlight fracture and the interlock with the 
deflected fender, very high orientation angle crashes can induce yawing or fail to engage by not 
crushing the fender or fracturing the headlight. In addition, in the second simulation, the low 
vertical release force of the bottom cable permitted the cables to slide up the post before impact 
instead of interlocking with the vehicle.  
In the third simulation, the penetration mechanism was relatively unique to low-tension 
cable median barrier systems. The vehicle adequately engaged the bottom cable while the top 
two cables slid over the hood and roof. The low cable-to-post attachment strength of the bottom 
cable-to-post attachment was insufficient to retain the cable on downstream and upstream posts 
from impact. Following cable release from posts downstream of the vehicle, the cable had 
insufficient tension to remain at the contact height and drooped, permitting the vehicle to pass 
over the bottom cable and redirect toward the opposing lanes.  
Simulations of cable median barrier crashes are typically very challenging and require 
careful examination of all the components in the system. For cable models, use of the model 
developed by Stolle and Reid is recommended [29]. Tensioning was efficiently and quickly 
produced in the cables using short sections of *MAT_CABLE_DISCRETE_BEAM parts with 
ramped load curves, tensioning the cables over the first 50 ms of impact. Researchers determined 
that for every 2 kip tension and 100 m length of cable simulated, one 6-in. (152-mm) length of 
tension was required. Four tensioners were used in simulations 1 and 2, whereas only one 
tensioner was used in simulation 3.  
Cable to post attachments were also difficult to simulate. Each cable-to-post attachment 
was independently simulated and evaluated to determine if minimum manufacturer-reported 
maximum strengths and deformations were observed. Since beam elements have the best contact 
definitions with other beam elements, beam-to-beam contact should be used whenever practical, 
and beam-to-shell-edge contacts should always be avoided. 
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In each simulation, early models of each crash event indicated that redirection was 
possible. In the first simulation, the vehicle model incorporated a lower open section of the 
bumper cover at the air dam. The opening in the bumper cover permitted adequate cable 
engagement and the vehicle was redirected. This illustrated the effect that vehicle profile can 
have on vehicle redirection. Likewise, in the second simulation, the simulated vehicle was both 
lighter than the actual vehicle, and had no glass headlight. The vehicle was redirected in many 
variations of impact location along the barrier, and cable tension.  
In the third simulation, weight was the most significant differences between the simulated 
and physical vehicles. When the vehicle was simulated at the nominal weight of the model, the 
vehicle was redirected and did not override the cable. However, when additional weight added to 
the model to bring the equal to the curb weight of the real vehicle, the vehicle did not redirect 
nearly as quickly with a higher dynamic deflection, and the vehicle ultimately overrode the 
cable. The increased energy at impact ultimately determined whether the vehicle was captured or 
penetrated through the system.  
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11 CAUSES OF CABLE MEDIAN BARRIER ROLLOVERS 
11.1 Overview of Crash Data 
Unlike cable median barrier penetrations, rollovers caused by cable median barriers have 
not been well studied. Frequently when rollovers were observed during full-scale tests on cable 
median barriers, results were largely dismissed as specific to an impact configuration or design 
concept failure [e.g. 51, 52]. Nonetheless, rollovers are real concerns for impacts with cable 
median barriers. In most states, rollover crashes were more severe but occurred less often than 
penetrations. Rollovers typically occurred in 3% to 8% of all cable median barrier crashes.  
Rollover events were particularly cumbersome to reconstruct; since, rollover causes were 
subject to many more factors than were penetration crashes. An accurate determination for the 
causes of the rollover was extremely difficult to obtain as median profile and smoothness, 
vehicle roof stiffness, angle of roll eccentricity, vehicle weight, and trip speed all affect the path 
of a rolling vehicle and the predominant locations of vehicle damage. Further, scene diagrams 
represent estimates of responding officers regarding scene diagrams and are frequently inexact. 
One trait of all rollover crashes on cable median barriers is that, at the time of rollover, all 
vehicles were non-tracking. Vehicles involved in rollovers which initially contacted the barrier 
with tracking impact conditions all yawed to non-tracking conditions before tripping. 
Despite the difficulty in gauging trip causation, common factors were identifiable through 
narrative, scene diagram, photographic, and median slope evidence. Common factors associated 
with rollovers enable researchers and manufacturers to recommend improvements addressing 
general classes of problems instead of addressing individual crashes. Rollover causes were 
largely independent of which system was installed, although rollover frequencies varied between 
systems. This finding was reasonable as all systems rely on three basic components: support 
posts to maintain cables at desired heights; cable-to-post attachments to maintain cable heights 
and transmit lateral and vertical load from cables to posts; and multiple tensioned cables. Similar 
to the determination of the causes of penetrations, a detailed investigation and analysis was 
conducted to determine the causes of rollovers on cable median barriers. A summary table of 
rollover causes is shown in Table 34. 
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Table 34. Causes of Rollovers with Cable Median Barriers 
 
11.2 Rollover Analysis 
11.2.1 Steep Median Slope Rollovers 
When vehicles encountered steep median slopes (i.e., steeper than 6:1), rollover 
frequency increased, as was discussed in Chapter 5. These types of rollovers may be difficult to 
mitigate because the slope contributes to vehicle instability, thus new cable barrier designs alone 
may not be sufficient to prevent these types of containment failures. The cable barriers 
frequently captured the impacting vehicle during these crashes, but the vehicle tripped and rolled 
before it was fully redirected.  
There were three types of median slope-caused rollover failures. The first type was 
caused by entrapment, in which an impacting vehicle struck the barrier and the front (or rear) 
tires extended over the median slopes before the vehicle was redirected. Extension of the 
vehicle’s wheels over the slope lowered the impacting end of the vehicle. Then, the subsequent 
redirective forces resisting the vehicle pressed the wheels of the impacting end against the 
roadside slope, potentially causing digging in on the slope or generating large frictional resistive 
forces as the suspension compressed, potentially culminating in a frictional roll moment which 
caused rollover. An additional scene diagram of a rearward vehicle rollover crash occurring at a 
break point of a 6:1 approach slope is shown in Figure 130. The scene diagram was highlighted 
to indicate the locations of the median slopes.  
The second slope-related rollover failure type was due to vehicle orientation near the 
center of a steep V-ditch. Vehicles were also captured during this type of rollover, but redirection 
frequently resulted in yaw displacement of the vehicle around the impacting end. Wheels on the 
other end of the vehicle were forced to climb the median approach slope, which generated large, 
dynamic vertical and sideslip forces. Due to a combination of large trip forces, vehicle 
Nucor CASS Brifen Gibraltar Generic Total
Steep Median 
Slopes
Vehicle either impacts barrier installed on roadside shoulder 
and protrudes over median slope before a tire becomes 
snagged on the approach slope, or trips due to changes in 
the median terrain when barrier is located within ditch.
3 6 - - 7 16 13%
Broadside Skid
Vehicle contacts barrier with large oversteering orientation 
angle. Frequently, sideslip angles in these crashes are 
approximately 90 degrees.
8 20 2 - 7 37 37%
Contact with 
Post
Vehicle struck cable median barrier and initially began to 
redirect. During redirection, vehicle tire snags on post or 
becomes entrapped by cable(s). Can occur when 
orientation angle approaches +/-90 degrees during 
redirection.
12 24 1 1 19 57 42%
Other Effects
Rollover caused by other effects, such as end terminals, 
tow-behind trailer attachments, or large exit angles 
following redirection. Relatively infrequent events.
1 2 - - 2 5 25%
Large Vehicle
Tractor-trailers, buses, large trucks, camper vehicles, and 
construction vehicles. No cable barrier is currently designed 
for these types of impacts. Rollover crashes with these 
large vehicles are tolerated and better than penetrations.
1 4 - - 2 7 -
25 56 3 1 37 122 36%
Passenger 
Cars
Total
Rollover 
Contributor
Description
Number of Rollovers Recorded
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instability, digging in to the slope, post impact, or rough median terrain, the vehicle then tripped 
and rolled. 
  
Figure 130. Entrapment Rollover Crash in which Vehicle Extends Over SBP of 6:1 Slope 
The third type of median slope rollover was caused when vehicles struck a cable median 
barrier installed on a V-ditch back slope. After redirection, some vehicles skidded laterally into 
the median and tripped due to the slope transition in the center of the median. An example of this 
crash type is shown in Figures 131 and 132. In this crash, a Dodge Caliber struck the cable 
median barrier with an orientation angle of approximately 110 degrees and a CG trajectory angle 
of approximately 21 degrees. The vehicle displaced one post and yawed to nearly 180 degrees 
before being redirected, then rebounded down the back slope and tripped. It is believed that the 
vehicle made two and a half complete revolutions. Because the vehicle rolled through the center 
of the V-ditch and back up the approach slope, vehicle damage was extensive. 
Pickup trucks, vans, and SUVs were found to be the most susceptible to the median 
slope-related crashes in which the wheelbase and suspension stroke were large. Passenger cars 
were involved in only 4 out of the 25 potential median slope-related rollovers. Of these, two 
were full-size cars, one was a mid-size “crossover” class vehicle, and one was a compact car.  
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Figure 131. Example Rollover Crash Caused by High Redirection on Back Slope 
June 20, 2013  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13 
206 
 
 
Figure 132. Example Rollover Crash Caused by Redirection on Back Slope (continued) 
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11.2.1 Broadside Skid Rollovers 
Rollovers which occurred when vehicles struck cable median barriers with broadside skid 
conditions were much more common than steep median slope-related rollovers. Vehicles 
involved in these crashes either impacted the cable median barriers with sideslip angles very 
close to 90 degrees, or yawed nearly 90 degrees after impact before rolling over. Broadside skid 
rollovers were distinct from both contact with post and median slope rollovers because the cables 
were the primary contributor to rollover. Passenger vehicles were involved in 35% of these types 
of rollovers, whereas SUVs, pickup trucks, and vans accounted for 65%. For those larger 
vehicles which rolled due to large oversteering angles, SUVs alone accounted for 29% of all 
rollover crashes. 
Vehicle impacts at high orientation angles contributed to vehicle instability by increasing 
the overturning moment applied to the vehicle frame. A model and schematic diagram of the 
force interaction in a high-orientation angle crash is shown in Figure 133. During rollover 
crashes, new, energetically-favorable roll axes were generated through which the applied 
moments to the vehicle were maximized. The new roll axis was rotated with respect to the 
longitudinal axis of the vehicle to incorporate the contribution of a small pitch moment at the 
cable impact location.  
Because of this shift in the vehicle’s trip axis, the leading back corner of the vehicle was 
typically the first location to contact the ground. Frequently, first contact of the vehicle’s upper 
body with the ground resulted in displacement of the upper frame rails, crushing near the rear-top 
corner of the vehicle, roof slant, and often an accumulation of dirt, grass, or median materials at 
the initial contact site. In addition to the increased pitch moment, vehicle-to-cable friction 
interaction caused yaw moments, which tended to increase the orientation angle. Thus, if the 
vehicle struck the barrier at a relative sideslip angle of 60 degrees, the frictional interaction with 
the barrier tended to accentuate vehicle yaw toward a 90 degree sideslip angle, increasing 
rollover propensity. Examples of oversteering rollover crashes are shown in Figures 134 through 
136. In each of the crashes shown, the vehicle struck the cable barrier with the front end at a high 
orientation angle then tripped and rolled. None of the crashes were caused by an impact with a 
single post or series of posts. Median slopes contributed to some crashes, but wheels were not 
entrapped on a slope in any of the crashes. Further, no trailer attachments or towed units were 
present. 
One crash involving a Jeep Grand Cherokee is shown in Figure 134. During this crash, 
the vehicle struck the cable barrier with the left-front corner in an oversteering configuration, 
yawed around the front end, and tripped as the vehicle approached a 90-degree orientation angle. 
The right-rear corner made first contact with the ground, shattering the rear windshield and right-
rear window. As the vehicle rolled, the roof was crushed, but most of the remaining damage to 
the vehicle only occurred to the exterior body panels. A similar crash involving a Suzuki Grand 
Vitara which also yawed around the front end before tripping is shown in Figure 135.  
A second high-orientation angle rollover crash occurred involving an Isuzu Rodeo, as 
shown in Figure 136. During this crash, as the vehicle descended into the V-ditch, the right-front 
bumper corner engaged the cables. Combined with the large frictional moment from the tires, the 
vehicle tripped with the right-rear corner leading, and made one complete revolution, coming to 
rest on its tires. Most of the damage was concentrated on the right side. 
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Figure 133. Impact at High Orientation Angle with Unbalanced Force Diagram 
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Figure 134. Example Rollover Crash Caused by High Orientation Angle at Impact 
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Figure 135. Second Example Rollover Crash Caused by High Orientation Angle at Impact 
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Figure 136. Third Example Rollover Crash Caused by High Orientation Angle at Impact 
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11.2.2 Contact with Post Rollovers 
The most obvious cause of rollover crashes was attributable to vehicles contacting and 
snagging on posts, which can form trip points. Unlike other types of rollover crashes, vehicle 
contact with posts can accentuate rollover risk for all impacting vehicles, including small cars. 
When comparing vehicle data within each barrier make, lighter vehicles were found to be more 
susceptible to tripping, as shown in Table 34. Mid-size and small passenger cars comprised 24 
out of the 55 rollover crashes caused by post snagging, or 44% of all rollovers involving vehicle 
contact with posts. Furthermore, no large cars were documented with this type of crash result, 
and only six out of the 29  SUV, pickup truck, and van rollovers related to vehicle contact with 
posts had weights over 4,400 lb (1,996 kg).  
Rollovers caused by contact with posts were unique because the rollover initiator was 
wheel snag on a flange or web of the post. Although multiple compounding factors including 
friction contributed to most rollovers, contact with post rollovers also occurred in wet and snowy 
weather when roadside friction was reduced. The occurrence of these types of rollovers in low-
friction conditions indicates that even weak posts can contribute to vehicle instability, which was 
noted historically [53]. Examples of post snag rollover crashes are shown in Figures 137 and 
138.  
Contact with post rollovers were the most sensitive to the make of cable barrier struck, 
since post strengths were critical to facilitating rollover. Post shapes and cable tensions are 
shown in Tables 35 and 36, and the several post section shapes are shown in Figure 139. 
The cumulative rate of vehicle rollover on each system was plotted against calculated 
yield moments about the X and Y axes shown in Figure 139. Bending moments were calculated 
based on the assumption that no torsional warping occurred and that all loading occurred through 
each post section shear center. Scatter in the weak-axis bending moment direction appeared to be 
randomly distributed, as shown in Figure 140. However, a possible correlation was observed 
when rollover frequency was plotted against yield moments about the X direction, as shown in 
Figure 141.  
Considering the large number of factors contributing to rollover events, these results 
suggested that there may be a strong relationship between post strength in bending along an axis 
parallel with the roadway and the frequency of rollover crashes. These results also indicate that 
post bending strengths along axes perpendicular to the roadway (i.e., the Y-axes) do not have a 
strong correlation with rollover frequency.  
Note also that many rollovers occurring due to impacts with Nucor systems were caused 
as posts accumulated in front of the vehicle after being lifted out of the ground or sockets, or 
fracturing at the ground line. As the posts accumulated, the effective strong-axis strength of the 
next downstream post increased. This effect, unique to Nucor systems, may have increased the 
average rate of rollover if the cable-to-post attachment was weaker and if the posts-soil 
interaction was stronger. If the Nucor result followed the trend of the other high-tension cable 
median barrier systems, the expected rollover rate would be between 1.9% and 2.7%. 
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Figure 137. Example of Post Snag Rollover Crash 
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Figure 138. Example of Post Snag Rollover Crash 
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Table 35. Summary of Post Characteristics in High-Tension Cable Guardrail Systems 
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B-119A
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B-141
B-141A
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B-141D
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B-157
B-137
B-137A
B-137A1
B-137B
B-137C (HSA)
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B-137D
B-147A
B-88
B-88
B-88A
B-88B
B-88C
B-88D
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0.188                  
(78364)
0.263                         
(4301)
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(5696 kN-mm)
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(22785)
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(2148)
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(28157)
7.8%
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(27530)
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(6400)
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(31790)
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(10749)
1.285                             
(828)
2.781              
(1157512)
4.7 kip-in.                             
(537 kN-mm)
~3.7%
Predominantly 
TL-3
N/A
4.9%
36               
(250)
35.1                                
(156)
1.670                       
(1077)
2.520               
(1048903)
0.455                  
(189385)
80                                
(552)
36                                
(250)
27.0                    
(120)
0.656                  
(10742)
0.519                  
(11782)
0.606                  
(224800)
1.125                  
(477500)
0.496                          
(8121)
51.6                          
(229)
1.176                   
(717)
36                                
(250)
26.5                          
(117)
1.259                      
(812)
80                                
(552)
66.1                          
(293)
1.423                         
(917)
36                                
(250)
29.0                          
(128)
1.378                      
(888)
2.629                
(1094355)
2.907                
(1209901)
0.641             
(266671)
0.704                  
(11542)
0.615                  
(288554)
1.477                  
(24198)
1.433                  
(596622)
36                                
(250)
31.1                          
(138)
0.226                        
(3704)
1.481                  
(955)
3.359                  
(1398162)
0.562                  
(234088)
1.706                  
(27963)
0.519                     
(8512)
0.142                  
(59271)
1.336                  
(21887)
80                                
(550)
38.9                          
(172)
0.840                        
(541)
0.151                  
(62900)
1.187                  
(19450)
1.595                  
(663706)
1.373                  
(22506)
0.183                       
(2995)
1.421                  
(23285)
0.320                           
(5239)
36                                
(250)
11.1                          
(49)
0.529                       
(341)
1.869               
(778000)
1.491                  
(24436)
60                                
(410)
53.8                          
(239)
1.560                  
(1006)
2.232                  
(929049)
0.382                  
(6251)
2.034                  
(33334)
1.276                  
(20904)
1.688                  
(27654)
3.2%
N/A
39.6 kip-in.                             
(4483 kN-mm)
48.4 kip-in.                             
(5472 kN-mm)
53.2 kip-in.                             
(6050 kN-mm)
48.1 kip-in.                             
(5472 kN-mm)
61.4 kip-in.                             
(6991 kN-mm)
82.4 kip-in.                             
(9227 kN-mm)
42.7 kip-in.                             
(4863 kN-mm)
3.2%                                                 
(~5.6% TL-4 
System)
N/A
5.6%
N/A
1.034              
(430199)
60.5 kip-in.                             
(6883 kN-mm)
52.4 kip-in.                             
(5930 kN-mm)
64.2 kip-in.                             
(7254 kN-mm)
25.4 kip-in.                             
(2886 kN-mm)
8.1 kip-in.                             
(926 kN-mm)
18.7 kip-in.                             
(2128 kN-mm)
76.5 kip-in.                             
(8571 kN-mm)
6.6 kip-in.                             
(749 kN-mm)
14.1 kip-in.                             
(1600 kN-mm)
0.100                  
(41589)
0.646                        
(10593)
0.134                  
(2201)
0.827                        
(13544)
0.273                  
(4467)
0.791                  
(12965)
1.702                  
(27889)
1.858                  
(30447)
1.858                  
(30447)
0.605                           
(9913)
0.802                  
(13141)
0.862                  
(14129)
0.779                  
(17160)
1.338                  
(21931)
B-64
B-64 Sup
B-147
Cable Barrier System
FHWA
Approval Letter
Nucor Steel Marion Inc.
NU-CABLE
B-96
B-96A
B-167
B-183
B-184
B-184A
B-193 Revised
Trinity Highway Safety 
Products, Inc
CASS
Hill & Smith Limited
Brifen Limited
WRSF
B-82
B-82B
B-82B1
B-82C
B-82C1
Gibraltar
Gibraltar Cable Barrier
Safence, Incorporated
Safence Cable Barrier
Low-Tension, 3-Cable 
Median Barrier
Post Installation Option
Post 
Shape
Post Size
(TL-3) Driven Post with 
     Trapezoidal Soil Plate
Socked Post in Concrete
     Base 
U
6 kg/m (4 lb/ft) U-
Channel with 
3/8 in. (10 mm) hole
U
7.5 kg/m (5 lb/ft) U-
Channel with 
3/8 in. (10 mm) hole
In Concrete
Driven
Base-Plated
Driven Sleeve with Notch
Driven Sleeve with
     Soil Plate
C
INP 80
C
0.1575-in. (4-mm) thick 
C-post
Driven Post S
S3x5.7 (S76x8.5) 72-in. 
(1,829-mm) Long
3.96 in. x 1.97 in. x 
0.1575 in. (100 mm x 50 
mmx 4 mm)
S
S4x7.7 (S101x11.5) 
with 11/16 in. (17 mm) 
holes at groundline
Driven Post
Post in Concrete Footer
S/Z
3.93 in. x 1.26 in. x 
0.236 in. (100 mm x 32 
mm x 6 mm)
3.93 in. x 2.17 in. x 
0.179 in. (100 mm x 55 
mm x 4.55 mm)
Driven Post
Socked Post-Rebar Tube
Socked Post withTube 
     in Concrete
C
3.25 in. x 2.5 in. x 0.15 
in. (83 mm x 63 mm x 
3.4 mm) 
slotted tube
Plastic Sleeve in Concrete 
     Footer
Driven Post
I
Post Material Galvanization
Nucor Steel 
Marion Inc 
Grade SP-80
NA
NA
ASTM A 36 ASTM A 123
ASTM A36 A123
ASTM A709 
Grade 36
Galvanized
ASTM A570 
(A1011) Gr 60
ASTM F1043A
A 36 Hot 
Rolled
NA
Cold Rolled 
from A36 
A 123
A 36 Hot 
Rolled
Galvanized
Critical Cross 
Section Area
Critical Moment of 
Inertia 
Critical Moment of 
Inertia 
Plastic Section Modulus Strong Axis 
Bending 
Moment
Weak Axis 
Bending 
Moment
Rollover Rate
Maximum 
Post Shear 
Capacity
Yield Stress
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Table 36. Standard Cable Heights and Tensions 
 
System (in.) (mm) lb kN
15* 381*
21 1/2 546
25 1/2 648
29 1/2 749
15 381
27 686
31 787
35 889
19 483
31 787
38 965
42 1067
20 13/16 529
25  1/8 638
29  7/16 748
20 7/8 530
29 1/2 749
38 1/8 968
19  1/2 495
26 660
26 660
28 3/8 721
18 1/2 470
24 1/2 622
30 1/2 775
36  1/2 927
20 508
25 635
30 762
20 508
30 762
39 991
20 508
25 635
30 762
39 991
18.9 480
24.8 630
30.7 780
36.6 930
18.9 480
22 559
25.2 640
28.3 719
18.9 480
22* 559*
25.2 640
28.3 719
19  5/16 491
30 15/16 786
34 11/16* 881*
38  7/16 976
20 13/16 529
25  1/8 638
29  7/16 748
*Optional cable shown
** 1st, 2nd, and 3rd cables are interwoven between posts
*** Posts are installed on alternating sides of system
Low-Tension, 
3-Cable,
Non-Proprietary
950 4.2
18.94250
21.44800
13.43020
TL-4
TL-3
TL-3
Trinity Highway Safety 
Products, Inc
CASS
Cable Design Tension
at 70ºF (21ºC)
5600 24.9
20.54600
Cable Barrier System
Nucor Steel Marion Inc.
NU-CABLE
Hill & Smith Limited
Brifen Limited
WRSF
Gibraltar
Gibraltar Cable Barrier
Safence, Incorporated
Safence Cable Barrier
TL-4 
I-post
TL-4 
C-post
TL-4
C-post 
MASH on 4:1 
Slope
TL-3
TL-4
TL-3
TL-4
3-Cable
TL-4
4-Cable
TL-3 
Side-Mounted on 
O-posts
Cable Heights
TL-3
TL-4
6:1 Slope or 
Flatter
TL-4
4:1 Slope
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Figure 139. High-Tension Post Section Shapes  
 
Figure 140. Y-Axis Yield Moment Relationship with Rollover Frequency 
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Figure 141. X-Axis Yield Moment Relationship with Rollover Frequency 
11.2.3 Other Rollover Causes 
Several other rollover causes were identified in the research study, although each cause 
was relatively unique. For these remaining rollover crashes, the most frequent rollovers involved 
large vehicles, such as tractor-trailers, buses, or single-unit trucks, as well as vehicles with tow-
behind trailers. The increased rollover frequency for tow-behind units was likely the result of a 
high trailer center-of-gravity with respect to the towing vehicle. For example, the vertical CG 
height of many ½-ton to ¾-ton pickup trucks ranged between 25 and 30 in. (635 to 732 mm), but 
the storage floor height on most tow-behind units was at least the center axle height of the 
vehicle, typically 16 to 18 in. (406 to 457 mm). As a result, tow-behind trailers dramatically 
increased the effective CG height of the towing vehicle.  
In particular, tow-behind camping units were particularly sensitive to rollovers. Over 
60% of all vehicles with tow-behind campers were at least partially involved in a rollover event 
in the database, although trailer-related crashes were infrequent. 
11.3 Discussion 
In general, rollovers occurred less frequently than penetrations. However, this was not 
indicative of the difference in crash severities.  
Rollover crashes increase risk of injury or fatality for the occupants of impacting 
vehicles. Occupants utilizing safety belts experience risk due to large accelerations, occupant 
compartment deformation or intrusion, or an appendage being pinned under the vehicle after 
flailing. Unbelted occupants are at higher risk of fatality due to bouncing and tumbling within the 
interior occupant compartment, as well as during ejection, in addition to the factors affecting 
belted occupants.  
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Rollover crashes contributed to more A+K fatalities than penetration crashes. After a 
vehicle penetrates a cable median barrier and the barrier does not crush the occupant 
compartment or contribute to rollover, then the vehicle can come to a stop in the median without 
causing occupant injury. Penetration crashes resulted in property damage only (PDO) in 73% of 
the crashes, and on average, 7.9% of penetration crashes were severe with the highest injury 
severity of A or K. Using data only from states with complete data sets, 35% of rollover crashes 
had a highest severity of PDO damage, whereas 17.3% resulted in A+K injuries. This indicates 
that, in the event of a rollover, severe crash outcomes are almost twice as likely as if the vehicle 
had penetrated through the barrier. Although prevention of cable median barrier penetrations is 
necessary to reduce the risk of severe crashes with cable median barriers, rollover crashes have 
higher associated severities in general and every effort should be made to mitigate these types of 
crashes.  
High orientation angle crashes tended to promote a chaotic rollover path with combined 
roll and pitch motions. At high speeds, these types of rollovers were more severe on average than 
the other rollover types observed in this database. At lower speeds, more energy was transferred 
to the more energetic roll and pitch motions along the eccentric roll axis, as shown in Figure 133. 
These crashes had lower average severities than for other rollover types. High-orientation angle 
crash fatality risk was 50% greater than median slope fatality risk and nearly twice as likely than 
the risk due to contact with posts.  
One way to reduce rollover propensity is to place the cable median barrier near the center 
of the V-ditch, within 4 ft (1.2 m) of the centerline. Whereas penetrations occurred more 
frequently in ditch centers, particularly in narrow V-ditches, rollovers occurred approximately 
20% less often in ditch centers than anywhere else in the median. Despite these competing 
factors, median centers were associated with the lowest rates of severe and fatal injuries. 
Moreover, penetration crashes are easier to prevent than rollover crashes in general, so factors 
which reduce rollover frequency may still have high benefit-to-cost ratios by reducing overall 
average crash severity even if the countermeasures increase penetration frequency. 
A different method of reducing rollover frequency is to alter cable barrier post design. 
The frequency of rollover events with CASS C-post systems was nominally higher than other 
high-tension barrier systems at 5.6%, but rollover events on CASS systems with weakened 
S4x7.7 posts only resulted in a rollover rate of 3.7%, as shown in Table 35 and Figures 140 and 
141. Strong-axis post strength appeared to be closely related to rollover propensity. 
Unfortunately, this presents a difficult design problem for engineers:  strong posts, with high 
strong-axis bending strengths, had higher rollover frequencies than weak posts with low weak-
axis bending strengths. However, strong posts were able to exert more lateral force on the 
vehicle during redirection, reducing the number of posts damaged in a crash and potentially 
reducing dynamic deflection. This results in a trade-off between rollover mitigation and design 
deflection. 
The Gibraltar dataset was very limited. As such, few conclusions could be made with 
regard to the Gibraltar rollover performance. However, Gibraltar utilized the strongest posts in 
bending about the X-axis. There is cause for concern that crashes with Gibraltar systems may be 
at elevated risk of rollover. Additional investigation with a broader accident database may be 
necessary. 
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12 DISCUSSION 
12.1 Penetration Crashes 
A maximum reduction in penetration crash frequency of 92% could be realized if all 
passenger vehicle penetrations were prevented. Practically, this is impossible due to the wide 
range of possible impact conditions and vehicle profiles the barriers would be subjected to. 
Penetration events can even occur on concrete median barriers, which are frequently cited as a 
replacement for cable median barriers with a history of penetrations leading to cross-median 
crashes. However, many of these penetration crashes can be prevented through improvements in 
barrier design, updated barrier placement guidelines, and by varying cable mounting heights on 
the posts. 
There is a major advantage of high-tension cable median barrier systems over low-
tension systems. Following most impacts on high-tension systems, the cables retain sufficient 
tension to minimize cable drop in the impact region where posts were disengaged from the 
cables. Crashes into low-tension cable median barriers frequently resulted in cable drop after 
impact. Some crashes involved two or more vehicles striking the low-tension cable median 
barrier in succession in Washington, Missouri, and in some non-penetration crashes in North 
Carolina. In many of these crashes, all errant vehicles were captured and redirected. However, 
state DOTs reported that crash sites were unsightly and suggested that any additional crashes at 
the same location could result in increased risk of penetration [23]. Higher-tension systems 
provided some sense of confidence that additional impact events would not result in penetrations.  
The Gibraltar cable barrier system, with wide post spacings up to 30 ft (9.1 m) and 
installed on alternating sides of the cables, may exhibit a higher susceptibility to underride 
penetration crashes. Vehicles impacting at the location of a post on the opposite side of the 
cables can cause complete post disengagement. Although the hairpin cable-to-post attachment 
was relatively strong, as shown in Figure 142, upward vertical bracket release could occur during 
impacts with low-height, sharp-nosed and narrow front-profile vehicles, as shown in Figure 138. 
For posts installed at the approved 20- to 30-ft (6.1- to 9.1-m) spacing, any cable-to-post 
disengagement of a given post would result in a 40- to 60-ft (12.2- to 18.3-m) unsupported cable 
length. With such large unsupported lengths, the barrier may experience an increased penetration 
frequency due to median slopes, low-profile vehicles, or vehicle crashes under non-tracking and 
high-orientation angle impact conditions. If more posts disengage from the cable, unsupported 
cable lengths could render vehicular capture difficult. Furthermore, since lateral cable loads are 
resisted by cable barrier posts, long unsupported lengths could contribute to excessive dynamic 
deflections and low probabilities of capture. Higher cable tensions, which were intended to 
reduce the likelihood of excessive cable deflections, alternatively increase the risk of rollover, 
windshield and window crush, and excessive occupant risk, in addition to increasing the soil 
foundation requirement of the cable anchors. 
Whereas the Gibraltar cable barrier system may be more prone to underride in some crash 
configurations, the vertical release load of the cable-to-post attachment may be sufficiently small 
to prevent override penetrations. Based on a preliminary analysis, the hairpin bracket should 
vertically release away from the posts when posts deflect laterally, and impacts at posts will less 
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frequently cause the cables to be pulled down by the deflected posts. More analysis will be 
necessary to conclusively determine the accuracy of this estimate. 
12.2 Rollover Crashes 
Rollover crashes were more severe than penetration crashes on average; since, most 
penetration crashes involved vehicles coming to rest in the median with only property damage. 
Severe penetration events were limited to crashes in which the occupant compartment was 
deformed, barrier elements protruded into the compartment, or impacting vehicles were involved 
in a cross-median crash. Rollover crashes much less frequently resulted in property damage only. 
Low-speed, short-distance rollover events could also be severe if an occupant was ejected from 
the vehicle. 
The cable entrapment within the vertical slots of the CASS barrier was found to 
contribute to penetration propensity when impacts at posts applied downward forces on the 
cables, preventing vertical cable release. This effectively created a ramp to allow the impacting 
vehicle to pass over the top of the barrier, which also was associated with a high rollover 
frequency.  
The weakened S-posts utilized in the CASS TL-3 and CASS TL-4 systems was 
correlated with a decrease in rollover rates. Penetration frequency was unchanged for these posts. 
The major difference between the CASS C-shaped posts and the CASS S4x7.7 (S102x11.5) 
posts was a significant reduction in strong-axis post strength. Since the weakened/modified posts 
were nominally more flexible at the ground line and yielded at lower loads under the same 
impact conditions, the posts could not sustain lateral forces sufficient to cause rollover. This 
proprietary design was reflective of the improvement that can be obtained by weakening a 
nominally strong post section in terms of its strong-axis bending capacity. Note that the Nucor 
flanged U-channel posts are not installed with the strong axis parallel with the roadway, and thus 
strong-axis weakening is not expected to have a significant effect on rollover propensity. 
Although this improvement would likely assist other cable median barrier systems, untested post 
modifications are not recommended for use in any barrier system. 
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Figure 142. Gibraltar System Details, TL-3 System [54] 
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12.3 Barrier Placement and Median Grading 
As stated in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.4, barriers placed in medians wider than 40 ft (12 m) 
had optimal performance when installed near the center of 6:1 or 8:1 V-ditches. Penetration 
crashes were reduced from over 10% on slopes flatter than 10:1 or steeper than 5:1 to less than 
8% on slopes ranging between 9:1 and 6:1. Likewise, rollover frequency decreased from over 
5% for slopes flatter than 8:1 and steeper than 4:1 to approximately 1% on slopes ranging 
between 7:1 and 5:1. However, barriers placed in narrow medians may not experience the same 
safety benefits observed in wide medians. Current standards are under development to establish 
meaningful crash testing procedures for evaluating barriers installed within relatively narrow, 
sloped median ditches [20]. However, crashes into systems installed in narrow, flat medians are 
expected to have very similar outcomes to crashes into systems with wide, flat shoulders. 
Many studies have been performed to determine optimum barrier placement within 
medians located between divided highways [e.g. 26-28]. From these studies, the optimum 
location for placing a cable median barrier is at or near the center of the V-ditch in order to 
prevent the maximum number of nuisance impacts. Unfortunately, this barrier placement poses 
problems for state DOTs in terms of erosion control and mowing concerns, as cited by most of 
the states surveyed in this study. Most states prohibited the installation of cable median barrier 
within 1 to 8 ft (0.3 to 2.4 m) of the center of the ditch, which was consistent with placement 
guidance provided by FHWA. Barriers located near the center of depressed medians can cause 
increased difficulty with the maintenance and repair work of damaged cable barriers. In addition, 
post socketed and end anchor foundations may require greater depths, diameters, and/or 
reinforcement as the ditch bottom generally has a higher moisture content than the adjacent 
median slopes. 
In response to these concerns, state design practice has historically tended toward 
installing cable median barrier close to one or both of the two shoulders, or on an approach slope 
or back slope as far away as possible from the travel lanes. Barrier placement alternatives were 
determined from full-scale crash testing results. In addition, state DOTs have historically 
installed cable median barriers near shoulders and on 6:1 or flatter slopes based on successful 
crash testing of barriers installed on level terrain. 
Unfortunately, systems installed near shoulders were more likely to be associated with a 
severe crash than installations near the center of the median, as discussed in Chapter 5, Section 
5.2.7. Approximately 15% of the crashes occurring with cable median barriers located on 
shoulders near the travel way were severe, although the sample size was relatively small. The 
severe crash rate was 4.4% for all crashes occurring further than 4 ft (1.2 m) from the center of 
the median. In contrast, the severe crash rate for barriers installed near the center of the median 
was 1.6%. Penetration frequency was 5.6% higher for barriers installed near the center of the 
median than on approach or back slopes, but rollover frequency was 1.2% lower for this same 
comparison. However, these conclusions applied to medians wider than 40 ft (12.2 m). 
Flat medians enabled errant vehicles to oversteer and increase CG trajectory angles 
before crashing into the barrier. As the CG trajectory and orientation angles at impact increased, 
the likelihood of penetration or rollover increased as well. These roadside/median encroachments 
were usually caused by avoidance maneuvers or panic reactions to on-road conditions and/or 
situations. 
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Steeper median slopes can allow errant vehicles to launch into the air beyond the slope 
break point and potentially vault over a barrier. As a result, it would seem reasonable that the 
distributions of CG trajectory impact angles and impact speeds for barriers installed near 
shoulders as well as near V-ditch centers would be similar, although bumper and hood heights 
with respect to the barrier may not be similar. Higher-speed impact events were found to increase 
the severity of those crashes. Crash severity was also increased when vehicles were redirected 
back into adjacent travel lanes. In addition, vehicle redirection into adjacent travel lanes was 
more common when barriers were installed near median shoulders as compared to median 
centers. 
Barriers installed near median centers significantly reduced the risk of re-entering 
adjacent travel lanes and potentially striking adjacent vehicles. Vehicles, which departed the road 
at low angles and were able to regain control, were also less likely to crash into the barrier, thus 
decreasing both nuisance hits and severe crash frequency. If barrier placement is not feasible 
near the center of divided highways, it is recommended that barrier placement occur as far as 
reasonably possible away from travel lanes using taller, more robust barrier systems.  
The symmetric 6:1 V-ditch configuration also reduced the risk of override relative to 
steeper median slopes due to reduced propensity for “bounce-over”. As a vehicle was projected 
over the SBP and onto the front slope of a median, there was a physical separation which 
occurred between the nominal and actual bumper height positions above the ground [27-28]. The 
difference between actual and expected bumper positions in a crash increased with slope 
steepness. Steep-sloped ditches not only promoted override conditions due to vehicular 
launching over the SBP, but there was also a risk of the vehicle contacting the front slope and 
redirecting up the back slope, causing a redirective “leap” into or potentially over the barrier.  
A risk analysis was conducted based on median terrain to determine bounce-over 
likelihood in 6:1 V-ditches wider than 40 ft (12.2 m). When allowing for a 20% difference 
between observed and actual bounce-over frequencies, vehicles were over 10 times more likely 
to underride the barrier than to vault over the barrier on slopes of 6:1 or flatter. Medians with 4:1 
slopes more commonly resulted in “bounce-over” penetrations and overrides. 
Some recommendations have been made regarding critical barrier placement in medians 
when considering the NCHRP Report No. 350 and MASH impact safety standards [28]. 
However, most prior crash testing studies were conducted using the NCHRP Report No. 350 or 
MASH crash test conditions at roadside departure. Due to the wide distribution of crash speeds, 
CG trajectory and orientation angles, and median slopes on a given section of road, barrier 
placement recommendations must be broad and incorporate a large spectrum of possible vehicle 
crash conditions.  
All median barriers are roadside objects, and crashes with any roadside object can 
potentially pose a risk to occupants of errant vehicles. It was noted that for high-tension cable 
barrier systems, more than 50% of all severe injuries or fatalities were not caused by rollovers or 
penetrations. Even for low-tension cable barrier systems, the barrier-related A+K crashes 
constituted 30% of all serious or fatal crashes. As such, it is believed that a reduction in nuisance 
crashes into cable median barrier can also dramatically decrease the frequency of serious 
vehicle-to-barrier crashes. 
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12.4 Full-Scale Crash Testing 
12.4.1 Background 
Full-scale crash testing guidelines have advanced significantly since the introduction of 
such documents as NCHRP Report No. 153 [55] and the Transportation Research Circular 
(TRC) No. 191 [56]. Prior to the acceptance of NCHRP Report No. 230 [57] in 1981, crash 
testing was largely conducted ad hoc and according to engineering judgment. Standardized 
testing vehicles and impact conditions were required according to the criteria presented in 
NCHRP Report 230, but those guidelines were based on historical estimates of the practical 
worst-case impact scenarios, using subcompact small cars and large sedans as test vehicles. 
As the number of light trucks and utility vehicles increased in the late 1980s, it became 
apparent that updates to the crash testing criteria were necessary. With the introduction and 
acceptance of crash testing criteria proposed in NCHRP Report No. 350 in 1993 [31], the 
standardized vehicles used to evaluate roadside appurtances at any test level were changed to an 
1,808-lb (820-kg) 820C small car and a 4,409-lb (2,000-kg) 2000P pickup truck. These vehicles 
were selected for several reasons:  (1) the small car had a low mass and front hood height, which 
could increase risk to occupants due to high decelerations, occupant compartment deformation, 
or underride; (2) the larger and heavier 2000P vehicle was useful for testing structural adequacy 
of roadside appurtances; and (3) the 2000P pickup truck was susceptible to instability, even 
rollover. These guidelines remained in effect for well over a decade, until MASH was accepted 
in 2009 [24]. 
With the introduction of MASH, criteria for conducting and evaluating full-scale crash 
tests were proposed based on real-world studies of more than 890 run-off-road crashes [22]. 
Vehicle selection was determined based on the 2nd and 95th percentile vehicles purchased in the 
United States based on data collected from vehicle sales between 2000 and 2004. A 5,000-lb 
(2,268-kg) 2270P pickup truck and a 2,425-lb (1,100-kg) 1100C small car were chosen as the 
most representative vehicles using similar arguments as were used following the acceptance of 
NCHRP Report No. 350. An optional mid-size 1500A vehicle weighing approximately 3,300 lb 
(1,497 kg) was also proposed if it was believed that barrier systems would be susceptible to 
crashes with this sedan-type vehicle. 
12.4.2 Crash Observations  
The vehicles selected for use in full-scale crash testing according to the criteria presented 
in NCHRP Report No. 350 and MASH were not selected based on a historically poor 
performance with certain systems. As a result, crash tests have rarely been conducted with the 
most critical vehicle types or crash conditions.  
It has been frequently stated that the increased scrutiny applied to cable median barriers 
examined in this study places the barriers at competitive disadvantage with respect to other 
barrier systems. However, cable median barriers were the only barriers which show favorable 
performance on 6:1 slopes, and have the potential for application in steeper slopes. Cable median 
barriers will continue to be less expensive to manufacture and install in divided medians than 
other median barrier types. If the concerns addressed in this study are satisfactorily addressed, 
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the associated reduction in severe crash risk would make cable median barriers the safest barriers 
available for use on divided roadways.  
Furthermore, this study should be used as a springboard to apply this type of system-
specific analysis to other barrier systems en route to more specific, comprehensive guidelines for 
roadside safety appurtance testing that can accurately predict worst-case scenarios and prevent 
serious crash occurrences. Without sufficient scrutiny applied to barrier system containment 
failures and methods to prevent such events from being propagated, it will be impossible to 
reduce the current rate of roadside fatalities with any meaningful and purposeful direction. In 
time, all barrier systems should be subjected to scrutiny on a crash-by-crash basis. 
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13 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Cable median barrier crash data were collected from 12 state DOTs and analyzed to 
determine mechanisms of cable median barrier containment failures resulting in penetration and 
rollover crashes. It was determined that the composite rate of passenger vehicle penetration 
through cable median barriers was approximately 9.9%, and rollover occurrence was 
approximately 8.1%. Causation was also identified, and the crash database was segregated by 
predominant failure mechanism contributing to barrier penetration or rollover. By creating 
categories of penetration-related and rollover-related containment failures, the mutually 
exclusive rates of penetration and rollover were determined to be 9.3% and 5.1%, respectively. 
This observation led to a composite CMB containment failure rate of 14.6%.  
Adverse weather conditions were determined to significantly reduce the propensity for 
rollover and penetration crash frequency. Barrier penetration and rollover rates were decreased 
by approximately 35% and 70%, respectively, during rain or snow precipitation. However, when 
roads were wet or snow-covered, penetration propensity was decreased by 6% and 49%, 
respectively, and rollover frequency was reduced by 76% and 47%, respectively. It is evident 
that friction has a significant effect on crash outcome in both penetration and rollover crashes. It 
was likely that the frictional contribution from adverse weather events decreased CG trajectory 
angle into the barrier, which in turn reduced the IS value of the crash during storms. The rate of 
penetration after storms was very similar to dry conditions, since vehicles returned to nominal 
travel speeds. Lower IS values at the time of impact somewhat reduced the likelihood of rollover 
and penetration. As a result, standard crash test conditions should not be altered from the 
nominally dry condition used in full-scale cable median barrier crash tests. 
CG trajectory and orientation angles at impact were explored through a limited study of 
severe cable median barrier crashes in the state of Missouri. The high rate of high CG trajectory 
and orientation angle impacts in the severe crash database indicated a need to evaluate cable 
median barriers at higher CG trajectory and orientation angles. The 85th percentile impact 
condition for severe cable median barrier crashes was 39 degrees relative to a tangent line on the 
barrier. The currently-used 25 degree angle into cable median barrier installations only 
corresponds to the 70th percentile CG trajectory angle. Severe crash databases have historically 
been used to determine the “practical worst-case” impact conditions. These results are consistent 
with methods used in NCHRP Report 665 [22]. 
The performance of each barrier system was not equal, but there was also no “silver 
bullet” cable median barrier system. It was determined that the cable median barrier type with 
the lowest rate of A+K crashes was the low-tension 3-cable median barrier. The lowest rate of 
severity of high-tension systems occurred on the Safence 4-cable median barrier; however, only 
one other TL-4 barrier was evaluated in detail. Of the TL-3 high-tension cable median barriers 
evaluated, the Brifen WRSF had the lowest A+K ratio for crashes. The highest frequency of 
A+K injuries was observed with the Nucor 3-cable median barrier. With respect to only 
fatalities, both Nucor and Brifen systems were involved in fewer fatality crashes than with the 
Trinity CASS system, which was strongly related to the increased rate of rollovers.  
Insufficient information was present to make definitive conclusions about the Gibraltar or 
Safence systems. The limited data available for Gibraltar systems suggested a high rate of 
rollover crashes, which was consistent with the rollover model shown in Figure 141.  
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Crash severities were related with containment failure rates, but the correlation was 
limited. Although many fatalities occurring with cable median barriers were caused by cross-
median impacts or rollovers, other fatalities and serious injuries occurred in capture or 
redirection crashes. The highest correlation of containment failure with crash severity occurred 
with the 3-cable median barrier, with nearly 70% of all fatalities and serious injuries related to 
either rollover or penetration. If containment failures were equally reduced for every barrier 
system, the system with the highest expected rate of severe crash reduction would be the low-
tension, 3-cable median barrier. 
Penetration mechanisms were discussed in detail, and causes of penetrations were 
determined and analyzed for each system. The penetration mechanisms were classified into 
fundamental groupings:  diving, prying, override, bounce-over, system failure, and large vehicle 
penetration events. Of these, the diving and prying penetrations were common on every cable 
median barrier system, while override penetrations were common on CASS and Nucor systems. 
Generic cable median barrier crashes had the fewest number of override events, likely because of 
the weak top cable-to-post connection, and insufficient data were available to make deterministic 
conclusions about override penetrations for Brifen, Gibraltar, or Safence systems. Based on the 
analysis of penetration mechanisms, higher bottom cable tension, lower top cable tension, 
stronger bottom cable-to-post connections, and weaker top cable-to-post connections were 
recommended.  
Furthermore, it was noted that every future TL-3 cable median barrier system transition 
may require the use of 4 cables, with the bottom cable located approximately 13 to 15 in. (330 to 
381 mm) above the ground. The bottom cable should have strong resistance to lifting on the post, 
but must be safely overridden when vehicles pass over the cable. To reduce the propensity for 
override penetrations, the top cable should be located a minimum of 35 in. (889 mm) above the 
ground.  
Short post spacing was not strongly correlated with increased resistance to penetration. 
The smallest post spacing observed in the database was located in Missouri on a stretch of low-
tension, 3-cable median barrier. For approximately 1 mi (1.6 km) of barrier, the post spacing was 
reduced to 4 to 6 ft (1.2 to 1.8 m) on center. The barrier was located adjacent to one shoulder and 
protected vehicles from entering a median with estimated 4:1 slope. However, two severe 
penetrations still occurred in this segment in a three-year period, both from the vehicles in 
adjacent travel lanes. If post spacing alone could prevent penetrations, it is statistically unlikely 
that a barrier with this small post spacing would encounter two severe penetration crashes in a 1-
mi (1.6-km) stretch of roadway in only three years. As a result, it is unlikely that the reduced 
post spacing utilized on the low-tension, 3-cable median barrier can prevent penetration crashes 
without additional modifications, such as stronger cable-to-post attachments. 
Some systems, such as Brifen WRSF and Gibraltar, rely on cable engagement with the 
flanges of adjacent posts in addition to or in lieu of strong cable-to-post attachments. In these 
systems, post spacing may have a more significant effect on penetration propensity than in the 
low-tension, 3-cable median barrier.  
Rollover causes were also explored in detail. Whereas penetration events tended to occur 
in similar patterns based on barrier type, rollover events were similarly irrespective to barrier 
type. Rollovers which occurred on cable median barriers were most commonly caused by 
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interaction with median slopes, high orientation angles at impact, or tripping on post members. 
Several other factors, such as trailer attachments and tire loss, were also briefly discussed. 
However, it would be infeasible to uniquely accommodate most of these infrequent rollover 
causes. As with penetration events, rollovers caused by impacts with large vehicles were not 
addressed, since no barriers in this study were designed to accommodate semi-tractor trailers.  
Barrier improvements to reduce risk of rollover included the use of weak collapsing 
posts, reduced overall cable tensions or differential cable tension, and graded medians which 
favor moderate (i.e., 6:1 to 8:1) slopes for medians of 40 ft (12 m) or wider. 
Cable median barrier installations are being erected annually at a rapid pace. Many cable 
median barrier systems resulted in reductions in severe injury and fatal crashes due to cross-
median crash reduction. Nonetheless, modifications to full-scale testing conditions, barrier 
design, and roadside design must be made to ensure optimal performance of each barrier system. 
By implementing these design changes, it is expected that at least 50% of all cable median 
barrier related severe crashes could be mitigated, and that penetration rate by passenger cars 
could be reduced by as much as 80%. 
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14 RECOMMENDATIONS 
14.1 Modifications to Barrier Designs 
14.1.1 Cable-to-Post Attachments and Vertical Positions 
An untested design concept has been proposed by researchers to address cable median 
barrier containment failures and involves a stratification of cable-to-post attachment strengths for 
high-tension cable median barrier systems. The stratification methodology is an attempt to 
reconcile post strength, post bending moment, vehicle geometry, vehicle crush strength, and 
principles of controlled redirection via energetically-favorable capture zones on the vehicle for 
optimum redirection performance for any barrier, whether located in a V-ditch or on flat ground. 
This design methodology would implement low-tension cables with low-strength cable-to-post 
attachments at the tops of the posts to minimize risk of excessively damaging the occupant 
compartments of small cars involved in cable barrier crashes. The upper vertical cable release 
loads should be low to prevent roof crush. Likewise, the upper horizontal cable release loads 
could be less than or equal to the load required to form a plastic hinge in the base of the post. 
Using this design principle, the top cable-to-post connection would be the weakest, but vehicles 
could still be redirected with a single, top cable.  
The bottom cable on the posts could likewise have cable release loads which is 
proportional to the load required to initiate plastic hinge formation at the base of the post and 
should be located no higher than 15 in. (381 mm) from the ground. The vertical resistance for the 
bottom cable to be pushed down should be lower than vertical cable resistance to rising up the 
post flange. Because of the low bottom cable height and resistance to vertical uplift, underride 
events will be less likely. Furthermore, most windshield crown heights are at least 24 in. (610 
mm) above the ground. As such, there is little risk of impacting vehicles to dive in the median 
and underride the bottom cable if it is located no higher than 15 in. (381 mm) and if the cable has 
a strong resistance to vertical rise. Fundamentals of this design concept are already being utilized 
in some high-tension cable barrier systems, but potential improvements to energy absorption 
through cable-to-post attachments, post strength, and post spacing can be made for every system.  
The design concept is shown schematically in Figure 143.  
Low-tension, 3-cable median barrier systems sustained the lowest frequency of large 
orientation angle-related rollovers but the highest number of post snagging related rollovers. This 
reduction is likely due to the lower cable tension and resulting lower lateral force on the vehicles 
applied by the cables. Common S3x5.7 (S76x8.5) post sections used with low-tension cable 
median barrier systems should be weakened, and improved cable-to-post connections should be 
utilized in order to experience a significant improvement in safety performance. Bottom cable-
to-post attachments permitted frequent underrides and occasionally through-cable penetrations. 
Both of these penetration types would be significantly reduced if the bottom cable-to-post 
attachment was strengthened. The top cable-to-post attachment appeared to be optimal for the 
low-tension, 3-cable median barrier since overrides were infrequent on this system. This cable-
to-post attachment strength should be evaluated based on cable tension and height above the 
ground. Note that the nominal mounting height for the top cable in all low-tension, 3-cable 
median barrier systems in this study was 33 in. (838 mm). 
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Figure 143. Cable Median Barrier Stratification Concept 
14.1.2 Cable Tension 
One design alteration, which may alleviate some rollover propensity caused by high-
orientation angle crashes into high-tension cable barrier systems, is to reduce cable tension. A 
reduction in cable tension would decrease the lateral force imparted to a vehicle at the point of 
impact. Vehicles entering a V-ditch frequently have a pitch and roll displacement associated with 
the angled orientation in the ditch. As a result, interaction with cables in the ditch may cause an 
increased trip propensity due to roll and pitch moments imparted to the vehicle by the cables. 
Lower cable tension would permit a more gradual cable engagement with the vehicle and thus 
may reduce rollover propensity. 
14.1.3 Number of Cables 
One design improvement which would aid a low-tension, 3-cable, TL-3 median barrier 
system would be the addition of a fourth cable. The added cost of the fourth cable is an initial 
fixed cost which would not greatly increase annual maintenance costs associated with barrier 
repair. However, the anticipated safety improvement obtained by considering an additional cable 
is expected to be very high. Cost savings due to reduction in severe injuries and fatalities should 
far exceed the increased cost that the additional cable would add to system installations, as 
discussed in Chapter 10.  
In steeply-sloped medians or to reduce the rate of tractor-trailer penetrations, a fifth cable 
should be considered for every cable median barrier system. 
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14.1.4 Summary of Design Improvements 
Several cable design improvements for cable barriers are recommended for further 
evaluation and are shown in Table 37.  
Table 37. Summary of Barrier Design Improvement Recommendations 
 
Barrier System Component Problem Recommended Design Improvements
Cable to Post 
Attachments
Strong attachment prevents cable release after post 
is struck or deflects, causing continued engagement 
and post pullout from the ground or post fracture.
Eliminate nut from upper and middle clips. Redesign lower clip to 
release at a load near to the bending capacity of the post.
Post Embedment Frequent post pullout from ground or sockets.
Extend embedment depth to optimum length determined by 
component testing. Deepen embedment in socket to optimum length 
determined by component testing. 
Cable Heights
Insufficient number of cables to prevent 
penetrations.
Increase the standard number of cables in the TL-3 design to 4. 
Place the top cable at least 35 to 38 in. (890 to 965 mm) above 
ground, and the bottom cable at approximately 13 to 15 in. (330 to 
381 mm).
C-Shape Posts Frequently contribute to rollover.
Drill weakening holes at ground line in corners of post to facilitate 
post collapse and reduce the strong-axis yield moment. Consider 
breakaway alternative instead of post deformation as primary failure 
mechanism.
Post Slot
If vehicles make first contact with post instead of 
cables, posts can be pushed down while still retaining 
cables, increasing rollover propensity.
Weaken the flange or web via slot or saw cut adjacent to middle or 
upper cable(s) to reduce risk of posts pushing cables downward.
Cable Spacer
Vehicles which "dive" under cables are subjected to 
large vertical loads which can crush occupant 
compartments or increase ridedown accelerations.
Add additional bottom cable to prevent underride. Consider 
independent cable suspension within the slot or removal of at least 
one cable from the slot.
Cable to Post 
Attachments
Bottom cable attachments using "roller" to maintain 
cable height contributes to diving and prying 
underride failures.
Add physical attachment to resist vertical displacement of bottom 
cable. Lower bottom cable height to 13 to 15 in. (330 to 381 mm) to 
reduce underride potential. Vertically separate 2nd and 3rd cables in 
TL-3 system.
Cable Weave
Cable weave on bottom cable has contributed to 
rollover when wheel on impact side of vehicle 
overrides cable and causes pinch point at post.
Consider eliminating bottom cable weave or reduce height of bottom 
cable.
Override Large passenger vehicles can override system. Increase height of top cable in TL-3 system.
C-Shape Posts
Post Slot
Cable Spacer
Post Spacing
Large post spacing significantly increases risk of 
penetration by reducing lateral constraints on cables.
Decrease standard post spacing. Limit maximum post spacing to 10 
ft (3.0 m) on centers.
Cable Hangar
Cable hangar can be pried upward, lifting all cables 
up and releasing them from the post, contributing to 
override.
Cable attachments should be independent, to allow cables to release 
from posts without adversely affecting all other cables.
Alternating Posts
Impacts at back sides of posts entrap cables and 
create ramps, facilitating rollover and penetration.
Prevent impacts centered on the back sides of posts from pushing 
cables downward.
Post Strength
Tube post section does not completely collapse on 
weak-axis impact and forms ramp contributing to 
rollover.
Add weakening element to tube posts to completely collapse after 
impact.
Cable to Post 
Attachments
Bottom and middle cables release from posts at low 
loads, causing extensive cable displacements when 
one cable redirects vehicle, and can increase 
penetration propensity.
Increase bottom and middle cable pullout load vertically and 
horizontally. Consider use of a retrofit strengthener which adds 
pullout resistance.
Cable Heights
Barrier is susceptible to diving and prying underride 
failures.
Add fourth cable between 13 and 15 in. (330 to 381 mm). Apply 
stronger cable-to-post connection resisting vertical uplift and back 
side pullout.
Post Strength Post strength frequently contributes to rollover.
Slot, cut, or alter posts to make weaker. Apply weaked tube or pipe-
section posts which will flatten completely when impacted.
See comments on Trinity CASS.Similar concern as Trinity CASS.
Low-Tension 3-Cable 
Median Barrier
Gibraltar
Nucor NU-CABLE
Trinity CASS
Brifen WRSF
Blue Systems Safence
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14.2 Barrier Placement in Medians 
Many medians have slopes which may vary widely, even within a section spanning only 
one mile (1.6 km). As such, it is impossible to know a priori the actual slope in front of or 
behind a barrier before it is installed in the median. Thus, every barrier system should be crash 
tested and evaluated on the front and back slopes of a 4:1 V-ditch in the most critical 
configurations, which were determined and are discussed in Reference 20. Crash testing on the 
4:1 slope or in a narrow 6:1 V-ditch may still be necessary if it is recommended for use on slopes 
shallower than or equal to 6:1 because of median geometry variations. These matrices should 
more adequately ensure that cable barriers can accommodate errant vehicles traversing sloped 
medians under tracking conditions.  
Note that placing cable median barriers along both shoulders will not necessarily prevent 
all penetrations, cross-median crashes, or rollovers. Penetration crashes were nearly as common 
when barriers were impacted at the shoulders as occurred in the center of the ditch. Rollover 
crashes commonly occurred with low CG trajectory angles but high orientation angles. Rollover 
frequency was also greater when cable barriers were located adjacent to shoulders than in other 
locations since roadways typically have higher-friction surfaces which can increase the tripping 
moment on the vehicle and cause larger changes in CG trajectory angle with the same steering 
input applied. Whenever convenient, it is recommended that cable median barriers be placed as 
close to the center of the median as possible. 
14.3 Full-Scale Crash Testing 
14.3.1 Full-Scale Crash Testing on Slopes 
Due to the wide range of possible impact conditions which could occur on any cable 
median barrier, a variety of underride and override barrier impact conditions should be 
considered likely unless impacts with similar conditions cannot be observed with regular 
frequency in real-world crash databases. Override penetrations, underride penetrations, and 
rollovers were observed for barrier systems regardless of approach slope, back slope, and median 
placement. Using crash data as indicators, it will likely be necessary to utilize much of the crash-
testing matrix recommended in Reference 20. Testing in accordance with these matrices will 
likely prevent many future penetration and rollover crashes. 
14.3.2 Impact Conditions 
Based on the impact conditions observed in this report, the 85th percentile CG trajectory 
angle involved in serious cable median barrier crashes was 39 degrees. Since the severe crashes 
followed the trend of all penetration crashes, based on the observation of Missouri and North 
Carolina data, full-scale crash testing to evaluate propensity for penetrations should be conducted 
at the higher CG trajectory angle of 39 degrees in future testing.  
Based on the plot of impact angle shown in Figure 11, many rollovers in Missouri were 
observed when the initial orientation angle was approximately 45 degrees. In fact, the only 
severe crashes which occurred with orientation angles between 35 and 55 degrees were either 
penetration or rollover crashes. An orientation angle of 45 degrees is recommended for full-scale 
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crash testing, since crashes occurring at CG trajectory angles greater than 10 degrees were 
frequently oversteering crashes. 
In order to test system susceptibility to low-CG trajectory angle, high-orientation angle 
crashes with SUV and light truck vehicles, the 50th percentile CG trajectory angle of 18 degrees 
is recommended. This angle is lower than the current 25-degree angle used in full-scale crash 
testing, but it should still be representative of a practical worst-case impact condition when 
combined with the 45-degree orientation angle. 
The currently-used impact speed of 62.1 mph (100.0 km/h) appeared to be representative 
of the 85th percentile condition, although an actual speed distribution was not available. Impact 
speed estimates in each crash were provided by responding officers in Ohio. The median 
estimated impact speed was 60 mph (97 km/h), and the average estimated impact speed was 58.1 
mph (93.5 km/h). Furthermore, the speed limit on interstates in Ohio was only 65 mph (105 
km/h). This data suggested that impact speeds used in full-scale crash testing should not be 
reduced. 
14.3.3 Vehicle Selection 
The crash testing of cable barrier systems according to the TL-3 test criteria found in 
NCHRP Report No. 350 may not have been tested with the most critical vehicles. Although it 
may be argued that the 2000P pickup truck used in NCHRP 350 crash testing is critical based on 
vehicle analysis results, barrier systems should also be evaluated with widely-purchased vehicles 
which have the greatest propensity to cause barrier failure. Many of the vehicles shown in Table 
28 are no longer being produced. As a result, an analysis of newer vehicle features consistent 
with the critical features identified in Chapter 7 should provide guidance for future vehicle crash 
testing efforts. 
Very few small car crash tests have been conducted under recent impact safety standards 
on cable barrier systems. These crashes were not believed to be critical. Based on crash data 
collected in this study, small car crashes were only critical if an occupant made contact with the 
barrier, the vehicle penetrated over, under, or through the system, if cables crushed the occupant 
compartment or caused rapid decelerations, or if the vehicle tripped and rolled over. All of these 
conditions were infrequent in the available database of real-world cable barrier crashes. A small 
car test would likely waste valuable research money without providing much critical barrier 
performance insight. 
14.3.4 Summary of Full-Scale Crash Testing Recommendations 
The recommended impact conditions for consideration in future full-scale crash testing of 
cable median barriers are shown in Table 38.  
These crash tests are recommended to replace the current TL-3 MASH crash test nos. 3-
10 and 3-11 which are required for cable barrier systems and should be conducted on level, flat 
terrain unless otherwise specified. These tests are intended to supplement V-ditch testing of cable 
median barriers [20].  
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However, current limitations on crash testing procedures may limit the ability of agencies 
to conduct non-tracking and partially-skidding crash tests. Until the necessary apparatus are 
developed to conduct crash testing with the recommended impact conditions, full-scale crash 
tests should be conducted at the CG trajectory angles identified in Table 38 and in fully-tracking 
conditions. Additional research to develop crash testing apparatus to conduct full-scale crash 
tests with off-tracking conditions will be necessary. 
If the roadside safety community intends to reduce the number and frequency of cable 
median barrier containment failures, updates to existing testing criteria should be considered to 
reflect the more realistic “practical worst-case” impact scenarios. Whereas data per each system 
were not historically available, better data are now available to guide the redesign of systems to 
obtain the maximum possible safety improvement. The matrix provided in Table 38 is expected 
to cover the most critical crash conditions. Test no. 3-10A may incorporate a small car if a small 
car is shown to be most critical, but currently there is no plan to incorporate a separate crash test 
specifically for small cars. 
Table 38. Recommended Crash Testing Impact Conditions for Cable Median Barriers 
 
 
Figure 144. Representative Crash Testing Impact Diagram 
Test No.
Impact Speed, 
V (mph)
CG Trajectory 
Angle, φ (deg)
Orientation 
Angle, ϴ (deg)
Vehicle Class Description
3-10A 62.1 39 45 Passenger Car
Passenger car penetration prying/underride test. Impact 
should occur 2 ft (0.6 m) downstream of post. 
Recommended vehicles include:  Acura Integra, 
Chevrolet Impala, Chevrolet Lumina, Dodge Intrepid, 
Ford Escort, Ford Taurus (model years before 2008), 
Honda Accord, or Subaru Impreza.
3-11A 62.1 39 45
SUV, Pickup 
Truck, or 
Commercial Van
High-angle override test. Impact should be 4 in. (102 
mm) upstream of post. Recommended vehicles include 
Chevrolet Blazer, Ford Explorer, Ford Escape, Toyota 
4Runner, Toyota Tundra, or commercial van vehicles.
3-11B 62.1 7 7
SUV, Pickup 
Truck, or 
Commercial Van
Low-angle override test. Should be conducted in ditch on 
6:1 approach slope. Vehicles should be similar to those in 
test 3-11A.
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